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Waging the War on Wars:  
Feminist Ways Forward
Swati Parashar, Professor in Peace and Development, 
Gothenburg University, Sweden
Amidst the pandemic shutdown, this book came like a breath of fresh 
air. It has now become commonplace to think of the pandemic in 
terms of war, using the war metaphor to describe ‘combating’ the 
novel coronavirus and winning a decisive victory against it. While 
public health has now become a military campaign, actual wars 
happening out there (Yemen, Syria, Afghanistan and elsewhere) have 
been normalised to such an extent that unless the violence exceeds 
past statistics, they escape public scrutiny and attention. In these 
times, when we have accepted the realities and the discourses of war, 
removed the tag of exceptionalism and adopted its vocabulary in 
everyday parlance, to turn to the question of feminist solutions to 
ending war seems both exhilarating and daunting. The editors of this 
volume and the chapter authors have created a unique opportunity 
for us to centre, once again, the politics of hope in reimagining a 
world without the relevance and spectacle of wars. This reimagin-
ing is enabled through a recognition of differences in feminist 
knowledges, epistemologies and methods, in our understandings of 
wars as gendered violent encounters that have dominated most of 
human history.
First, this book raises an important question: what do we think of 
as war and what are its most compelling stories and memorialisa-
tions? War is an unaesthetic, cruel, violent and occasionally even 
redeeming activity for participants, victims, survivors and observers 
alike. It remains one of the most theorised and researched activities 
in politics, International Relations (IR) and cognate disciplines. War 
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captures distinctive social formations, and foregrounds imagined 
communities and emotional orders, lived experiences, performing 
bodies and their relationship with one another. Feminists have 
intimate knowledge about the injuries of war and myths that 
perpetuate it. If it were not for feminist research and activism, we 
would not know the gendered seduction and emotions of war, or the 
sustained myths about its inevitability, its (dis)honourable codes of 
conduct, performativity, multiple forms of violence within violence, 
patriarchal dividends and quality of redemption. Our levels of analysis 
would not have gone beyond the state and international system to 
include complex war narratives, memory politics and the spotlight 
on warring bodies, who know more about wars than our minds know 
about them. We would not have a sense of our own embeddedness 
in wars ‘out there’, as consumers of the media, unintended victims, 
unsuspecting bystanders, and tax-paying contributors to the war 
machine and its frenzied narrative. 
This feminist storytelling about war itself is the most radical act 
of dissent; remember when they did not want us to study/research 
war and write about it? We could mourn its victims, but could we 
have a politics highlighting its violence and failures, and demanding 
its end? Megan MacKenzie and Nicole Wegner, who conceptualised 
this project, are invested in the stories we tell about wars because 
these stories unsettle war myths and the normative assumptions 
about gender roles and hierarchies. The nature of war has changed, 
as the authors in this volume remind us, and how we count the 
injuries and deaths matter in how we foresee its end. In my own 
work, it is precisely in this feminist mode of dissenting storytelling 
that I have been invested in counting the famine dead as victims of 
‘slow violence’ of wars. For, in that counting and acknowledging of 
the emaciated, feminised bodies as victims of deliberate violence and 
starvation, lies the solution to famine wars and reparative and restora-
tive justice. This book offers a number of similar alternative stories 
of war, which explore a number of important questions, including: 
what is considered war and by whom; how and with what weapons 
are contemporary wars being fought; who counts as a casualty and 
why; which actors have material and discursive power; who has the 
monopoly of violence; and what insights can feminist collaboration 
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organising and activism offer to prevent and end violence; how can 
this same feminist activism help to support lives in war zones and 
reconstruct and reorder broken communities, and heal individuals 
and societies, after the deathly destruction? 
Mainstream knowledge about war have assumed it is inevitable, 
claiming that certain protagonists (states and their militaries) have 
a legitimate monopoly over violence. We have also been told that 
some (just) wars are necessary for a greater good and for the survival 
of the human race itself, wars that obliterate destructive forces, evil 
people and shifting enemies. Feminist research has challenged this 
view by bringing to light the violence that is structural, silent and 
often invisible, pervasive and beyond the immediate context. War 
victories and defeats both unleash more violence than exists in a 
pre-war scenario, often compounding the problem it sought to solve 
in the first place.  Continuously highlighting this through rigorous 
and ethical feminist research has driven the point that war is neither 
a natural outcome of a preordained gender order, where men always 
make wars (aggressive, militarised masculinity) and women make 
peace (passive, peaceful femininity), nor always the logical outcome 
of pre-existing conflicts. The authors in this volume tell us wars can 
be prevented through consistently questioning their legitimacy and 
efficacy, through timely interventions by peace-seeking stakeholders, 
by emphasising generosity as opposed to ‘loss of face’, by focusing on 
stories that are backstage and invisible, and by developing alternative 
vocabularies where war and peace are seen as a mutually sustaining 
continuum and not as distinct temporal activities where one ceases 
when the other begins. 
In my own work on wars and political violence, over a period of 
time, I have talked about radical knowledges necessary about war, 
that can make peace more accessible and democratic. Those who 
own the war story (usually men, victorious and claiming both moral 
and material superiority over the vanquished) also get to have the 
big voice in peace. Alternative storytelling (for example, of women as 
perpetrators and planners of war; of men as pacifist peace-makers) 
challenges the gendered order of war, thus rendering the conventional 
war story non-sustainable and unrepresentative. However, some of 
us working with postcolonial/decolonial/anti-race feminisms have 
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also cautioned that this alternative storytelling about war cannot be 
premised on Western ideals and experiences. Promoting Western-
style ‘gender equality’ through conventional institutions, politics and 
organisations, will not guarantee peace or the absence of violence. 
Decolonial feminist research demands engagement with and critical 
scrutiny of gender tropes, including the idea that better representa-
tion of women (which women?) automatically challenges gender 
hierarchies and violent masculinities. Feminists know all too well 
that ‘gender equality’ has been the mainstay of colonial civilisational 
projects and is certainly not a panacea in these times, especially if it 
becomes the war cry to emancipate women ‘out there’.
This thoughtful collection provides an excellent insight into 
feminist thinking about war and its solutions. The authors not only 
retell stories about war and warring bodies with empathy, detail and 
diligence but also highlight the missed opportunities, erasures and 
silences in dominant war myths. The chapters also, perhaps uninten-
tionally, reflect the anxiety and uncertainty of the times we inhabit, 
the enclosures we have built around ourselves, the framings which 
have been hard to reject and the vocabularies in feminist research 
and writings that we have normalised and accepted without querying 
further. In that, I wish some of the brilliant minds in this collection 
had looked beyond the fenced terrains of feminist inquiry around 
conventional terms: the state and non-state actors, civilian–military 
relations, international organisations, United Nations Security 
Council agendas and formal settings of peace. A radical crossing over, 
swimming against the tide is absolutely necessary in these times, to 
reclaim feminist curiosity and the spirit of homelessness. Mainstream-
ing impulses of feminism need to be challenged, and while that may 
not have been the mandate for this volume, it certainly can serve as 
the intervention to question feminist framings and terminologies. It 
is equally important to recognise that feminists are not alone in this 
struggle to find solutions to war, and we need to join forces with a 
range of activists and scholars who are engaged in these efforts.
It is important to interrogate how we normalise mainstream 
narratives and fence knowledge terrains for radical and alterna-
tive knowledges to emerge. The step towards this is a self-reflexive 
critical enquiry about our own situatedness and our privileges in 
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the knowledge systems we seem to legitimise. Russ-Smith in this 
volume, for example, powerfully reminds us that, ‘Non-Indigenous 
people must critically reflect, unpack and address their privilege and 
colonial legacies in order to even begin a process of decolonisation. 
This process is unsettling… . It is meant to be unsettling.’ This can 
be the starting point we all need because when feminism gets all 
too comfortable, and loses its capacity to unsettle, our storytelling 
becomes predictable. We focus on perhaps forgotten characters, but 
not the circumstances that enable the gendered politics around these 
characters. A transformative storytelling would involve an unsettling 
of the self, a querying of privileges we carry, including the privilege 
of storytelling as academics, researchers and activists. As feminists 
we must get used to that position of discomfort, unsettling and 
annoyance. We are not in the business of pleasing the world out there, 
agreeing with established wisdom, borrowing the terms of reference 
from given knowledges. We have thrived only because we have 
created our unconventional frames of analysis and provided avant-
garde visions. The comfort of our feminism needs to be unsettled.
Feminists know that in victory and in defeat, war produces the same 
results. During reflective moments and self-doubt that are so frequent 
for those of us studying war and peace, I turn to the Mahabharata 
(Great War), the popular epic from India. Several retellings of this 
ancient and highly complex war story exist in the popular domain, and 
the characters involved have been discussed at length. The war in this 
story lasts only for 18 days, whereas the story itself revolves around 
the lives of the protagonists entwined with ancestral and intergenera-
tional politics across a few hundred years. The events leading to the 
war and the overtures of peace are significant. A feminist re-reading 
would suggest that unbridled patriarchal aspirations, militarism of 
the times and not paying attention to complex gendered relations 
breeds a culture of violence. The ‘Great War’ was avoidable and the 
text itself, the conversations that Krishna (God incarnate) has with 
both warring sides (Pandavas and Kauravas, who were also related 
in a kinship) as a mediator, includes advocating for peace, generosity 
and justice. Krishna’s messages were subtle but important: there are 
no sides in war, all have something to lose; no war is completely 
ethical in its methods and moral in its outcomes; war is never the 
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only solution to injustices, ambitions and aspirational masculinities. 
It is important to remember that Krishna does not choose battlefield 
bravery for himself always, preferring to be called Ranchhor or ‘one 
who abandons the battlefield’. The feminist Mahabharat, thus, tells 
us that war is not a virtuous encounter between equal adversaries, it 
is entirely avoidable through empathy and peaceful reasoning, and 
ultimately there are no moral victories. For me, this is a peace story 
as much as a war one. 
So, then, what is my take-away from this rich volume? That 
feminists do not have one or more solutions to war, feminist critical 
thinking and unsettling is the solution as the chapters in this book 
impressively convey. This is an uplifting and thought-provoking 
contribution in times when we are witnessing multiple kinds of wars, 
along with a global backlash against feminist thinking and gender 
activism. The ideas here leave us inspired as we bear witness to this 
risk-taking intellectual collaboration. The book does not answer all 
the questions and neither does it pretend to fulfil all its promises, but 
then, conversations have just begun …
In closing, it would be wise to remember these words of the Indian 
poet of radical ideas, Sahir Ludhianvi.
Jang to khud hi ek maslaa hai,
Jang kyaa maslon ka hal degi;
Aag aur khoon aaj bakhshegi,
Bhookh aur ehtiyaaj kal degi.
War is itself a problem,
It isn’t the solution to any problem;
Today it will offer fire and blood,
And deliver hunger and want tomorrow.
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Introduction to Feminist Solutions  
for Ending War 
Megan MacKenzie and Nicole Wegner
War is studied within a range of academic subfields and commented 
on by endless policy experts and analysists. What unifies much of 
this work is that it is grounded in an implicit assumption that war 
is inevitable and a permanent part of global relations. The goals 
of much of war studies seem to be to predict, quantify effects and 
costs, scrutinise and improve military strategy, and measure power 
gains and losses. We treat this approach to war as a problem with 
serious global implications. We argue that if the study of war does 
not question the utility of war, and is largely absent of any attention 
or commitment to limiting and ending war, then such work can, and 
does, entrench ideas of war and militarism as normal and acceptable 
parts of social and political life. 
Our solution to this problem is to draw on experts from around the 
world to explore feminist solutions for ending war. What we offer in 
this book is hope in the form of tools for reconceptualising war and 
imagining a world without it. As we explain in greater detail below, 
the focus is on feminist solutions because, drawing on the work of 
bell hooks, we understand war to be a complex failure that is the 
product of an international system shaped by patriarchy, militarism, 
white supremacy and capitalism. As a result, feminist solutions that 
acknowledge and address this complexity are required. 
This book started from a desire to face the complexity of war with 
a sense of hope and a vision that peace is possible. After teaching 
and researching war and security for over a decade, I (Megan) felt 
it was necessary to regroup and try different approaches to studying 
war in order to avoid overwhelming myself and my students. While 
teaching issues like rape in war, I would inevitably see students almost 
physically lean back as they became overwhelmed by the magnitude 
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of the issues and the seeming lack of any pathway forward. In 2018 I 
hosted a small workshop entitled Feminist Solutions to Ending War 
and organised a senior undergraduate unit with the same title. The 
intent of both was to centre feminist solutions in our analysis of war. 
There was a commitment not to be simplistic or delusional in the 
quest for solutions, but to keep the attention on solutions even while 
acknowledging the complexity of war. Students and scholars seemed 
to embrace this approach and the conversations that were generated 
in this class and at the initial workshop continued. In 2019 we (Nicole 
and Megan) began working together and we were united in our 
unabashed commitment to doing work and generating conversations 
aimed at ending war. This book is a product of that commitment. 
This book is also a product of the context and time in which it 
was written. While we understand that global politics is never dull, 
the time during which we were writing and editing this volume was 
shaped by events that were repeatedly described as ‘unprecedented’ 
and historic. As the authors were completing their chapters, vast 
swaths of Australian land were ravaged by bushfires, producing 
toxic air in most major cities, displacing 18,000 Australians and 
killing nearly half a billion animals. The World Health Organization 
declared a global pandemic, as the SARS-COV-2 ‘coronavirus’ spread 
rapidly throughout the world, resulting in the deaths of nearly 2 
million individuals (at the time of writing). The virus has laid bare 
global racism and inequality, the impacts of weak and underfunded 
social and health services, with black and marginalized communities 
at increased fatal risks from the virus. 
While the virus spread rapidly across the world, in the United 
States, George Floyd, an unarmed Black man, was asphyxiated by four 
police officers in Minneapolis, Minnesota, prompting national and 
international protests, many met by brutal militarised state security 
responses. Black Lives Matter and other anti-racist movements 
pointed to the legacy of police killing and brutality towards black men 
and women in the US and Canada, including the recent deaths of 
Regis Korchinski-Paquet, Breonna Taylor and Rodney Levi. Similar 
violent force in the past year was used against civilian protesters at 
anti-authoritarian rallies in Hong Kong, Algeria, Iraq, Bolivia, India, 
Nicaragua and Russia. Detailed claims of Australian soldiers killing 
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Afghan civilians have surfaced. Military forces and militarised police 
forces have been used against civilians around the world and billions 
dedicated to military budgets, even as nations struggle to provide 
adequate medical resources to civilians in a global pandemic. Media 
images have shown nurses around the world wearing garbage bags 
as personal protection gowns and face masks they have reused 
or bought themselves while military and police forces show up to 
civilian protests with gas masks and shields. 
As editors, we recognise that these events inevitably shaped why 
and how we wrote this book, and that we have experienced and 
witnessed them from a place of extreme privilege. We edited the book 
with a commitment to feminist politics and ethics. Given the global 
circumstances, we were aware that authors wrote their chapters while 
dealing with multiple pressures, including caring for and worrying 
about loved ones, home schooling children, and facing illness 
and unemployment. Feminist methods and ethics required us to 
acknowledge these circumstances and adjust our editorial practices, 
which included checking in with authors regularly, shifting deadlines, 
and offering different types of support to ensure that the chapters 
were not an additional burden during an already intense time. We 
tried to ensure that the process of writing this book, even in light 
of a pandemic, could be inspiring and supportive. In many of the 
conversations we had during this time, authors expressed a revived 
commitment to this book, and told us that in the current context, 
bold feminist solutions for ending war seem more important than 
ever. We agree. 
Although this book was written at a time of intense global insecurity 
and uncertainty, it is grounded in hope. We seek to look boldly at the 
world and not simply critique what is, but propose what could be. 
This book aims to offer pathways forward to a more peaceful and 
equitable world. What we advance in this book are solutions (broadly 
conceived) for ending war and promoting sustainable peace. The 
purpose of the book is to inspire readers to consider the possibility of 
life without war and political violence, and to engage with a number 
of possible pathways to peace. It also asks readers to rethink what 
constitutes war and what peace is and how we can attain it. 
MacKenzie and Wegner
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This book does not rely on a single definition or ideal of feminism. 
Nor is feminism merely used to critique mainstream scholarship or 
accounts of war and political violence. In short, this is not a book 
promising peace if we just ‘add’ women. Instead, in each chapter the 
authors draw on their own expertise and experience to offer unique 
definitions and theorising of feminism and war, which shape their 
unique solution to ending war and political violence. These solutions 
include economic restructuring, arms abolition, centring Indigenous 
knowledge, memorialising war differently and incorporating the 
voices of diverse actors in seeking strategies for ending war. Ending 
war requires challenging complex structures, but the solutions found 
in this edition have risen to this challenge. 
In addition to answering the overarching question, ‘How can 
we end war?’, some of the sub-questions that the book will address 
include: How might the stories we tell about war perpetuate or 
prevent it? What can we learn from feminist activism and feminist 
theory in order to prevent war and violence in the future? What are 
the obstacles to preventing war and violence and what signs exist that 
feminist work can remove or overcome these obstacles? 
In this introduction, we do not present an extensive summary of 
each of the chapters. It would be difficult to provide a summary that 
would do justice to the richness of the chapters and we want to let 
the authors speak for themselves. In the remainder of the chapter, we 
outline the understanding of ‘feminism’, ‘ending’, ‘war’ and ‘solution’ 
that influenced our approach to editing this book. We also highlight 
the ways that contributing authors offer distinct understandings 
and theorisations of these same concepts. We encourage readers to 
engage with the diverse theories, definitions and solutions offered 
in the chapters that follow and consider the ways that the solutions 
might be complementary, overlapping and opposing. 
 
what do we mean by ‘feminist’?
Feminists have long theorised the connections of gender and war, 
outlining how multiple relations of power are reproduced through 
war. They have also studied how the effects of war are intensely 
shaped by gender, race and class, with impacts that extend long into 
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the so-called post-war periods. How individuals experience war, 
whether they might support or oppose war, and how they manage 
to survive and thrive in the ‘post-war’ period are shaped by gender, 
race, class and location. The contributors to this volume offer 
solutions that draw from a range of feminist, queer, Indigenous, and 
postcolonial theories. While we acknowledge and value the diverse 
understandings of feminism offered by the authors of this volume, it 
is important to clarify the approach to feminism that grounded our 
thinking in putting together the book. 
We draw on bell hooks’ definition of feminism, and her approach 
to addressing the connections between patriarchy, white supremacy, 
capitalism and militarism. bell hooks describes feminism as ‘a 
movement to end sexism, sexist exploitation, and oppression’ (2014, 
1). Throughout her work, she discusses ‘white supremacist capitalist 
patriarchy’ and uses the phrase ‘to remind us continually of the inter-
locking systems of domination that define our reality’ (1997, 7). For 
hooks, it is impossible and futile to study militarism in isolation from 
patriarchy, racism, and capitalism because they all ‘function simul-
taneously’ (1997, 7). This aligns with Carol P. Christ’s work, which 
treats patriarchy as an ‘integral system created at the intersection of 
the control of women, private property, and war – which sanctions 
and celebrates violence, conquest, rape, looting, exploitation of 
resources, and the taking of slaves’ (Christ 2016, 216). Similarly Johan 
Galtung declared ‘the liberation of all oppressed peoples necessitates 
the destruction of the political-economic systems of capitalism and 
imperialism as well as patriarchy’ (cited in Combahee River Collective 
1977). Rather than treating war as a confined political event that can 
be observed, predicted and studied in isolation, these approaches 
situate war within a complex system of patriarchy, white supremacy, 
capitalism and militarism. 
This understanding of feminism and the demand to consider these 
interlocking forms of oppression requires a departure from simplistic 
ideas that adding women to the study, practice, or analysis of war 
will necessarily lead to more peace. We do not believe that ‘adding 
women and stirring’ is sufficient to disrupt the interlocking systems 
of oppression and exploitation that perpetuate conflict and warfare 
across the globe. Women participate in, support, and benefit from war 
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and militarism in ways that some feminist peace scholarship does not 
acknowledge or account for. Assuming that electing more women, 
hiring more female soldiers, or generating a female-led foreign 
policy will lead to peace not only perpetuates a simplistic and binary 
understanding of women as inherently peaceful but also mystifies the 
ways that women contribute to current forms of war and militarism. 
Again, we draw on hooks, who disputes the assumption that women 
are agentless, and therefore inherently peaceful: 
In keeping with sexist thinking, women are described as objects 
rather than subjects. We are depicted not as laborers and activists 
who, like men, make political choices, but as passive observers 
who have taken no responsibility for actively maintaining and per-
petuating the current value system of our society which privileges 
violence and domination as the most effective tool of coercive 
control in human interaction, a society whose value systems 
advocate and promote war. (1995, 60) 
We believe that feminist solutions for ending war must acknowledge 
the ways that women – particularly white women in positions of 
power – have benefited from war, imperialism and militarism. 
Just as it is simplistic to assume that ‘adding more women’ will lead 
to peace, we do not assume that men are the sole source of war and 
militarism. While many acts of war and practices that perpetuate 
insecurity are led by men, we agree with hooks that ‘all men do not 
glory in war, that all men who fight in wars do not necessarily believe 
that wars are just, that men are not inherently capable of killing or 
that militarism is the only possible means of safety’ (hooks 1995, 59). 
Feminist solutions for ending war must consider the ways that war 
and militarism create conditions in which some men – particularly 
Brown and Black men – are treated as inherent threats and whose 
death and harm are all too often treated as inevitable if unfortunate 
‘collateral damage’ to security operations. 
Moving beyond an understanding of war as ‘man made’ and 
solvable by ‘more women’ opens space for the types of complex 
and hopeful solutions to ending war we seek. If war is understood 
as a practice embedded in patriarchy, white supremacy, capitalism 
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and militarism, complex solutions are required to end war. It first 
requires that we rethink the inevitability and utility of war as well as 
the ways that war is an extension of the everyday forms of violence 
that have become acceptable and normalised in society. hooks makes 
clear how her approach to feminism requires radical rethinking and 
radical solutions to ending war and militarism: ‘to fight militarism 
we must resist the socialisation and brainwashing in our children that 
teaches passive acceptance of violence in daily life, that teaches us 
we can eliminate violence with violence …’ (1995, 63). In addition, 
resisting war is not simply about condemning military operations. 
It requires that we take a close look at our own complicity in global 
practices that perpetuate the strong hold of militarism, capitalism, 
and colonialism. For example, white bourgeois women in the United 
States often benefit from imperialist conquest as consumers of widely 
available cheap commercial goods. Ending militarism requires 
examining our consumption patterns and then actively working 
towards wealth redistribution. Cynthia Enloe’s (2004) examina-
tion of the militarisation of sneakers and the processes that lead to 
‘cheap labour’ in many global factories reminds us that capitalism, 
imperialism, and militarism work in tandem, even outside spaces we 
consider to be ‘war zones’. Women who oppose militarism must be 
willing to withdraw all support for war, ‘knowing full well that such 
withdrawal necessarily begins with a transformation in our psyches, 
one that changes our passive acceptance of violence as a means of 
social control into active resistance’ (hooks 1995, 63–4). 
While reading this book, we encourage readers to consider the 
various ways that feminism is defined and theorised in this book. For 
example, in chapter 3, scholar and activist Sarai Aharoni maps both 
the power and perils of feminist peace activism. Aharoni distinguishes 
between ‘women’s politics’ and ‘feminist politics’, explaining that 
there is no inherent ‘peaceful’ nature of women that motivates them 
to organise, but that lived realities have certainly influenced women’s 
desire to seek alternative politics focused on peace. Aharoni shows 
that disagreements and failures can be productive and highlights 
ways that women peace organisers can create meaningful space for 
self-care and solidarity in their challenging work. In chapter 2, Heidi 
Hudson bridges a feminist ethics of care with African Ubuntu-inspired 
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feminisms to advocate taking collective responsibility for war. Rather 
than essentialising gendered roles or simplifying Ubuntu philosophy, 
Hudson demonstrates how mutual responsibility is a practice for all 
genders in creating conditions for peace and for ending conflict. 
For some authors, the value or role of feminism is questioned in 
their solutions to end war. For example, in chapter 1 Jess Russ-Smith 
opens with an Indigenous vision of war and peace as a Wiradyuri 
woman. She challenges settler futurity and the idea that colonial 
dominance is inevitable. Russ-Smith centres Indigenous knowledge 
as a cosmology, not a ‘tool’ or ‘lens’ for Western feminists to engage 
with superficially. Eda Gunaydin offers another challenge to Western 
feminism in chapter 5, where she explores jineological theory and 
practices implemented by Kurdish women’s liberation movements 
in her chapter. Gunaydin argues that Kurdish women articulate 
a feminism that is radically different from Western feminisms, 
particularly in the emphasis on anarchist and anti-capitalist ideals. 
In chapter 6, Cai Wilkinson acknowledges the tensions between 
queer and feminist theory and praxis, and offers a queer analysis of 
security practices. Drawing on examples and powerful testimonials, 
Wilkinson shows the ways that queer visions of security trouble the 
assumption of ‘peaceful’ and ‘secure’ everyday spaces such as border 
crossings, public bathrooms, and bedrooms. 
what do we mean by ‘war’?
Just as the chapters do not offer a unified definition of feminism, 
they also do not offer a singular conception of what constitutes 
‘war’ or peace. As editors, we aim to identify common-sense ideas 
about war that persist in many Western societies, including that war 
is an inevitable, temporal, necessary political act. We ask readers to 
consider the politics of such mythologised ideas. We reject commonly 
held ideas about war, including the concept of war as politics by other 
means. We dispute that war is necessary, brave, useful. We reject the 
notion that war is always a final resort, after all other political options 
have been exhausted. In creating our own definition of war, we draw 
on Carolyn Nordstrom’s (2004) approach to war as a complex and 
expansive political process, and her concept of ‘vanishing points’. She 
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defines vanishing points as ‘the points where the normative (what 
should be) intersects with reality (what actually is)’. She goes on to 
argue that research on war: 
should illuminate both sides of this intersection: the ideals we 
hold as a society and the unfolding realities as people live them, 
regardless of how they might contradict our stated laws and values. 
In point of fact, research may uphold a division that considers 
only the normative, as if it were reality. That which contradicts 
normative ideals is ignored, and becomes invisible to formal 
analysis. (Nordstrom 2004, 163) 
Vanishing points can be re-illuminated when we explore myths about 
war. These myths can be disrupted by using more complex defini-
tions of war and violence, by speaking to different people with varied 
experiences about war, and by asking different questions about war.
Drawing from Nordstrom and hooks, we define war as a complex 
failure shaped by patriarchy, militarism, capitalism and white 
supremacy. War is a complex failure because war rarely achieves the 
political outcome for which it was declared, and the effects of war 
are unbounded and endlessly destructive. War is a complex failure 
because, rather than a calculated last resort, war is often hasty and 
reactionary. War is a career choice, a multi-billion-dollar industry, 
and a never-ending series of policies. War is a complex failure 
of human ethical and moral commitments to each other. War is a 
complex failure to create political solutions that would enhance 
the capacity for humans and animal species not only to thrive and 
survive, but also to live in a safe environment that is protected and 
respected. War is a complex failure situated within, and a product of, 
a patriarchal, white supremacist, capitalist and militarist system. Any 
solution to war must acknowledge and address this complexity.
In addition to naming war as a complex failure and rejecting key 
myths of war, we reject the idea of the unknowability of war. We reject 
the assumption that civilians must commit unrestricted support for 
war and soldiers in exchange for their presumed ignorance of the 
pain of war. It may be true that most Western citizens do not know 
the details of the activities done in their name in wars and occupation 
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overseas, but civilians in war zones know war, they experience it and 
have knowledge about war that matters. When war is treated as a 
political operation led by militaries, soldier experiences are fetishised 
and presumed to be the primary means to know and understand 
war. Furthermore, the public understands soldier experiences to be 
‘off limits’ and private, largely as a result of gendered norms. ‘Good 
soldiers’ are constituted as stoic hyper-masculine heroes who should 
keep their stories and trauma deep within. At the same time, civilian 
experiences of war and insecurity are often cast as ‘anecdotes’ or 
context to war, rather than constituting a valid account of war. 
We reject the idea that individual experiences of war are simply 
anecdotes to be superseded by data on civilian casualties, military 
budgets, and statistics. Stories and context matter. Solutions to war 
must account for these stories in order to address the complexity of 
war, and to acknowledge the experience of war. Such solutions will be 
radically different from current military strategies, which prioritise 
vague and technocratic plans of coercive credibility, balance of power, 
strategic defence, and mutually assured destruction. These strategies 
sustain war; they are not solutions and ways to peace. 
We encourage readers to consider the implications of treating war 
as a complex failure. We also encourage readers to map the varying 
and complex definitions of war offered in this text. In chapter 7, Ray 
Acheson reminds us of the ever-present war that centres around the 
production of nuclear weapons and the metaphorical and physical 
violence associated with nuclear bombs and the nuclear industry. 
Nuclear war is not only the exchange of missiles but also a conflict 
over whose opinions, knowledges and experiences are credible in 
discussing the bomb. Acheson explains that current patriarchal, 
capitalist, militarist and colonialist systems are sustained in discourse 
on nuclear weapons. In chapter 1, Jess Russ-Smith focuses on ‘war 
on Country’, or the long-standing political project to colonise and 
erase Indigenous peoples and their ways of knowing and being. Her 
conceptualisation of war breaks open traditional notions of war as 
combat between two uniformed institutions and helps us to recognise 
the ways that Indigenous lives have been subject to martial control. 
War, for Indigenous peoples, is ongoing and relentless. For many 
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Indigenous communities, the ongoing forms of everyday violence on 
people and country constitute war. In chapter 8, Yolande Bouka also 
considers war and intervention as extensions of colonial and imperial 
violence. Drawing on Black Feminist and anti-colonial thought, she 
asks readers to ‘reimagine the world as one where Black and Brown 
people’s lives matter’, and argues that considering the experiences of 
Black and Brown people – particularly women – would fundamen-
tally challenge global justifications for war and intervention. 
what do we mean by ‘ending’?
Feminists have long been critical of the temporality of wars and the 
assumption that peace ‘happens’ when formal war fighting stops. 
Ending wars, understood as complex failures, requires thinking 
outside the ‘official’ delineations of fighting and considering the ways 
that war and violence seep into the everyday. Ending war asks that 
we consider what is left in the rubble of violent practices and how to 
move forward from the ashes. In chapter 9, Sertan Saral considers the 
ways that the ends of wars have been memorialised and how these 
memorials serve to romanticise the war period while simultaneously 
erasing colonial violence on the lands in which the memorials are 
built. In chapter 10, Roxani Krystalli considers experiences of former 
female combatants in Colombia and the challenges they face in times 
of ‘peace’. For many of her interlocutors, war was not a traumatic 
black-box experience, but provided opportunities for friendship, 
meaning and authority. She considers the effects of ‘ending’ war on 
these women and their identity. 
Imagining a world without war creates space for considering 
radically different ways of organising society. Rather than strategis-
ing about the cessation of formal wars, in chapter 11 Keina Yoshida 
proposes living in harmony with nature as a solution for peace. 
Yoshida suggests that the destruction of nature is a root cause 
and catalyst of many wars; therefore, to end war we must end the 
ecological domination and destruction of nature and reconceptualise 
our relationship to land, forests, rivers and oceans. In chapter 12, 
Carol Cohn and Claire Duncanson challenge the sustainability of 
ending war without adequate economic planning for peace. Cohn 
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and Duncanson outline the relationship between capitalism and war 
and see post-war contexts as windows of opportunity in which new 
economies of care and ecological sustainability can ensure meaningful 
and sustainable peace.
what do we mean by ‘solutions’?
Our understanding of feminism and war demands solutions for 
ending war that are complex, comprehensive and interested not only 
in silencing guns, but in dismantling wider systems of oppression 
that limit people’s everyday security and sense of health and serenity. 
We are particularly interested in solutions that embrace the notion 
of sharing responsibility, power, and accountability with regard to 
ending war. Feminists have long understood that peace is more than 
the cessation of ‘official’ fighting. For many feminists, peace involves 
dismantling interconnected systems of patriarchy, colonialism, 
racism, capitalism, nationalism – recognising that these hierarchi-
cal structures work in tandem in perpetuating exploitation that 
underpins global conflict. Dismantling these systems is a tall order. 
As Laura Shepherd reminds us in chapter 14: ‘Preventing violence 
is complex, ending war much more so.’ Therefore, in the chapters 
to follow, the authors offer various tangible solutions to addressing 
the complex and interconnected challenges associated with war and 
political violence. These solutions are sometimes complementary and 
sometimes competing. For example, some authors emphasise a strong 
role for the state, while others suggest dismantling state structures. 
We embrace the diversity of these solutions and encourage readers 
to consider what approaches they can envision and if, whether and 
how they might consider incorporating these solutions into their 
everyday practice. 
The contributors to this volume offer a range of important 
solutions for ending war, and also explore the potential benefits of, 
and limitations to, these proposed solutions. For example, in chapter 
14 Laura Shepherd offers a seemingly simple, yet profound solution 
to war: listen to women. Outlining the politics of the Women, Peace, 
and Security agenda of the United Nations, Shepherd demonstrates 
how women can offer unique solutions to war from their historical 
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knowledges about war and peace, their historical practices involving 
peace organisation, and their ongoing practices of making connec-
tions across complex areas and geographical distances. In chapter 13, 
Thomas Gregory offers a solution that challenges how war casualties 
are counted. Demystifying the concept of ‘collateral damage’, Gregory 
demands we consider not the quantitative human costs of war, but the 
qualitative experiences of those touched by it. In chapter 4, Diksha 
Poddar and Shweta Singh challenge the notion of ‘solutions’ and 
argue that learning the contextual complexities of localised conflict 
is key to understanding how conflict can be ended and peace can be 
fostered. They resist the notion of universal ‘solutions’ to ending war 
and instead urge us to focus our attentions on quotidian practices, 
such as education for peace as a pathway to ending war. 
conclusion 
There are several overarching themes that run through this edited 
collection. The first is the finding that women and marginalised 
people and communities have unique lived experiences in relation 
to war and violence. These experiences are often ignored, erased, 
or unaccounted for in descriptions of war and insecurity, as well as 
efforts to reduce war and political violence. These knowledges and 
lived experiences should be reflected on and taken seriously if we seek 
to promote sustainable and wholistic peace. The second theme of this 
volume is the conclusion that ending war requires much more than 
examining violence against ‘women’ or exposing gender inequalities. 
Several chapters consider structures that underpin the processes of 
war and violence and hinder meaningful peace, including issues of 
colonial oppression, ecological exploitation, heteronormativity and 
homonormativity, state and nationalist racism. Their authors seem to 
agree that to end war, we must challenge and dismantle multiple hier-
archies. A third theme across chapters involves the practice(s) and 
ethics of care and caring as central to the human experience. Far from 
the vapid neoliberal idea of resilience and ‘me time’, these chapters 
acknowledge the ways that humans are interdependent in relation to 
each other and to non-human life in the natural world, despite long-
standing onto-epistemological assertions within mainstream IR that 
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actors are rational, individual and self-serving. The chapters in this 
book demand that our relationships to one another, to our environ-
ment, and to our future require that we take seriously practices of 
relationality and care/community building if we seek to end war for 
good.
As shown by the contributions in this collection, ending war is no 
simple task, and it requires hope. Hope is radical. Hope makes space 
for acknowledging violence and oppression and taking responsibil-
ity for a role in transformative change. We hope that you find the 
following chapters inspire and challenge you. We have found great 
joy and hope in reading the brilliant contributions to follow and hope 
that you will too.
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Giyira: Indigenous Women’s Knowing, 
Being and Doing as a Way to End  
War on Country
Jessica Russ-Smith
Indigenous knowledges are not a tool of, or for, Western feminism, 
but are an entire cosmology that produces radically different ways of 
thinking, writing, and understanding war and violence. Given that 
this chapter draws on Indigenous knowledge, readers should expect 
to be challenged by what will inevitably be unique ways of phrasing 
the problem of war and the potential for solutions. For example, 
for reasons I will elaborate, I focus on ‘war on Country’ to capture 
the ways that colonial violence has continued to impact Indigenous 
peoples and Country, and as a Wiradyuri woman I centre Wiradyuri 
women’s knowledge and teachings as a pathway toward peace 
and survival. Specifically, this chapter explores Wiradyuri ways 
of knowing, being and doing as an Indigenous feminist solution 
to ending the war on Country. It is imperative to understand that 
Indigenous knowledges cannot be owned, nor should they be 
expected to be fitted and edited in ways that fit Western models and 
expectations. Indigenous knowledge has potential for shaping and 
influencing peace solutions and for understanding how to end the 
colonial war on Country that Indigenous people and land continue 
to be subjected to. 
This chapter aims to explore these ideas through discussion of the 
following core themes: colonisation as an act of war, decolonisation, 
white possessive logics and futurities as violence, Indigenous futures 
and giyira. This chapter will be using the 2019–20 Australian bushfires 
to further illustrate the key arguments. These fires are a war on 
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Country and an act of colonial violence based upon colonial relation-
ships to land. Colonial relationships to land reflect possessive logics 
of ownership and use of land as a commodity (Moreton-Robinson 
2015), which vary significantly from Indigenous relationships of 
care and love of Country. Australian politics and society have long 
ignored Indigenous knowledges and relationships to land. This active 
ignorance and exercise of white colonial power have led to more 
intense violations of Country, including catastrophic fires. 
For Indigenous people, Country is all things. It is the land, water, 
people, animals, ancestors, stories, songlines and sovereignty. I am 
a Wiradyuri woman from the Wambuul (commonly known as the 
Macquarie River in New South Wales, Australia), and my positioning 
and experience as a Wiradyuri woman is central to the core themes 
discussed below. This chapter is centred around the Wiradyuri 
concept of ‘giyira’ which means womb and future (Grant Snr and 
Rudder 2018). Giyira illustrates the ways that our past, present, and 
future are connected. This concept is useful for exploring the ways 
that solutions to war on Country require attention to past, present, 
and future violence, as well as commitment to future Indigenous 
communities and respect for past and present knowledges. Through a 
Wiradyuri yinna (woman’s) lens, the war on Country will be explored 
to propose ways through which we can weave peace within our ways 
of knowing, being and doing which will directly impact our future 
generations. I use the terms ‘knowing, being and doing’ together to 
reflect the ways that Indigenous cultures insist on a deep connection 
between knowledge, identity, and praxis (Moreton-Robinson 2015). 
Colonialism continues to cause great wounding and violence across 
many spaces and Indigenous knowledges. 
Central to this discussion is the idea that Indigenous and Wiradyuri 
women’s ways of knowing, being and doing require us to think differ-
ently about time and place. Western and dominant understandings 
of time and place reflect colonial logics of power and ownership 
that directly affect ways of knowing, being and doing in relation 
to Country. If we want peace in the future, we need to think about 
past and present violences and their legacies and acknowledge the 
importance of Indigenous knowledges as key to weaving a future of 
peace. The acknowledgement of, and respectful engagement with, 
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Indigenous knowledges must be central to efforts to sustainable 
processes of peace-building (Adeogun and Muthuki 2017). Through 
the exploration of grandmother and granddaughter relationships that 
are significant to Wiradyuri way of life, I propose ways through which 
colonial violences of land can be transformed. Wiradyuri women and 
our wombs are the grass we use to weave, and the future generations 
are the baskets, the transformations of our weaving. 
Relationships are fundamental to Indigenous cultures. Within 
Wiradyuri culture, and many Indigenous cultures, women play an 
important role in these relationships. Wiradyuri way tells us that the 
relationship between grandmother and granddaughter is of unique 
significance. Through our grandmothers we are given and taught 
our stories, songlines, totems and responsibilities. Grandmothers 
and granddaughters share an indescribable and intrinsic connection. 
Wiradyuri ways of knowing through grandmother and granddaugh-
ter challenge Western conceptions of time and space. The relationship 
between grandmother and granddaughter is not solely related to 
living grandmothers and their living granddaughters, but also relates 
to the grandmothers and granddaughters that are our ancestors. I am 
a granddaughter not only to my two biological grandmothers, but 
to generations of women before me. I am also a grandmother, even 
though I have not given birth to a child and therefore a granddaugh-
ter has not been ‘birthed’ in a medical sense. Within my womb I hold 
the ovum of my future children and their children. My body is both 
grandmother and granddaughter, my body is a space of relationship 
to future and past. My being is guided by the understanding that I am 
a grandmother and a granddaughter, that I have responsibility to care 
for the past and the future. My role in addressing war and violence is 
embedded within the notion of effecting change beyond my lived life, 
as I am to live in my present guided by the following question, ‘What 
kind of ancestor do I want to be for my granddaughter?’ This approach 
to being reflects the importance of future and relationship within our 
culture. My body symbolises the past and the present, my body is 
the grass being woven. What is being woven is dependent upon my 
actions. An absence of action now, or an absence of respect and care 
in our actions now, feeds the war on Country as it directly impacts the 
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time and space our granddaughters will live in. Therefore, baladhu 
giyira, baladhu giyira, I am womb, I am future. 
This chapter presents an Indigenous and radical rethinking of 
war, violence and peace. So, as the author I invite you to engage 
with this chapter through deep critical reflection of self, knowledge 
and learning. Deep critical reflection and listening for Wiradyuri 
people requires vulnerability, respect and openness. For Wiradyuri 
people, listening deeply is a central part of our culture that requires 
continuous self-reflection. A commitment to learning and listening to 
the ideas expressed in this chapter is also a commitment to respecting 
self and others. Therefore, this invitation to respectfully engage with 
these knowledges discussed below is of great importance, as our 
knowledges cannot be taken out of context and require deep respect. 
As you read, I encourage you to reflect on the following questions: 
How can you as a reader reflect upon ‘being, knowing and doing’ – or 
the ways that you know, are, and do? How do you think these ways 
impact how you do or do not engage with Indigenous knowledges 
respectfully? What does deep listening look like for you?
war on country 
In Australia we are currently fighting a war that deeply violates the 
past, present and future. War on Country refers to the colonisation of 
land and the ongoing colonial practices towards Country. These are 
extremely violent and require solutions that can save and nurture our 
future. Colonial understandings see land as a commodity which can 
be owned, bought, traded, sold, and an object to which any action can 
be committed if it leads to an economic benefit. This understanding 
of Country is the foundation of colonial violence, as it sees Country 
as inferior, voiceless, powerless and therefore an object which can be 
owned. This colonial logic reflects what Aileen Moreton-Robinson 
(2015, xii) refers to as white possessive logics: ‘White Possessive 
logics are operationalised within discourses to circulate sets of 
meanings about ownership of the nation, as part of common-sense 
knowledge, decision-making, and socially produced conventions.’ In 
contrast to Indigenous relations to Country, settler colonial states, 
including Australia, see Country as a source of property and capital 
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to own; from this view, Indigenous peoples are seen as an obstacle 
to settlers’ claiming the resources of Country (Tuck and Yang 2012). 
These white possessive logics of Country are an action of war, as they 
aim to perpetuate and reinforce colonial and white superiority. 
White possessive logics of Country have led to land being used, 
abused and violated in the name of money and power. These violences 
include the cutting down of sacred birthing trees for new roads, 
destroying sacred sites for mining, drilling land for oil, clear-cutting 
forests for agriculture, and the exploitation of many sacred sites for 
tourist pleasure, such as climbing Uluru. These weapons of war are 
carving a grim future, or lack of future, for our future generations 
of people, animals and plants. Indigenous ways of being, knowing 
and doing are critical and essential for preserving and caring for our 
future. For Wiradyuri people, Country is fundamental to our way 
of life, wellbeing, and future (Green 2018). Country is all living and 
non-living things; it is our bodies, our relationships, the ancestors, 
the land, animals and plants. Solving the war on Country is about 
shifting colonial logics to an understanding that reflects Indigenous 
ways of knowing, being and doing, which emphasise being in a rela-
tionship to, with and through Country. Indigenous peoples’ relational 
being with Country must be acknowledged, nurtured and listened to 
if we hope for a future. 
Towards the end of 2019, multiple catastrophic fires began burning 
across various areas of Australia; these were the frontiers of a war on 
Country. The fires have killed or displaced over 3  billion animals, 
with some native species potentially extinct, and unprecedented 
heat waves and fires continue into 2020 and 2021 (Australian 
Parliamentary House 2020; UN Environment Programme 2020). 
Country, homes, animals and people have been destroyed by the 
force and violence of the fires. These fires in Australia are one army of 
colonial violence and settler futurity, that is, logics that sustain settler 
power and bodies while attempting to erase Indigenous people and 
Country. Fires are burning, destroying and erupting upon Country. 
The fire is not a metaphor for colonial violence or war. It is colonial 
violence. It is war. The perspective I am presenting here is that fire is 
a multidimensional being that can have its own agency and can be 
used, or misused, within relationships of power. Culturally, fire holds 
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great significance in sacred practices. This is sacred knowledge and 
therefore further details cannot and will not be shared in this context, 
but is important to note that Indigenous peoples have deep knowledge 
and a series of practices associated with fire that have been repeatedly 
marginalised and ignored by Australian governments and society. In 
relation to colonial violence, fire has been used as weapon to exert 
power, and therefore fire is also an extension of colonial policies that 
have been attempting to erase Country both literally and metaphori-
cally for centuries. In these contexts, fire is colonial violence as it is 
part of the colonial relationship to land that reflects possessive and 
hierarchical logics. 
The more of Country that burns, the more colonial violence 
displaces and dislocates people, animals, plants and Country from 
one another. As the fire burns, Indigenous people are violently 
dislocated from our mother and wounded. The fire attempts to erase 
Country, it erases our ways of being as Indigenous people as we 
are Country. We are not separate beings to Country, nor do we just 
exist in a relationship to Country. We cannot own Country, because 
Country is not an object. We cannot possess Country because we do 
not exist in a relationship of power over Country. We are Country. 
We, as Indigenous people, are an expression and part of Country. The 
violence of fire does not metaphorically impact Indigenous people, it 
literally harms us. By us, I do not just mean individuals or communi-
ties but also our ancestors, songlines, stories, and futures, all of which 
are part of our bodies. As the fires burn, salt and acid are poured into 
the open wound, with violence so deep it makes our ancestors cry. As 
Indigenous peoples, these cries echo in our bodies. 
Historically, colonial war has violently torn through land by invasion 
in attempt to dislocate Indigenous peoples from the land. The impact 
of colonial violence in the present does not just impact Indigenous 
peoples and communities, it re-opens the wounds of past violences as 
it continues the war on Country, which is a war on Indigenous ways 
of knowing, being and doing. Therefore, the fires re-open wounds 
of the past, pulling apart the scars which are on our bodies and skin. 
Colonial logics and actions such as ignoring Indigenous knowledges, 
prioritising extraction, and disconnection from land have all fuelled 
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these fires. These fires perpetuate colonial logics that attempt to erase 
Indigenous sovereignty through erasing Country. 
Indigenous peoples’ ongoing sovereign relationship to Country 
may appear threatening to white and non-Indigenous people: it is a 
reminder that colonists do not in fact own the land, that the land is not 
to be owned. Our relationship to Country is an embodied relation-
ship that extends beyond space and time. Colonialism has desperately 
been trying to erase Indigenous relationships with Country through 
various weapons of war, from massacres in the Australian frontier 
wars to the destruction of sacred lands and resources for profits, 
to the forced removal of Indigenous children from their families 
and Countries, to the contemporary bushfires. The relationship 
Indigenous people have with Country reminds us that the fire can 
be resisted and the future can be protected. Indigenous cosmologies 
resist colonial violence and war, as explored in greater detail below 
through my analysis of Wiradyuri women’s relationships of grand-
mother and granddaughter. Indigenous ways of knowing, being and 
doing, can be a way to prevent and heal from colonial violence and 
nurture the future.
decolonising knowledges: shifting from settler 
futurity to giyira 
For Indigenous people the past, present and future are intercon-
nected. Understanding and analysis of the past is crucial for 
developing meaning and understanding of contemporary contexts 
and structures. However, discussions of the future are equally as 
important when attempting to end the war on Country. Core to 
ending the war on Country is shifting from ‘settler futurity’ to giyira. 
This shift involves decolonising and transforming hierarchies of 
knowledge and examining structures of privilege and power that 
sustain white/Western knowledges as superior while dismissing 
Indigenous knowledges. The continuation of dominant discourses 
and structures, epitomised by white supremacy, that sustain colonial 
violence will only further place Western systems of knowledge 
as superior. We cannot continue to position white and Western 
knowledges as the benchmark system through which peace and 
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solution must be explored. If this hierarchy of knowledge continues, 
the war on Country will continue and our future is endangered. 
Settler futurity refers to a future where settler power and bodies are 
sustained and preserved, while Indigenous bodies are erased (Baldwin 
2012; Tuck and Gatzambide-Fernandez 2013; Goodyear-Ka’opua 
2017). Settler futurity is an understanding of the future as a separate, 
disembodied and disconnected time and space. It is important to 
note that settler futurity is not merely an idea or theory, but is an 
active agent in contemporary and past society. Settler futurity frames 
Indigenous people and culture as a thing of the past, and therefore 
positions the future to relate to and centre around settler, colonial 
and white identities. Settler futurities reassert colonial narratives of 
Indigenous people as savages and a race that cannot survive time 
(Goodyear-Ka’opua 2017). Settler futurities are actioned now in the 
present in ways that forcibly violate Indigenous relationships with 
Country in a hope to erase Indigenous people. 
The ignorance and neglect of climate change by white politicians 
and citizens represent settler futurities and are purposeful and 
strategic actions of the war on Country. The absence of caring for 
Country in a way that sustains and enriches Country for our grand-
daughters and their granddaughters are examples of colonial violence. 
This inaction does not come from not knowing, but rather a space of 
knowledge hierarchy that sees Indigenous ways of knowing, being 
and doing as invalid, wrong and relating to the past. Through the 
fire, settler futurity aims to erase evidence of Indigenous knowing, 
being and doing through violently destroying the being that is central 
to our survival, Country. Indigenous knowledges, and in particular 
Indigenous women, are key in shifting settler futurity logics and 
practice; our bodies symbolise Indigenous futurities through giyira. 
Our bodies resist settler futurity as they loudly and unapologetically 
protest that Indigenous people are here and will continue to live 
through our ways of caring for Country. As Goodyear-Ka’opua (2017, 
187) states, ‘in many ways the Indigenous person’s most powerful 
weapon against further destructions and exploitation is simply 
staying and surviving’. Decolonisation is a solution to war; however, 
it cannot succeed unless Indigenous women, our sovereignty, voices, 
knowledges and bodies, are central to this transformation.
Giyira
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Discussions about, and solutions to the war on Country cannot be 
abstract or guided by catch phrases. Decolonisation is not a metaphor, 
it is a process of continued action. Tuck and Yang assert the dangers 
in decolonisation being taken as a metaphor: 
When metaphor invades decolonization, it kills the very possibil-
ity of decolonization; it re-centres whiteness, it resettles theory, 
it extends innocence to  the settler, it entertains a settler future. 
Decolonize (a verb) and decolonization (a noun) cannot  easily 
be grafted onto pre-existing discourses/frameworks, even if they 
are critical, even if they  are anti-racist, even if they are justice 
frameworks. The easy absorption, adoption, and  transposing of 
decolonization is yet another form of settler appropriation. (Tuck 
and Yang 2012, 3)
Decolonisation used as a metaphor echoes white supremacist logics 
as it proposes a white/settler innocence, excusing guilt and respon-
sibility for the actions of war. This can be seen within institutions, 
including universities, where a wave of energy toward the inclusion 
of Indigenous people and knowledges has occurred; however, the 
methods of doing so have often maintained knowledge and racial 
hierarchies. The inclusion of Indigenous scholars and knowledge 
has been called an ‘addition of diversity’ to the dominant white 
structure (Green et al. 2018). Yet, these ‘inclusions’ are not genuine 
actions of justice, rather they are tokenistic, offensive and further the 
maintenance of colonial power by maintaining existing hierarchies of 
knowledge. Tuck and Gatzambide-Fernandez (2013, 73) describe this 
re-inscription of colonial violence by arguing that ‘white curriculum 
scholars re-occupy the “spaces” opened by responses to racism and 
colonisation in the curriculum, such as multiculturalism and critical 
race theory, absorbing the knowledge, but once again displacing 
the bodies out to the margins.’
White and non-Indigenous people must critically reflect, unpack 
and address their privilege and colonial legacies in order to even 
begin a process of decolonisation. This process is unsettling (Fanon 
1963; Tuck and Yang 2012). It is meant to be unsettling. Decolonisa-
tion disrupts space, fuelling discomfort. Decolonisation calls upon 
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each person to be, know and do in a way that unsettles all fibres of 
their being. Decolonisation calls for us to think of our role to nurture 
now, like a womb, and to nurture the future for those who will come 
after us, our future. 
caring for country: indigenous futurities 
Indigenous futurities reflect a relationship of care with Country that 
nurtures our future generations. Through our relationships to, with 
and through Country, colonial violence and the war on Country 
can be transformed. Indigenous people believe that the past, present 
and future are connected. This interrelationship of time differs from 
Western logics that see time as linear. Indigenous understandings of 
time and place reflect the notion that all things, past, present, future, 
living and non-living always exist in relationship. As Bryan Kamaloi 
Kuwada (cited in Goodyear-Ka’opua 2017, 184) states: 
We are trying to get people back to the right timescale, so that they 
can understand how they are connected and what is to come … we 
are operating on geological and genealogical time … The future is 
a realm we have inhabited for thousands of years.
 
Indigenous futurities therefore do not signal a new solution to 
ending war. Instead, they reflect a constant existence that can be 
engaged with to create safe and healthy Country for our granddaugh-
ters and their granddaughters. Indigenous futurities are a conception 
of the future as a realm that we are already a part of. This links directly 
to the concept of giyira, which means womb and future, and empha-
sises the relationship between past, present, and future (Grant Snr and 
Rudder 2018). Country and our bodies as Indigenous women are the 
womb, but we are simultaneously the future as it is through the womb 
that new life is created and nurtured. Therefore, the state of our future 
depends upon the way in which we treat or mistreat Country now, as 
the health of the womb determines the health of the future. Colonial 
violence aims to destroy Country, in turn wounding the womb and 
wounding the future. Indigenous ways of knowing, being and doing 
provide space to transform colonial relationships with land, through 
a culture that is based upon respect, love and care for Country. 
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Indigenous relations to Country reflect a relationship of connection 
and deep care. For Wiradyuri people, caring for Country is a part of 
our culture, as Wiradyuri woman Sue Green (2018, 141) states:
the role of caring was not just situated with one person and an 
individual was not seen as being someone who was specially cared 
for, but rather everyone was cared for and everyone played a role in 
caring and nurturing the family and community. 
Caring for Country in this way presents a powerful solution for ending 
colonial violence and the war on Country. Indigenous futurities, 
including giyira, assert our sovereignty as Indigenous people, which 
shifts dominating colonial discourses about the future (Goodyear-
Ka’Opua and Kuwada 2018, 50). Indigenous knowledges, specifically 
the importance of women and futurity, highlight powerful ways of 
thinking, being and doing that can end colonial violence and the war 
on Country. 
Giyira, womb and future, is a being and action of past, present and 
future. This chapter takes particular focus upon the future through 
a Wiradyuri women’s lens. This positionality challenges notions 
of settler futurity, and emphasises a sovereign, decolonised and 
Indigenous understanding of future through women and relation-
ships. I argue that, in order to solve the war on Country, we must 
look to the future through a lens of relationships, as opposed to one 
of settler futurity. In this context, future refers to our future genera-
tions, including our grandchildren, as well as the Country they will 
be in relationship with. Thus, discussions of giyira pose solutions to 
ending the war on Country as a collective consciousness of care for 
all things, including self, people and land, and is critical to the ways 
we be, know and do now in the present. 
giyira: womb and future – i am granddaughter,  
i am grandmother 
In Wiradyuri way of life we learn that everything exists in a network 
of relationships. Through these relationships our ways of being in 
the world are influenced and transformed. In Wiradyuri culture we 
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understand that relationships create and govern our being and future. 
As stated by Elder Uncle Stan Grant Snr and Dr Paul Rudder (2018, 
8), ‘the value of anything is also connected to an understanding 
of relationships between that item and its relationships, to people, 
events, [and] places’. In effect, our value and wellbeing as humans 
can only be seen to be of the same value as Country. If Country is 
respected and treated with care and love, our bodies too reflect this 
positive peaceful state. However, if violence and war is perpetrated 
upon Country, much like the devastating fires in Australia 2019–20, 
then our bodies too become wounded. Moreover, if our bodies as 
women become wounded then our future is in jeopardy. My body 
is future and womb, if my body is unwell, the future is endangered. 
When Country is harmed by colonial violence and war, our connec-
tions to story, history, songlines and being are also harmed. Colonial 
violence aims to erase Country, and therefore erase Indigenous 
women’s bodies, as we are an extension of Country. Colonial violence 
aims to maintain and instil white supremacy and colonial legacies for 
the future. Therefore, Indigenous women and our ways of knowing, 
being and doing are key to preserving the future, as our bodies 
resist the power of white supremacy and colonial legacies which are 
weapons of the war on Country. 
Giyira, as an expression of Indigenous futurity, allows for Wiradyuri 
relations of caring for Country to become embedded into societal 
discourse, disrupting violence and liberating our future granddaugh-
ters. Decolonising and transforming discourses and relationships to 
Country are key to nurturing and caring for the future. Transforming 
settler colonial relations to land emphasises the need for reasserting 
the role of humans as protectors or carers of Country (Goodyear-
Ka’opua 2017). In order to protect our future, we must ensure a future 
is likely; here the womb plays the most critical role. Giyiria is how 
Wiradyuri women protect, through our bodies, and ensure that our 
existence continues. This continuation is not just about the physical 
existence of our bodies, but rather the powerful message our bodies 
carry; we are here, we cannot be erased, our granddaughters are here, 
our granddaughters cannot be erased. Through our wombs, the future 
is here and continues to be nurtured as our future generations and the 
stories they carry will continue. Our wombs are an act of resistance to 
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colonial violence, giyira is thus a way through which we can end the 
war on Country. 
conclusion
Colonial violence and the war on Country threaten the future. 
Indigenous ways of knowing, being and doing are the key to trans-
forming violence, ending war on Country, and creating safe space for 
the future. Settler futurity is a dominant understanding of the future 
that gains its power through colonial weapons of war and violence 
actioned in the present. Settler futurity emphasises the erasure of 
Indigenous people and knowledges, while aiming to ensure a future 
that benefits white power and ownership over Country. Indigenous 
ways of knowing, being and doing, in particular Indigenous women, 
our bodies and knowledges, are key to solving the war on Country. 
Through the Wiradyuri concept of giyira, the importance of (1) 
considering the future and (2) our role in nurturing and caring 
for the present to ensure a safe future is explored. This chapter 
emphasises the importance of challenging and reconceptualising 
dominant understandings of time, land and relationships as central 
to the process of decolonisation. Decolonisation is the solution to war 
on Country. Shifting from settler futurity to Indigenous futurities 
expresses the importance of thinking and acting in order to create 
safety for our granddaughters and future generations. Through the 
knowing, being and doing of our bodies now we can end the war on 
Country and ensure a healthy future for our grandchildren. Baladhu 
giyira, baladhu giyira. I am womb. I am future. 
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One for All, All for One:  
Taking Collective Responsibility for 
Ending War and Sustaining Peace 
Heidi Hudson
The chapter will advocate for feminist principles of solidarity and 
community that foster collective responsibility for war and peace. 
It theorises war and peace as a shared activity and responsibility. 
Despite efforts by critical and feminist scholars in the global North 
to challenge the narrow framings of (human) security, security 
discourses and practices continue to reflect individualist, abstract, 
and rights-based understandings of war and peace. The chapter will 
therefore consider an endogenous solution to ending war. Communal 
responsibility for war and peace can shift the focus from which 
warring parties or powerful individuals are accountable for ending 
wars. The feminist solutions in this chapter propose that war is an 
activity that we are all connected to in real ways, and therefore have a 
mutual responsibility to resist. 
The chapter draws on an integrated reading of Ubuntu, African/
Ubuntu feminisms and feminist ethics of care principles. It makes 
a case for embracing collective responsibility as an integral step in 
globally ending war. Ubuntu/Ubuntu feminism has emancipatory 
potential to end war and human insecurity, because, at the epis-
temological level, it serves as a critique of Western modernity. I 
present Ubuntu – an African value system(s) and philosophy(s) of 
personhood – as a means to reconsider contemporary Western and 
neoliberal visions of peace and security. Ontologically, Ubuntu/
Ubuntu feminism offers practical suggestions to foster friendly and 
caring relations that have wide relevance for both preventing conflict 
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and reconciling communities after conflict. Extending a normative 
framework that is based on liberal human rights to include Ubuntu-
inspired, African-centred, feminist interpretations of community 
and human security drives home the recognition that the solution to 
ending war is not ‘out there’; war is not just someone else’s problem to 
solve; we all need to be active, caring participants in bringing about 
the end of wars.
I start by outlining the contributions of critical and Western 
feminist scholars to peace and security and highlight how their con-
tributions have opened space for thinking about collective security. 
These approaches have not succeeded in dislodging the individual 
from the centre of how war, security and peace are analysed and 
theorised. In the second section I introduce Ubuntu as an African 
philosophy, showing how hospitality, identity and solidarity underpin 
a radical rethinking of who is responsible for war. In the third part, 
I discuss the peculiar relationship between Ubuntu feminisms and 
Ubuntu ‘proper’, showing how Ubuntu feminism amplifies human 
security. In the fourth section, I map out a related feminist version 
of human security that revolves around a global ethic of care. Taking 
the complementarity of Ubuntu, Ubuntu feminism and feminist care 
ethics into account, the chapter concludes with two elements of this 
singular solution of taking collective responsibility for ending war 
– taking collective responsibility for being hospitable to others, and 
from there, taking collective responsibility to care for others.
feminist and other collectivist attempts  
to move from war to peace
Despite the emergence of a climate of neighbourliness after the end of 
the Cold War, collective security arrangements have remained largely 
state-centric and focused on building military confidence, failing 
to translate collective security into collective responsibility. Human 
security emerged as policy tool and academic agenda for bottom-up, 
non-statist thinking about the absence of threat to human life, lifestyle 
and culture through the fulfilment of basic needs (UNDP 1994).
The global peace movement of the 1980s advocated for thinking 
about peace and security as an end state of ‘one for all, and all for 
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one’. Feminist contributions have moved understandings of collec-
tive security closer to collective responsibility by redefining power 
as ‘the ability to act in concert’ (Hannah Arendt in Hudson 1998, 
73). Collective security is therefore dependent on collective respon-
sibility as the means to prevent war and promote peace/security. 
Interdependence, mutual enablement and empathy are given prefer-
ence over masculine-associated autonomy, self-help, individualism 
and competition. In practice, it requires a collaborative approach 
where the survival of one depends on the wellbeing of the other, 
and where collaboration is not motivated by individual interest. The 
practice of mutuality also requires situated thinking about security 
in terms of care and everyday concerns, within a particular commu-
nity, and not in relation to isolated individuals. By deconstructing 
‘the human’ in human security, feminists and critical scholars have 
challenged the assumed universalism of basic needs of protection 
(‘freedom from fear’) and empowerment (‘freedom from want’). 
Yet, feminist human security scholarship has also been criticised 
for remaining stuck in individualist liberal approaches (Du Plessis 
2019, 42). 
The strong affinity between human security and human rights 
partly explains the failure to dislodge the liberal subject. Both human 
security and human rights speak predominantly to abstract autono-
mous liberal individuals rather than to communities in context. A 
case in point is United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 on 
Women, Peace and Security, where the liberal pro-women language 
presumes universal rights rather than rights that are connected to 
the economic, social and cultural context in which they are claimed. 
These feminist limitations form part of bigger liberal peace practices 
such as Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) and 
Security Sector Reform (SSR), which assume a ‘one-size-fits-all’ set 
of post-conflict reconstruction initiatives. Similarly, for countries 
emerging from violent and protracted conflict, elections are rarely 
an expression of collective responsibility for ending war and sustain-
ing peace, but rather vehicles of heightened competition and conflict.
Despite these shortcomings, and the fact that security scholar-
ship in general has been slow in making a substantive theoretical 
and empirical connection between collective security and collec-
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tive responsibility, critical-feminist work has nevertheless created 
openings for thinking about collective responsibility. 
ubuntu – ‘i am because we are’
In light of these remaining limitations, we need alternative, contextu-
alised approaches to pursuing peace and ending wars. One option is 
to bring largely Western critical-feminist perspectives into conversa-
tion with the African philosophy of Ubuntu and African feminisms. 
When a person is praised as having Ubuntu, it refers to the fact that 
s/he is generous, hospitable, friendly, caring and compassionate. This 
particular version of relationality has many dimensions: First, it goes 
to the heart of what it means to be human, stating that one’s humanity 
is bound up in the humanity of others – ‘a person is a person through 
other people’. Second, shared humanity is grounded in a sense of 
belonging, or as Archbishop Tutu remarked: ‘I am human because I 
belong, I participate, and I share.’ Third, a person with Ubuntu affirms 
rather than fights others, because there is a sense of belonging ‘in a 
greater whole [which] is diminished when others are … oppressed’ 
(Murithi 2006, 28). 
Restoring harmonious relationships through collective agreement 
is an ancient worldview (Peacock 2019, 3) not exclusive to Africa, 
and should therefore not be linked to Africans in an essentialist way 
as being stereotypically collectivist. Ubuntu is often criticised for its 
ambiguous nature – its gender-blindness, associating caregiving just 
with women. While women are celebrated as mothers, they have little 
decision-making power outside of this private sphere (Manyonganise 
2015). And although the philosophy and practice of Ubuntu is con-
tested (Manyonganise 2015), it nevertheless offers a number of tenets 
that can aid in an understanding of collective responsibility. Two key 
facets of Ubuntu are relevant for the feminist objective of ending 
wars. The first is hospitality, or the practice of opening up your home 
to others. The second tenet concerns the conditions that make such 
hospitality possible, and revolves around identity – namely how you 
view yourself in this relationship of caring. In a third tenet, Ubuntu 
feminism also extends the principles of Ubuntu through a collab-
orative approach to gender relations. The fourth tenet of Ubuntu 
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feminism relates to transcending gender binaries. In the following 
section I outline these four tenets of Ubuntu feminism and advocate 
for Ubuntu-inspired feminism. I then link my loosely-defined Ubuntu 
feminism to the two tenets of an ethics of care (its global reach and the 
salience of dependency) as a means to outline my ‘collective respon-
sibility’ solution to ending war.
Ubuntu hospitality: Laying the foundation for sharing and caring
The Nguni saying Siyakwamukela or wamlekile ekhaya (‘you are 
welcome’) captures Ubuntu philosophical connections of hospitality 
to the idea of sharing. The African saying izandla ziyagezana (‘hands 
wash each other’) (Chisale 2018, 5) invokes the notion of ‘sharing 
is caring’, grounded in the values of co-responsibility for the mutual 
enjoyment of rights, creating mutual interests and giving mutual satis-
faction. This hospitality also extends to the environment, holistically 
connecting past, present and future, connecting with ancestors in a 
web of ‘ecological togetherness’ (Seehawer 2018, 455, 456). Ubuntu 
can therefore support feminist solutions to ending war because, as 
a way of thinking, it underpins, for instance, the shared commit-
ment of women’s organisations, such as the Foundation for Women 
Affected by Conflict (FOWAC) in northern Uganda, supporting rape 
survivors. 
Identity, solidarity and humility 
What makes such hospitality or sharing possible? It is sustained 
by three interconnected factors – identity, solidarity and humility. 
Thaddeus Metz argues that the capacity for community is depend-
ent on the ability to identify with others, and displaying solidarity 
with them (Metz 2011, 533). But identifying with a group is not 
enough – there must be an expression of solidarity, a recognition of 
shared interests and mutual responsibility before care or mutual aid 
can materialise and produce mutual benefit. Solidarity thus coheres 
around sympathy for the group or having a genuine interest in each 
other’s wellbeing (Metz 2011, 538). Solidarity means one cares about 
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other people’s human security. Ubuntu is also about becoming 
more fully human, without being selfish (Molefe and Magam 2019, 
315–16), knowing full well that this process of becoming is always 
perpetual. Ubuntu therefore necessitates humility in recognis-
ing one’s own shortcomings and the need to rely on others. It also 
underlines that no identity is ever final and is only sustained through 
relationships with incomplete ‘others’ (Nyamnjoh 2015, 1–2). And 
it is therefore through this combination of identity, solidarity and 
humility that a deep relationality (the musketeer principle) begins 
to override people’s status as discrete individuals compelling them to 
support one another during times of war.
Living the reality of care and community
African feminisms (Kolawole 2002) arise out of the concrete realities 
of African women’s lives. Their lives are pivoted on daily, gendered 
practices of responsibility, caregiving and community building 
during times of war and peace. Fatma Ibnouf (2020), in her study 
on wartime care work and peace-building in Africa, hones in on the 
everyday structures that sustain lives during violent armed conflict 
and, specifically, care work performed by women. She draws atten-
tion to the unpaid and less visible care work that women do in 
conflict and post-conflict/peace-building contexts such as Darfur, 
western Sudan. It is often forgotten that it is exactly through this 
role as care workers during conflict that women actually earn their 
place as valid protagonists in peace-building processes. Most often it 
is women who take on the responsibility to keep life going (for all) 
during and after the conflict. There is therefore a direct link between 
women’s responsibilities to care for life and their commitment to end 
war. This connection is important – not to essentialise women’s com-
mitment to peace, but rather to revalue care and peace by making it 
a collective commitment. Ubuntu-feminist principles of responsibil-
ity revolve around the family/community. It is a holistic approach 
concerned with the wellbeing of the whole community, both male 
and female. The implications of this are that you cannot end war 
from a distance through standardised international recipes; experi-
ences of war and conflict are local, immediate and integrally linked 
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to the interdependence of men and women in their social and spatial 
contexts.
Community and security as inclusive to all genders 
African-feminist understandings of social justice contend that social 
transformation for all can only be achieved through women cooper-
ating with men – not by reversing gender roles (Ogundipe 1994). By 
extension, ending war becomes a shared responsibility that recog-
nises differential gendered experiences of war, and equally important 
roles for both men and women in making peace. It recognises how 
both men and women, through gendered expectations, are respon-
sible for conflict/violence. For instance, in Uganda, masculinity is 
associated with ownership of cattle, a norm that in the past has driven 
many men and boys to participate in cattle raiding, which in turn 
sparked violent conflict between communities. Women also promote 
conflict by encouraging men to partake in raids. When environ-
mental and economic conditions make some tribes dependent on 
cattle for their livelihoods, competition increases. Conflict poten-
tial is further raised because scarcity of cattle impedes men’s ability 
to pay bride wealth, thereby also affecting their sense of masculinity 
(Watson et al. 2018).
For collective responsibility across gender divides to take root, we 
need to first unlearn individualist thinking about what makes us feel 
(in)secure and then we need to understand that both conflict and 
peace are influenced by gender norms. For Ubuntu feminism, binary 
gender separation is not a given; its point of departure is not to reify 
sexed distinctions, instead offering an opening for thinking about 
root causes in multidimensional terms that transcend gender stereo-
types of peaceful women and violent men. 
In practical terms, to sensitise all genders to address the need 
for security means that women must work with men to eradicate 
the oppression of women through the creation of dialogical spaces 
between them. Part of this process of affiliation starts with the recog-
nition that men have enjoyed the benefits of the patriarchal dividend 
at the expense of women. The next ‘step’ would be for men to rec-
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ognise that Ubuntu is their construction and that they have defined 
it in rather narrow terms, thereby marginalising women. This 
common understanding should then be used as the basis from which 
notions of community, and gender roles and responsibilities, can be 
renegotiated. 
Whereas the feminist notion of intersectionality (Crenshaw 1991) 
is constructed around a negative relationality of interlocked oppres-
sions, Ubuntu feminism embodies a positive relationality of shared 
security and the ‘freedom to relate’ (Du Plessis 2019, 44). This is a 
radical departure from the understanding of human security as 
freedom from want or fear. Conceived as such, Ubuntu feminism 
offers us an understanding of human intersubjectivity that looks for 
commonalities across genders instead of looking for sameness with 
a particular group. This drive to ‘reach out’ or relate therefore works 
against seeing all men as violent perpetrators and women as eternal 
victims (Du Plessis 2019, 44). Ubuntu feminism extends Ubuntu’s 
notion of collective responsibility towards a more inclusive form of 
relationality where gender is not always primary and sometimes has 
to subject itself to the bond between men and women against racism, 
imperialism and war. It is this element of strategic/pragmatic fluidity 
that imbues Ubuntu feminism with the ability to make ordinary 
beings engage in ‘extraordinary’ acts of kindness during conflict. The 
story of a Sierra Leonean boy soldier who demanded a chicken at 
gunpoint is a case in point. While he was waiting, the woman of the 
house gave him a biscuit and water: ‘Later my neighbours criticized 
me for giving him the biscuit. I said I didn’t care if he was a rebel or 
not. He’s still somebody’s child’ (Cockburn 2007, 42). 
a globally connected ubuntu? care as the 
ethical and practical basis of human security 
Although Ubuntu and Ubuntu feminism do not speak directly 
to human security, their emphasis on care and community may 
address the gaps within dominant security perspectives in respect 
of gendered human security. Within state security perspectives, 
women are subject to biopolitical control of their bodies, sexuality 
(reproduction) and labour (production) for the benefit of others. In 
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a people-centric approach, a connection is made between women’s 
vulnerability/insecurity and the lack of development, making women 
the ‘faces of development’. A gendered human security is therefore 
conflated with a women-centric human security, and the woman in 
question is the bearer of universal rights to protection and empow-
erment (Du Plessis 2019, 45–7). What is clearly missing from this 
thinking is the complex and interconnected context within which 
these individual rights are being exercised or infringed upon, and 
how this relates to the global context.
In the analysis of Ubuntu and Ubuntu feminisms, I have largely 
pitched the encounters at the community/local and private level, in 
the everyday where family, marriage and motherhood enact them-
selves. But this runs the risk of depicting care as a responsibility that 
is localised in the home. It is necessary to make more explicit con-
nections with the realm of global security politics. For this purpose, I 
draw on Fiona Robinson’s (2011) theory on the ethics of care related 
to human security to extend my Ubuntu-feminist approach to war 
and peace. Her relational ontology approach (similar to Ubuntu) 
suggests that dependence and interdependence are fundamental to 
human existence (Robinson 2011, 4). The aim should be to under-
stand the nature of the relationships as well as locating the political, 
social and economic sources from where the relationships originate. 
Robinson (2011, 10) argues that relationships of domination and 
exclusion emanate from existing structures of power and inequal-
ity, ranging from local (e.g. the household) to global structures such 
as the global political economy, and consequently impact directly 
on the practices of care. Care is therefore not only a private matter 
confined to the family or local community (as depicted in Ubuntu 
and Ubuntu feminism respectively) but is also a global political 
issue that is central to the survival and security of people. How states 
‘care for’ their citizens through decisions about the distribution of 
resources has a direct impact on human security (Robinson 2011, 
3). How families and communities care for one another equally has a 
direct impact on state security.
Robinson offers insights for understanding security as dependence. 
She maintains that we should rethink dependency: 
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Our view of security in global politics would change once we rec-
ognise and accept not just interdependence among states but the 
ways responsibilities and practices of care grow out of relations 
of dependence and vulnerability among people in the context of 
complex webs of relations of responsibility. (Robinson 2011, 4)
Similar to Nyamnjoh, Robinson (2011, 11) argues that dependence 
should not be seen as something that needs to be overcome. It is a 
‘normal’ aspect of human existence and interaction with other vul-
nerable human beings. These insights should be integrated into 
security theory in non-paternalistic ways. 
With such a radical redefinition of the primacy of dependence, the 
relational qualities of security come to the fore. These include, first, 
the understanding that feeling secure has to do with a sense of belong-
ing/attachment and knowing that others are there to provide support 
(Robinson 2011, 7). Second, the human subjects of human security 
are understood as ‘human-beings-in-relations’ (Robinson 2011, 10), 
who function within networks of shared responsibility. Third, such 
a relational ontology presumes that human rights are much more 
powerful if viewed as relational and collective and located within 
the wider context of care (Robinson 2011, 11–12). In contrast, the 
dominant human rights perspective of human security focuses on 
autonomy and individual responsibility. Women as bearers of univer-
sal, abstract, inalienable rights and entitlements can only have human 
security if they are protected and empowered within a context of 
autonomy. Therefore, under conditions of poverty, a woman’s right 
to independence hinges on the level of protection against threats to 
personal security (usually by and from men as police, aid workers, 
fathers, husbands and partners). 
Robinson’s relational ethic of care theory displays a substantive 
degree of normative overlap with the epistemologies of Ubuntu and 
Ubuntu feminisms. But more importantly, it extends the principles 
of Ubuntu and African feminisms in significant ways by making 
explicit links between human relations and (human) security, and by 
recognising the political nature of relationality. Robinson reminds us 
to think of gendered human security as a deep appreciation of human 
interdependence, intersubjectivity, connectedness and relationality. 
One for All
39
a roadmap of sorts for action 
We need to read Ubuntu (as an African philosophy), Ubuntu 
feminism (as an extension and corrective to Ubuntu) and the theory 
of a global ethic of care (as a challenge to the co-optation of human 
security as complementary to state security) in conjunction. In so 
doing, we can begin to see how the feminist combination of Ubuntu 
and human security helps us to take seriously collective responsibil-
ity, changing the way we understand war and peace-building. Two 
broad ‘solutions’ to end war and ensure sustainable peace emerge 
from an integrated reading of the three perspectives. 
Take collective responsibility for ending war and sustaining peace 
through hospitality 
A ‘one for all, all for one principle’, present in all three above philo-
sophical approaches, advocates that all citizens (global or otherwise) 
must collectively share the responsibility for ending war. Nyamnjoh 
(2019, 3) states that being inhospitable is tantamount to declaring 
war as it rejects the bond of allegiance and solidarity. In this context, 
hospitality becomes a tool to achieve a sense of collective responsibil-
ity, as inspired by Ubuntu, Ubuntu feminism and ethics of care. 
Ubuntu offers us a new vocabulary in relation to war. We learn 
that war, human insecurity and human rights violations constitute 
grave degradations of people’s capacity for hospitality. Deprivations 
(want) or poverty seriously hinder people’s capacity for communal 
relationships because they deprive them of the ability and dignity to 
share or take care of others (Hoffmann and Metz 2017, 158, 159). The 
obverse – peace or freedom – is therefore not about ‘freedom from 
fear or want’ (human security speak), or freedom from interference 
of others (liberal speak) but about interdependence and collective 
responsibility. 
In addition, we learn that offering hospitality to strangers or 
travellers is a deliberate choice. Ubuntu feminism reminds us that 
making peace is not an accident, but requires a deliberate interven-
tion or change of heart; for example why women are included and/
or excluded from the peace table. In a patriarchal and violent envi-
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ronment, the reality is that women have to be ‘invited’ by men who 
display a change of heart, ‘allowed in’ by men who understand that 
men and women are collectively responsible for war and for ending 
it. And then the hard work begins not only to change behaviour but 
also the gendered norms that drive the behaviour. 
Finally, we learn that hospitality involves communal human 
encounters (Waghid and Smeyers 2012, 15) – relationships of 
accountability and responsibility. Working from the principle of sol-
idarity, identifying with others and sharing lives of mutuality and 
reciprocity, Ubuntu offers very particular applications for when war 
ends. When post-conflict restorative justice processes are instituted, 
hospitality forms the ‘meeting point’ where ‘the dominant (violent) 
one [becomes] answerable to the one against whom violence is per-
petrated’ (Waghid and Smeyers 2012, 14). 
To illustrate how collective responsibility might be operation-
alised, I draw upon a traditional structure of Inkundla/Lekgotla, a 
group mediation and reconciliation forum. This process of conflict 
resolution, using various stages of collective responsibility, demon-
strates how peaceful transition from war into sustainable peace can 
be ‘actioned’. The first stage involves fact-finding where the views 
of victims, perpetrators and witnesses are heard and perpetrators 
encouraged to acknowledge responsibility. In stage two, perpetrators 
are encouraged to demonstrate genuine remorse. During the third 
stage, perpetrators are encouraged to ask for forgiveness; victims are 
asked to show mercy. The fourth stage is where the perpetrator is 
expected to pay an appropriate compensation or reparation for the 
wrong done; amnesty is granted, but not with impunity; and in the 
final, the fifth stage, the process is consolidated by encouraging the 
parties to commit themselves to reconciliation. It is a public partici-
patory process, but also one where there is a public display of support 
(and communal responsibility) for both victim and perpetrator, who 
is never alone but always accompanied by family and friends (Murithi 
2006, 30–31).
This step of hospitality involves actions of opening up and engage-
ment; inviting parties to your home, the peace summit/lekgotla, as 
opposed to excluding them from such private and public spaces. 
This provides the foundation for deep care to develop. Collective 
One for All
41
responsibility conceived as restorative and hospitable can therefore 
complement the punitive edges of conventional justice. 
Take collective responsibility for ending war and sustaining peace 
through practising a feminist care ethic
The above depiction of reconciliation, however, runs the risk of pre-
senting the process as uncomplicated. This is certainly not the case, 
as the construction of community solidarity does not take place in a 
vacuum where individual interest is absent. For this reason, we must 
include an ethics of care to ensure that the causes of war/conflict are 
resolved, rather than simply leading to a cessation of armed violence. 
This involves a community-centred collective understanding of 
mutual care.
Ubuntu feminism’s cooperative stance in relation to men for the 
sake of the community/family, together with Robinson’s elevation 
of dependence and vulnerability as key to achieving human security 
force us to think of security in relational terms. As previously dis-
cussed, externally imposed solutions such as SSR and DDR often fail 
because they do not address underlying grievances. Operationalising 
an ethic of care as a global practice is therefore proposed as a means 
to move from addressing symptoms of war to root causes. To move 
beyond abstraction, we need to remember that security threats and 
root causes are related. 
Relations of care are rooted in everyday experiences of (in)security. 
By introducing human subjectivity and human relations of depend-
ence and vulnerability into human security thinking one begins to 
see the actual human (and natural environment) entanglements. This 
relationality expands human security’s rights-based focus on discrete 
individuals who are deemed insecure and unprotected because they 
do not have rights. We must focus on mutual responsibility for both 
conflict and peace. In conventional security approaches, we fail to see 
marginalised groups in society and how relations of power threaten 
human security (Robinson 2011, 8). An alternative Ubuntu-feminist 
framing helps us recognise that it involves not only collective respon-
sibility for ending war, but also for creating a peace where community 
Hudson
42
care/hospitality is valued equally, rather than being a task or role of a 
particular gender.
In this contribution, I proposed to operationalise this ideal through 
an integrated reading of Ubuntu, Ubuntu feminisms and a feminist 
global ethic of care for human security (a globally connected version 
of Ubuntu). Each strand of thought offers a particular piece of the 
collective responsibility puzzle. By combining the specific insights 
of Ubuntu on hospitality, Ubuntu feminism on cooperative rela-
tions with men/gender relationality, and feminist security theory 
on its global application, this roadmap or tool provides us with a 
more textured understanding of gendered human security. A serious 
engagement with collective responsibility would change the way we 
understand war, and has implications for peace that we are yet to con-
template fully.
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Feminist Organising for Peace 
Sarai B. Aharoni
This chapter suggests that ‘feminist organising for peace’ is a feminist 
response to war and a way to resist violence. In presenting this solution, 
I engage with research about failed attempts to pursue successful solu-
tions to armed conflict. Despite difficulties in feminist organising to 
achieve peace arrangements, feminist organising within civil society 
is a common and necessary reaction to armed violence. Feminist 
organising offers a practical way for ordinary women to engage in 
everyday politics and to resist war. Common means for organising 
include: the physical act of showing up to peace protests, the initia-
tion of street vigils or online activism, and the supply of material aid 
or emotional support to civilians during war. In long-term conflicts, 
these acts may transform into local or even international networks, 
non-governmental organisations (NGOs), or service-oriented insti-
tutions. Organising for peace is thus one of the most basic feminist 
solutions for ending war. 
The chapter begins with a brief explanation of feminist peace 
organising. Next, it explores causes that bring women, mothers and 
feminists to respond to war. I emphasise the importance of listening 
to various historical and contemporary narratives of peace activ-
ists (Levi-Hazan and Harel-Shalev 2019). These narratives illustrate 
how women describe personal and collective transformations that 
are required to resist armed violence and injustice. However, the 
second part of the chapter complicates peace organising through the 
concept of ‘shadow feminism’ and explores the frustration and fatigue 
expressed by some peace activists. Drawing upon Virginia Woolf ’s 
conceptualisation of women’s resistance to war as ‘outsiders’, I dem-
onstrate the fragile wellbeing of activists. Thus, as a feminist solution 
for ending war, organising for peace not only involves public attempts 
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to resist militarised violence or war, but also requires the creation of 
feminist spaces where new forms of collective self-care may endure.
what is different about feminist  
peace organising? 
Feminist organising against war is both a direct response to violence 
and an attempt to transform deeper social issues that relate to women’s 
rights and wellbeing. In her book, Maternal Thinking, first published 
in 1989, Sara Ruddick (1995) offered an important analytical differ-
entiation between two types of women’s political organisations. She 
identified one type as based on ‘women’s politics of resistance’ and a 
second type as based on ‘feminist politics’. Ruddick’s’ guidelines for 
classification are still strikingly relevant for analysing contemporary 
modes of civil society responses to war.
Ruddick suggested that maternal work and daily tasks of fostering 
growth in the home and private sphere are relevant for understanding 
women’s responses to global politics, war and injustice. For Ruddick, 
although mothers ‘are not intrinsically peaceful, maternal practice 
is a “natural resource” for peace politics’ (1995, 157). Consequently, 
women’s politics of resistance could be identified by three characteris-
tics: ‘its participants are women, they explicitly invoke their culture’s 
symbols of femininity, and their purpose is to resist certain prac-
tices or policies of their governors’ (Ruddick 1995, 222). Indeed, case 
study research on 20th-century women’s grassroots organisations in 
Argentina, South Africa, Bosnia, Israel, Chechnya, Sri Lanka, Nica-
ragua and Liberia suggest that Ruddick’s observations were correct. 
In these conflicts, women were politicising their traditional familial 
roles and using motherhood to mobilise support for peace activism 
(Kaufman and Williams 2010). 
Feminist politics, on the other hand, is used in Ruddick’s work to 
identify ‘a politics that is dedicated to transforming those social and 
domestic arrangements that deliberately or unwittingly penalize 
women because of their sex’ (1995, 234). Although not all women’s 
political movements identify as feminist and not all feminist groups 
endorse feminine-maternal ideals, these two motivations for action 
are often interconnected. Feminism, as a movement that aims to 
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change societal perceptions about dominance and inequality, ‘shifts 
the balance within maternal practice from denial to lucid knowledge, 
from parochialism to awareness of others’ suffering, and from com-
pliance to stubborn, decisive capacities to act’ (1995, 236). 
A decade later, Cynthia Enloe (2000) came to a similar conclu-
sion. Following numerous conversations she had with feminist peace 
activists around the world, her take was that feminist anti-militarist 
organising offered local women the possibility to generate knowledge 
about their own societies as a means to break silence. She writes: 
Feminists from India, Zimbabwe, and Japan to Britain, the United 
States, Serbia, Chile, South Korea, Palestine, Israel, and Algeria all 
have found that when they have followed the bread crumbs of priv-
ileged masculinity, they have been led time and again not just to 
the doorstep of the military, but to the threshold of all those social 
institutions that promote militarization. (2000, 33)
Therefore, while mothers or women may not have an intrinsic drive 
for activism, the reasons that they often find themselves organising 
for peace are due to their unique gendered political experiences as 
women and mothers. 
Nonetheless, while I appreciate feminist organising as a solution 
to ending war, I am not uncritical of its actual costs. These concerns 
echo a postcolonial critique of pragmatic approaches to feminist 
peace research and the tendency of Western scholars to impose a 
particular interpretation of ‘peace’. The diversity of women’s peace 
initiatives implies that we must pay attention to the ‘emic (grounded) 
understandings of the concept and the everyday negotiations that 
make life possible within violent torn societies’ (Roohi, in Wibben 
et al. 2018, 91). By listening carefully to the stories of women peace 
activists, we can learn about the specific institutional choices and the 
overall challenges of organising and resisting militarism during war.
how do feminists organise?
Evidence from various cases suggest that women’s activism in times 
of war often builds on pre-existing contacts, friendships and pro-
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fessional networks. Many times, it starts as a direct response to 
humanitarian crises and human suffering. This is how Igo Rogova 
from the Kosovo’s Women’s Network in Pristina described her group’s 
initial organising process:
When war started in ex-Yugoslavia, we became part of the regional 
women’s networks that raised their voices against the war and 
provided help to women and refugees in those very hard times. 
When the war came to Kosovo, women’s rights activists became 
refugees themselves, but never stopped working with women and 
for women, this time in refugee camps in Macedonia and Albania. 
(Barry 2005, 4)
 
Early phases of organising are often grounded in the material needs 
and priorities of civilian women and girls. This phase contains a 
sense of urgency that mobilises women to pursue collective action. 
As such, women’s organisations are on the ground long before inter-
national actors arrive and will be there long after they leave, even if 
their members become victims of the conflict or displaced. 
Women’s peace organisations, initiatives, dialogue groups or public 
campaigns vary in their scope, form, size and duration. Some of them 
are formal institutions while others are grassroots gatherings. Since 
the 1980s and 1990s, there has been a steady worldwide growth of 
women’s participation in peace activism, which culminated in the 
formation of transnational network organisations that pushed for 
and drafted parts of Security Council Resolution 1325 (El-Bushra 
2007). Similar to the women who established political parties, inter-
national conferences, street rallies and petitions for peace in the early 
20th century (Confortini 2012), the surge of these global popular-
civic peace movements, many led by women, mothers and feminists, 
was a form of collective/group organising. Women’s organising for 
peace in this period was related to globalisation and enabled by the 
growing connections between local women’s groups in the decades 
which followed the signing of the Convention for the Elimination of 
all forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW 1979). 
Many women’s groups start on the grassroots level and are not 
part of official state mechanisms. In the early 21st century, NGOs 
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and international non-governmental organisations (INGOs) were 
the most common institutional forms of women’s collective action 
during and after war (Barry 2005). While initial phases of organi-
sation against war may include flexible and dynamic non-violent 
resistance through street protests or vigils, over time, NGOs enable 
more sophisticated structures for communication and build-up. 
NGOs have often formed when groups become institutionalised and 
engage in the monitoring and documentation of human rights vio-
lations, or when they collaborate to initiate informal dialogue and 
peace-building efforts, including projects that seek reparations for 
victims. Peace organising is related to the politics of institutions 
and the social and economic conditions that enable effective forms 
of action. As I explain later, these conditions also include emotional 
attachments that offer possibilities to foster a collective sense of safety 
and belonging during war. 
Advocates of women’s transnational organising for peace view 
it as a pragmatic approach to politics and conflict resolution. Ann 
Tickner and Jacqui True (2018) argue that women’s INGOs and 
feminist scholars who pushed for the adoption of the Women, 
Peace and Security (WPS) agenda were followers of the first wave 
of international feminism in the early 20th century. They identify 
both periods (post-First World War and post-Cold War) with a lib-
eral-pragmatic position towards the question of women and peace. 
This pragmatic logic of organising initiatives around WPS perceives 
the international sphere as a viable alternative to confining gender 
norms in the national sphere. By supporting local projects that foster 
dialogue between women from different conflict zones, the logic 
of transnational feminist solidarity is seen as a way to amplify the 
voices of political activists, refugees, displaced women and survi-
vors of conflict-related sexual violence (Cockburn 1998; Giles and 
Hyndman 2004). From this perspective, bringing women’s experi-
ences into international policy-making is a liberating path ‘to hold 
states accountable for putting these principles into practice with the 
ultimate purpose of ending conflict’ (Tickner and True 2018, 228).
Transforming women’s activism into NGOs may have benefits and 
limitations that could impact the broader objective of attaining peace. 
From an institutional perspective, the intense process of transforma-
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tion from informal groups into formal professional organisations 
in the fields of peace-building, human rights and women’s rights 
is sometimes referred to as NGOisation (Alvarez 2009). Although 
NGOs play an important role as transnational normative entrepre-
neurs (Keck and Sikkink 1999), they have been also criticised for 
displacing and disciplining grassroots organising and mass social 
movements (Choudry and Shragge 2011), and for weakening and 
depoliticising collective struggles for recognition and resources (Jad 
2003). Indeed, the effect of global power relations, economic inequal-
ity, differences in resources and mobility, as well as the different types 
of exposure to armed conflict, have influenced the issues and possi-
bilities for local organising (Tripp et al. 2008). The growing access to 
international funding may result, in certain cases, in a subtle colonial 
overtone, as international mechanisms to promote the role of women 
as peace-makers may ignore the long-standing activities of women’s 
organisations working to prevent, assist those affected by and raise 
awareness of violence against women, torture and rape.
One example of good intentions that have gone wrong is found in 
the case of Acehnese women’s groups in Indonesia that were able to 
organise two All‐Acehnese Women’s Peace Forums in 2000 and 2005 
with external funding to discuss the ongoing peace talks. Marjaana 
Jauhola (2016), who followed the history of the Finnish-brokered 
peace agreement between the Indonesian government and the rebels 
of the Free Aceh Movement (GAM), argued that ‘despite these local 
peace-building efforts, the results were disappointing, and the peace 
process legitimated a highly problematic elite‐masculinist agenda for 
the post‐conflict reconstruction’. Only one woman, Shadia Marhaban, 
participated in the actual rounds of negotiations. Marhaban admitted 
that she was unaware of the importance of including women’s rights 
perspectives at the time and later accused all the negotiating parties 
of failure to accommodate the concerns of Acehnese women in the 
post-conflict legal framework, to consider its potential violent conse-
quences for women, or to include redistributive economic measures. 
While not all professional NGOs have grassroots origins, these 
groups have varying degrees of social influence in post-conflict soci-
eties (Heideman 2017). In many places, feminist NGOs that work 
on peace and anti-militarism have managed to promote change by 
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creating spaces for the development of personal and collective capa-
bilities, crafting alternative political visions, and by introducing 
creative practices to solve conflict-related issues.1 Indeed, to measure 
the successes or failures of feminist organising for peace, it is essen-
tial to understand the different causes that bring women to publicly 
resist war and armed conflict.
personal and political transformations  
of peace activists
Dear Ms. Aharoni,
[…] I am a passionate reader and researcher in matters of con-
flicts, human rights and women’s issues, hence I decided to make 
these topics the main subject of my Master Thesis entitled: Women: 
united in building ties between cultures. The main goal of my thesis 
is to put in evidence the bravery of women, their strength and 
empathy towards one another. […] I conceive my work as a critic 
against our patriarchal society, rooted on negative stereotypes 
regarding women. Naturally I’ll be also writing about you in my 
thesis. (random email sent to author, 2014)
One of the important lessons I have learned as a scholar and activist 
is that organising for peace often starts with a transformation. Trans-
formation may refer to the personal process of becoming a political 
activist or to the collective build-up of a movement, organisation, 
project or protest that seeks to resist power, knowledge and political 
decisions concerning war and peace. Many times, actual experiences 
or strong emotions about war trigger the imagination of individu-
1 For example, the Israeli women’s peace movement, which is one of the most doc-
umented case studies in this field, has seen the emergence of 25 different groups 
between 1975 and 2018. Most of them were established by local women (Jewish, 
Arab and LGBT) during and after violent escalations and became registered NGOs 
over time. The main types of activity they engaged in are: protest, advocacy, peace 
education, community work and legal services. Only six of these groups were still 
active in 2018, the oldest among them is Women in Black, founded in 1988 (Aharoni 
and Hasson, 2020). For more discussion on the structure and impact of Israeli wom-
en’s peace organizations see also: Herzog (2008), Hermann (2009) and Lavie (2018).
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als in ways that enable new forms of thinking about old problems. 
Transformation thus appears both as a dramatic signifier in activists’ 
personal life stories and in the histories of social movements.
Reflecting on my life-story, I often think about the introduction 
to Jean Bethke Elshtain’s book Women and War (1987) as a good 
thought exercise. The book, one of the earliest feminist scholarly 
works about war, was written primarily from the perspective of an 
American political theorist trying to grapple with questions about 
politics and motherhood. In the introduction, Elshtain attempts 
to challenge existing practices of writing about war as a masculine 
topos and describes her personal transformation from being a girl-
child fascinated by stories about Jean d’Arc and heroic combat to 
an involved adolescent during the 1950s and, later on, to a political 
theorist and mother. Transformation as a form of political awakening 
is a key element for peace activism. 
The ability to come out in public and share political life stories 
reflects the ‘subjective turn’ in Western feminist academic scholar-
ship on peace in the 1980s. Carol Gilligan’s (1982) call to listen to 
women’s language and different voice on matters of morality, justice 
and ethics, had partially inspired Elshtain and many others. Indeed, 
much of my own ‘feminist curiosity’ grew out of personal experiences 
of war, and was later shaped by proximity to feminist organisations. 
Born in Israel to a father of Jewish Iraqi origin and an American-Jew-
ish mother, I self-identify as a Mizrachi-Jew. Having lived through 
several armed conflicts (Yom Kippur War, First Lebanon War, First 
Intifada, First Gulf War, Second Intifada, Second Lebanon War, 
War(s) on Gaza ), I have seen war’s three faces. First, as a civilian in a 
shelter, I experienced war at least three times: as a young girl, a high-
school student and a young mother of two young boys. Second, as a 
woman-soldier, I served in the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) during 
the First Palestinian Intifada and was trained to be part of a military 
organisation. Finally, unlike most Israeli women, I became involved 
in a local Israeli feminist organisation, Isha l’Isha- Haifa Feminist 
Center that addresses conflict-related issues, where I became involved 




After so many years of living in proximity to a protracted armed 
conflict, and being part of different feminist activities for peace and 
against the ongoing military occupation in Palestine together with 
Jewish and Palestinian women, I am considering the balance of 
success and failure. Though I acknowledge that feminist organising 
for peace does not always produce a successful or just resolution of 
armed conflict, as is the case of Israel-Palestine, I have come to under-
stand that collective actions of coming together have other purposes. 
In order to demonstrate the historical roots of communal resistance 
as a practice of survival and care, the remainder of this chapter takes 
an alternative way of thinking about feminism in hard times – during 
war, crisis or oppression. 
outsider resistance 
Organising as more than a solution to war: creating a community 
for peace …
This new society […] would have no honorary treasurer, for 
it would need no funds. It would have no office, no committee, 
no secretary; it would call no meetings; it would hold no confer-
ences. If name it must have, it could be called the Outsiders Society. 
(Virginia Woolf, ‘Three Guineas’, 1938, in Woolf 2007, 860)
Women’s collective organising could become an existential means 
to cope with harmful and violent experiences of war. But collective 
organising contains tensions about whether women should ‘lead from 
the inside’ through the institutionalisation of women’s peace groups 
or whether they should resist war and militarism by organising as 
‘outsiders’. Drawing upon Virginia Woolf ’s epistolary essay ‘Three 
Guineas’ (1938, in Woolf 2007), I consider if an ‘outsider society’ may 
be a radical feminist solution to war.
Woolf, a pacifist, understood war to be a violent and disruptive 
form of masculine dominance, which created a fraternal bond that 
excludes women as a group. She theorised that nationalism and its 
extreme manifestation in Fascist Italy, Spain and Nazi Germany, 
were interconnected with violent masculinity. As a response, Woolf 
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argued for total refusal and indifference. The ‘outsider’ should ‘refuse 
in the event of war to make munitions or nurse the wounded’ and 
promise ‘not to incite their brothers to fight, or to dissuade them, but 
to maintain an attitude of complete indifference’ (2007 [1938], 860). 
Most important:
The outsider will find herself in possession of very good reasons 
for her indifference. She will find that she has no good reason to 
ask her brother to fight on her behalf to protect ‘our’ country. […] 
For, the outsider will say, ‘in fact, as a woman, I have no country. As 
a woman I want no country. As a woman my country is the whole 
world.’ (Woolf 2007 [1938], 861)
Woolf ’s intuition was simultaneously visionary and troubling. While 
she understood the need for transnational cooperation between 
(Western, white, educated) women as a way to counter militarised 
masculinity, indifference as an emotional standpoint might seem 
to reflect a passive and unheroic political plan. Her own suicide 
in March 1941, when the German invasion of England seemed 
imminent, reflects an emotional disempowerment to resist extreme 
forms of violence. Above all, ‘Three Guineas’ stands out as a reminder 
of what it means to lose hope and signals the emotional importance 
of feminist organisations. 
Many decades after Woolf ’s death, feminists and women politi-
cal activists have learned that creating an organisation is also a way 
to establish alternative ‘homes’ in which women can find a shelter 
from external violence. In the words of Audrey Lorde: ‘Caring for 
myself is not self-indulgence, it is self-preservation, and that is an act 
of political warfare’ (2017 [1988], 130). Consequently, acts of coming 
together are understood today as deeply political because they enable 
new forms of collective self-care. 
Feminist organising for peace provides community in times when 
individuals are forced to conform to national, militaristic or other 
communal values. These benefits of a community are not part of 
pragmatic objectives linked with the WPS agenda, which include 
adding women to peace negotiations or including gender-related 
clauses in peace agreements. Rather, feminist organising as a solution 
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to end war recognises the role of identities and emotions in mobi-
lisation for peace. Feminist organising for peace allows women to 
use these collective spaces to maintain a sense of belonging. Femi-
nists like Sarah Ahmed (2017) advocate that feminist organisations 
are spaces in which personal and collective memories and experi-
ences of pain and suffering can resonate. As such, they operate more 
like fragile shelters than strong, institutional walls: ‘It can be pains-
taking to build a shelter from materials left behind; from histories 
that make it difficult for some to survive. And yet we need to build 
such shelters to enable that survival’ (Ahmed 2017, 2). As a fellow 
traveller and long-time documentarist of the Israeli feminist peace 
movement, my field notes and personal memories contain various 
references and examples to such spaces. Often referred to as work-
shops, study groups, dance parties, community events, these fragile 
gatherings are where friendships grow, personal stories are shared 
and shared dreams for the future are born. 
the failures of feminist organising:  
shadow feminisms
My name is Rawia Lucia Shammas. I am 36 [… once] I believed 
in feminism as a starting point in changing the world. I was sure 
that it was my destiny and my mission, being born as a Palestin-
ian in a country called Israel, as a minority, within my homeland, 
to bring about change. Today I am pessimistic […] because I think 
I am unable to change much in my daily life […] I am stuck here 
for many reasons; my fate is decided by others. (Loucia Shammas 
2008, 109)
 
Feminist organising for peace does not have a singular script or a 
clear path towards success. As such, ‘getting organised’ may summon 
unwanted opportunities to witness violence, painful encounters and 
failures. These stories are part of shadow feminisms that contrast well-
known narrative of success, as they haunt ‘the more acceptable forms 
of feminism that are oriented to positivity, reform and accommoda-
tion rather than negativity, rejection and transformation’ (Halberstam 
2011, 4). 
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The expectation that women in conflict zones should only speak 
positively about their efforts to promote peace reflects a general 
amnesia of past and contemporary suffering. This expectation accords 
with neoliberal values and a specific United Nations cultural context 
that favours hopeful and future-oriented ‘success stories’. Optimism 
is viewed by pragmatists as a necessary starting point for peace. Con-
sequently, certain negative emotions – failure, anger, hopelessness 
– are rarely represented as legitimate responses to armed conflict 
(Gibbings 2011). Hence, the assumed connection between legitimis-
ing women’s peace projects by only highlighting successful efforts has 
become a source of ‘cruel optimism’ (Berlant 2011) – an attachment 
to an idea or an object of hope, even after it loses its traction. Given 
the drive for success stories, the realities of failed efforts to transform 
and reject militarism and war, and the disappointment and pessi-
mism of those effected, remains in the shadow. 
Contrary to the heroic image of women peace-makers as prag-
matic visionaries, many women who organise against war encounter 
negative social responses that range from contempt, disrespect and 
indifference to bullying, surveillance, direct threats or even physical 
violence. So, while many activists seek to be public in their resistance 
to war, peace activism also carries hidden emotional costs: trauma, 
melancholy, depression and burnout which may lead women to leave 
politics and engage in more traditional roles of caring for their com-
munities and families. Tova Benski (2007), who documented the 
public response to a vigil of Women in Black in Haifa, in which I 
myself was standing every Friday, found that most of the responses 
from passers-by were characterised by a highly aggressive and emo-
tional language. Responses from bystanders included ‘various acts, 
gestures, slurs, labels, swear words, suggestions, punishments, wishes 
in the form of “death wish”, insults etc.’ (2007, 65). I remember 
standing there and hearing words intended to cast shame, disgust, 
contempt and hate. We were publicly seen as traitors. But despite this, 
I continued standing because of the deep and life-changing friend-
ships I made in those vigils. 
In 2014, Cynthia Cockburn, an experienced scholar who followed 
various feminist peace groups for decades, wrote about the nuances 
of women’s failure and success to overcome the conditions of ine-
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quality and historical injustice in Israel. The opening sentence of the 
article alludes to the world of fairy tales: ‘There was once a dialogue 
between women of two communities who might have been thought 
unlikely to have kind words for each other’ (Cockburn 2014, 430). 
This opening suggests that, in order to move forward in feminist 
organising against war, optimism is needed that does not measure 
success or institutional change as the ‘best practice’. Rather, she also 
noticed the ability to maintain feminist spaces amidst conflict, war or 
oppression as an opportunity for these groups to survive, as a politi-
cal act of resistance. 
conclusion: peace activism and collective 
organisation as a tool and a solution
Sometimes women’s involvement in peace activism is overlooked or 
trivialised. In other cases, women’s desperate attempt to challenge 
war is romanticised in ways that hide the possible failures and chal-
lenges inherent in such attempts. This chapter offers organising for 
peace as a feminist solution to ending war and addresses the poten-
tial and the pitfalls of organising for peace. I argue that the ‘failures’ 
of organising are essential components in the evolution of women’s 
political activism during and after war. Hence, feminist organising 
in war is not only meant to achieve pragmatic outcomes. Regard-
less of the ability to transform violent conflict, peace activism can 
create political, emotional and communal spaces that may counter 
the dominant masculine-militaristic cultures of war. Consider how 
women who are active in peace movements often engage in mundane 
activities: embroidery of peace quilts (Williams 1994); cooking food 
and camping-out (Cresswell 1994); engaging in poetry, dancing, 
handicrafts and theatre performances (O’Reilly 2016), and many 
more ceremonial and artistic activities that are not policy oriented 
in a strict, pragmatic way. These activities foster peace because they 
provide a sense of community for those engaged in the emotionally 
laborious work of peace activism.
Collective organising by local women’s groups should not be 
measured as a solution for war against a liberal political paradigm. 
In short, collective organising is not simply direct participation in 
Feminist Organising for Peace
57
peace negotiations. It is also the relationship-building and communal 
support that provides peace and solidarity for those resisting war. 
Feminist organising for peace is not only a solution to war, it is also 
a solution for personal and communal distress. Self-care can become 
a political reaction to the destructive forces of militarisation, occupa-
tion or state violence, especially if it is a collective action (Michaeli 
2017). Listening to women’s personal stories and emotional narrations 
about political awakening, transformation, hope, disillusionment 
and despair is an important reminder that organising for peace has, 
in fact, many different causes, paths and results. 
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Piecing-up Peace in Kashmir: Feminist 
Perspectives on Education for Peace
Shweta Singh and Diksha Poddar
 
This chapter draws on feminist perspectives from the global South 
to identify strategic pathways towards transformative and sustainable 
peace. While we resist the idea of a simplistic and singular feminist 
solution to ending war, we envision feminist education for peace as 
a potential pathway. We understand this pathway to include values 
such as non-violence, compassion, coexistence and empathy.
We begin by introducing two approaches in peace studies. Education 
for peace is grounded in the ethos of equity and value-based learning. 
When such strategies are developed with attention to the local 
context and power dynamics, they hold the potential for interrupting 
patterns of violence and laying the foundations for sustainable peace. 
The second approach, critical peace education, problematises a one-
size-fits-all template. This subfield draws from postcolonial theory. 
It underlines that peace education could become part of the problem 
that it tries to solve, particularly if it overlooks the Western, Eurocen-
tric assumptions about peace and peace education (Gur-Ze’ev 2001; 
Zakharia 2017; Zembylas and Bekerman 2013). According to Bajaj 
and Hantzopoulos (2016, 4), there are three underlying principles to 
critical peace education: first, critical peace educators pay attention 
to how unequal social relations and issues of power must inform both 
peace education and corresponding social action; second, critical 
peace education pays close attention to local realities and local con-
ceptions of peace that amplify marginalised voices; third, critical 
peace education draws from social reproductive theory and critical 
pedagogy (as advocated by Freire 1970) to view schools as potential 
sites of both marginalisation and/or transformation. 
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While critical peace education has re-centred the gaze to issues of 
voice, agency and situated knowledge, this work has long been studied 
by feminist scholars writing on peace in the global South. Yet despite 
the important contributions made, feminist peace research from the 
global South has been marginalised within both peace studies and 
the subfield of critical peace education. Feminist education for peace, 
as distinct from both education for peace and critical peace educa-
tion approaches, not only foregrounds an alternative vocabulary for 
examining peace, but also draws attention to issues of universality, 
difference and politicisation of experience (for more details see Singh 
2021).
Feminist education for peace provides pathways to build long-term 
transformative peace, piece-by-piece. Situations of protracted con-
flicts, like Kashmir, are complex. Just as a singular narrative of conflict 
is problematic, a universalising notion of solutions for peace is prob-
lematic. Thus, this chapter resists identifying a singular solution to 
ending war. Instead, drawing upon perspectives of feminist educa-
tion for peace in the global South (Singh 2021), our chapter offers a 
collaborative approach to building peace based upon our experiences 
as academics and practitioners. 
Global North scholarship can be trapped in a ‘one-size-fits-all’ 
analytical frame that tends to ‘know what politics must be, because 
we know where politics is, because we know the sites of politics, and/
or how politics takes place – we know the processes called “politi-
cal”’ (Walker 2010). We re-centre our analysis in ‘everyday’ stories 
on youth and violence to offer an alternative perspective. We draw 
on our field experiences from Kashmir to examine key challenges for 
peace and youth education and build upon feminist education for 
peace. We address two key questions: first, what are the key tenets 
of a feminist education for peace from the global South, and why is 
it significant for long-term transformative peace? Second, how can 
we identify strategic pathways for building transformative peace, 
particularly at the level of the everyday? The everyday in Kashmir 
is marked by stories of militarisation, dehumanisation, alienation, 
pain, ‘betrayal’ and, most importantly, a discourse of ‘us’ and the 
‘other’. While feminist education for peace is not a complete ‘solution’ 
to ending war or creating peace, we advocate these approaches as a 
Singh and Poddar
62
starting point from which a multiplicity of contextual pathways to 
peace may follow. When developing feminist solutions for ending 
war, context matters.
This chapter proceeds in three parts. The first part introduces the 
readers to the distinctions in peace research between ‘education for 
peace’, and ‘critical peace education’ as theoretical models for devel-
oping peace. The second part describes the nuances of conflict in 
Kashmir and outlines why Kashmir is a valuable context to explore 
feminist peace education’s potential to build transformative peace in 
the Kashmir Valley. The third part identifies two strategic pathways 
for building long-term transformative peace and offers insights on 
how feminist peace education translates peace from a normative goal 
to a transformative lived reality. 
feminist perspectives on peace education
The field of peace research has problematised the assertion that 
the absence of direct violence means peace. In other words, peace 
means more than merely the absence of war. Peace research aims 
to expand the meaning and scope of categories of war, violence and 
peace. Writing in the 1960s, Johan Galtung put forth the argument 
that if the absence of violence means peace, we need to redefine 
the category of violence to include physical, cultural and structural 
violence. He explained the distinction between negative peace, which 
he defined as absence of visible/direct violence and positive peace, 
which meant the absence of not just physical, but also cultural and 
structural violence. This conceptualisation of peace was not new, 
as both Mahatma Gandhi and Frantz Fanon had previously written 
and spoken about notions of structural, cultural and psychological 
violence in their writings on colonialism, freedom, violence and non-
violence. However, Galtung’s work was part of a chorus of work that 
established the field of peace research and brought these categories of 
violence and peace onto the agenda of peace research, peace educa-
tion and activism.
For feminists, these categorisations of violence and peace were 
inherently problematic. Feminists argued that war, violence and 
peace impact men and women differently (Brock-Utne 1985; Chenoy 
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2002; Enloe 2004, 2005; Jayawardena 1986; Reardon 1985). More 
importantly, they underlined the continuities between different 
forms of violence in and outside war – including domestic violence 
and sexual violence – and thus argued for a continuum approach to 
violence (Confortini 2006; El-Bushra 2007). The evolution of the 
field of feminist peace research is significant as it provides ‘insights 
on not only what can be termed “spectacular” instances of violence 
or peace but also sharpens our analysis of the everydayness of recon-
ciliatory measures and the mundaneness of both violence and peace’ 
(Wibben et al. 2019). 
Evolution in the field of feminist peace research was marked by a 
growing recognition of education both as a site for violence and as 
a site that could facilitate pathways towards peace. Feminist peace 
research scholars highlight that since continuities exist between dif-
ferent forms of violence, peace education should critically look at 
cognitive learning with an emphasis on personal and relational 
change, which can lead to structural change (Brock-Utne 2009; 
Reardon 1985). Within the broader ambit of peace research, Reardon 
(1999, 7) defines peace education as the transmission of knowledge 
about the requirements of, obstacles to, and possibilities for achieving 
and maintaining peace, training in skills for interpreting the knowl-
edge, and the development of reflective and participatory capacities 
for applying the knowledge to overcoming problems and achieving 
possibilities. Education for peace, as a subfield of thought, involves 
an integrative and holistic approach with an emphasis on cognitive 
learning that deals with attitudes and changes in behaviour (Brock-
Utne 2009, 213).
Feminist scholars writing on gender perspectives on peace educa-
tion draw attention to the following three points: first, education and 
socialisation are conditioned by social values, which in many cases 
produce a predisposition to war (Reardon 1985). Second, education 
can legitimise militarism and sexism, and perpetuate a predisposi-
tion towards war; feminists critique values like militarism and sexism 
(Brock-Utne 1989, 2009; Reardon 1985). Scholars like Patricia 
Molloy (1995, 235–6) argue that a feminist reconceptualisation of 
peace requires a cultural critique of militarism and a deconstruction 
of the type of strategic thinking that informs the discourse within 
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which we live, act and form our subjectivities. Molloy (1995) argues 
that any hope for peace entails the creation of new discourses, thus 
moving into the realm of desire and the imaginary. She states that it 
is within this realm that ‘peace, politics and pedagogy meet’ (1995, 
3). Third, feminist scholars argue for a need to understand peace 
education as an act of freedom that hinges on an ‘engaged pedagogy’ 
that pays attention to emotion and feeling, which, bell hooks argues, 
is mediated by lived experiences, and in this case of being black or 
white (hooks 1994). 
In addition to these three points, feminists in the global South 
problematise a universal, or hegemonic, conception of peace, 
noting that the experiences of violence/peace cannot be separated 
from struggles of colonialism, imperialism and liberation strug-
gles (Jayawardena 1986). For feminists in South Asia, questions of 
war and violence are intimately connected to the conceptualisation 
of the ‘political’ itself. For instance, Menon (2004, 217) speaks of 
the ‘political’ in reference to potentialities ‘to subvert, to destabi-
lise, not just dominant values and structures, but ourselves’. So, for 
feminists in the global South, education is also a site for resistance 
through ‘politicisation of experience’ (Mohanty 1989). Scholars like 
Mohanty (1989), writing on intersectionality and difference, under-
line how pedagogical practices need to focus on the ‘politicisation 
of experience’ to translate normative goals into lived transforma-
tive experiences. We agree, and argue that both the content and 
process of this pedagogical practice cannot be scripted in a univer-
salising language of transformative peace. Educational interventions 
need to be attentive to complex power relations that are embedded 
in situations of protracted conflict, and thus any ‘technocratic’ or 
universalising approach to peace education can itself be an act of 
hegemonic violence (Gur-Ze’ev 2001). Singular ‘solutions’ to ending 
war can be counter to critical-feminist peace education, which pri-
oritises paying attention to local dynamics, community voices, and 
histories of colonisation. 
For the purpose of this chapter, we draw on feminist perspectives 
to education for peace from the global South to demonstrate strate-
gic pathways towards transformative peace. Drawing on the case of 
Kashmir, we highlight two key challenges: first, the narrative of ‘us’ 
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and the ‘other’, which creates differentiation and distancing and thus 
poses a challenge to transformative peace; second, the need to pay 
attention to issues of voice, agency, history/histories, and power in 
situations of protracted conflict. The case of Kashmir is significant as 
it highlights how protracted conflicts impact youth and education, as 
well as providing insights into why many young people pick up the 
gun, or walk the path of violence rather than peace. Drawing on our 
field experiences, we can state that the case of Kashmir elucidates 
how there is never a singular narrative on conflict, and thus a univer-
salising approach to peace can itself be an act of hegemonic violence. 
The following section highlights some of the key challenges for youth 
and education, and how a feminist education for peace can address 
some of these challenges.
perspectives on feminist peace education, 
transformative peace and kashmir
 
‘I am a stone pelter.’
‘I am too, you can arrest me’,
‘I was not, but now I will be’.
 Seema Mustafa (2011)
 
Insecurity in Kashmir is often represented in a narrative that centres 
Kashmir as a factor in state-centric India–Pakistan relations (Jammu-
Ladakh and Valley of Kashmir). In scholarship on Kashmir, the 
primary referents of analysis have been state, power, military capa-
bilities and jingoistic national security discourse. However, the story 
of political conflict in Kashmir is more complex. The contemporary 
conflict has its roots in a militancy movement of the late 1980s, which 
shaped a protracted mobilisation for azaadi (freedom). State-centric 
approaches to Kashmir that focus on national security discourse are 
incomplete. If we are to understand the connections between the 
militancy movement and contemporary conflict we must draw atten-
tion to the ‘everyday’ in Kashmir, with particular attention to youth 
and education. The everyday in Kashmir is marked by stories of mil-
itarisation, de-humanisation, alienation, pain, ‘betrayal’ and, most 
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importantly, a discourse of ‘us’ and the ‘other’ (Singh 2021). The 
context of ‘the everyday’ is a site of analysis for considering pathways 
to transformative peace. 
We draw upon extensive fieldwork that identifies three defining 
features of the conflict in Kashmir: first, the collective identity of 
Kashmiri Muslims, and their experiences of pain, alienation, dehu-
manisation and ‘othering’; second, militarisation in the Valley; and, 
third, the asymmetrical relationship between the state and its people 
(Singh 2018). We proceed with a brief discussion of post-2008 expe-
riences of youth in Kashmir – particularly in the Valley – to highlight 
the importance of education as a critical site for transformative 
everyday peace in Kashmir. 
Since 2008, Kashmir has seen increased involvement of youth in 
incidents of stone pelting and other violent resistance against the mil-
itarisation of the Valley. A series of high-profile violent events, such 
as the Amarnath land transfer row (in 2008), the Shopian rape case 
(2009), and the accidental death of a young schoolboy, Tufail Mattoo 
in the summer of 2010, triggered mass protests led by Kashmiri 
youth. Our fieldwork mapped the increasing sense of anger, frustra-
tion and alienation that young Kashmiri people experience, given the 
state of militarisation, and the use of coercive apparatus by the state. 
In response to the militarisation of the Valley and heavy-handed 
military force by the state, youth in Kashmir engage in stone pelting 
(throwing stones at armed personnel) as an act of resistance. These 
are subversive acts as space(s) for democratic dissent are limited in 
the Valley. 
In 2016, these previous events inspired a watershed moment for 
the youth protest movement. Burhan Wani, a 22-year-old, tech-savvy 
militant and school dropout was killed by state security forces on 8 
July 2016. He had joined the ranks of militant activists six years earlier 
and was the commander of Hizbul Mujahideen, a militant organisa-
tion in Kashmir. He was a ‘poster boy’ for a large number of Kashmiri 
youths. Many argue that Wani joined the militant ranks after he and 
his brother were stopped and beaten up by security forces when they 
went out for a picnic one day years earlier (Dasgupta 2016). The nar-
ratives about Wani reflect the connection between youth frustration 
with militarisation and excessive state police violence, and youth 
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resistance movements and activities like stone pelting. The response 
to state militarisation in the Valley was one of counter-militarisation. 
Wani soon became a popular face of the movement that glorified 
violence and militancy, and had become infamous through social 
media where he promoted anti-state rhetoric. 
Wani’s death came at a time when young students were increasingly 
picking up guns and using force to express themselves to the state. 
Less than a year later, in 2017, 15-year-old Faizan Ahmad Bhat from 
Tral, a young Kashmiri militant, died in a gunfight. Motta (2016), 
states that many educated young minds, who picked up stones as 
an act of resistance shared a ‘common thread of experience: all have 
been witness to, or have experienced first-hand, beatings, torture, 
harassment and humiliation at the hands of the security forces’. 
Anthropologists like Haley Duschinski (2009) show how intensive 
militarisation and a coercive state apparatus identify segments of the 
Kashmiri population as ‘threats to national order’. This characteri-
sation brings in sense of alienation, dehumanisation and ‘othering’, 
and more often than not young people take recourse to acts of stone 
pelting (and in many cases join the ranks of the militants) as resist-
ance against militarisation. 
strategic pathways for building long-term 
transformative peace
The story of Burhan Wani and many others from our fieldwork led 
us to wonder whether children’s experiences would have been dif-
ferent if educational spaces and critical pedagogy provided space 
to address issues of ‘lived experiences’ of youth in situations of pro-
tracted conflict. Perhaps if Wani had had the opportunity to engage 
in peace education – through pedagogies of empathy, understand-
ing, and contextualising difference – he might have taken alternative 
actions to joining a militarised resistance. If so, can feminist education 
for peace from the global South provide insights on how to actual-
ise this? In the case of Kashmir, limited study indicates that school 
curricula and pedagogical practice are not designed to take cogni-
sance of the ‘lived experiences’ of young people. Yet education holds 
great potential for transformative peace. We argue that, in situations 
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of protracted conflict like Kashmir, education must account for the 
various experiences of insecurity in order to create space for inno-
vative thinking about peace. We argue that a feminist education for 
peace is key to addressing the limitations of current gaps in education 
in places like Kashmir. Education for peace and feminist pedagogy 
are two strategic pillars that could provide pathways to transforma-
tive peace. Through this type of education, issues of distancing and 
differentiation could be addressed in a pedagogical narrative that 
legitimises these experiences and acknowledges different voices and 
agency in Kashmir. 
But what exactly might feminist education for peace look like in 
terms of normative commitments and pedagogical tools? In this 
section we outline what feminist pedagogy can mean and how it 
can contribute to lasting peace. In the previous section, drawing on 
our field experiences, we highlighted how in situations of protracted 
conflict like Kashmir, experiences of humiliation and alienation create 
constant distancing and differentiation, and many young people like 
Burhan Wani may chose violence as a means of expression, and reject 
peace. Esther Yogev (2008; in the context of Israel) argues that, ‘One’s 
identity motivates attitudes of constant distancing and differenti-
ation.’ The types of ‘constant distancing and differentiation’ (Yogev 
2010; see also Singh 2018) that can take place in insecure contexts 
and war zones leads to a trust deficit, a security dilemma which poses 
a significant challenge to long-term transformative peace. 
We advocate for a normative, feminist approach to education for 
peace grounded in the ethos of equity and value-based learning. This 
pedagogy would include values such as non-violence, compassion, 
coexistence and empathy. These pedagogical values can play a signif-
icant role in shifting the lens of distancing and differentiation, and, 
in turn, facilitate a process of re-humanisation of the ‘other’ (Sewak 
2002). 
In her path-breaking work Teaching to Transgress, bell hooks writes:
I came to theory because I was hurting – the pain within me was 
so intense that I could not go on living. I came to theory desper-
ate, wanting to comprehend – to grasp what was happening around 
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and within me. Most importantly, I wanted to make the hurt go 
away. I saw in theory then a location for healing. (hooks 1994, 59) 
For feminist scholars in the global South, hooks’ work is particularly 
important as it foregrounds that ‘lived experiences’ are different and 
dependent on multiple factors, including class, race, religion, sexual-
ity, and geography. Thus, transformative peace cannot be scripted in 
a language that does not acknowledge difference, voice and agency. 
hooks asserts that education cannot be hinged on a mind/body split, 
that ‘education as an act of freedom’ hinges on an ‘engaged pedagogy’. 
We must, therefore, pay attention to emotion and feeling, which is 
mediated by experiences of being black or white (hooks 1994). We 
advocate a need to reconceptualise difference and voice in methods 
of education within contexts of protracted conflict. We must provide 
the educational tools for youth to make sense of their experiences 
and recognise that difference has led to their diverse experiences 
in conflict. Drawing on Mohanty (1989, 181), we define difference 
as ‘asymmetrical and incommensurate cultural spheres situated 
within hierarchies of domination and resistance’. Thus, any ‘thrust 
to universalize or homogenize concepts or approaches may be coun-
ter-productive by masking power relations embedded in complex 
historical relations and undermining local understandings of how 
participants might cultivate their sense of transformative agency’ 
(e.g. Bajaj 2008; Hantzopoulos 2010; Zembylas and Bekerman 2013). 
We must, especially in education, pay attention to local voice(s) in 
order to cultivate a sense of transformative agency (Bajaj 2008, 135). 
Education can be a pathway for peace. We align with feminist 
scholars like Betty Reardon, who explains that education can social-
ise for war and peace, and thus we must pay attention to militarism 
and sexism embedded in teaching-learning processes. While we pay 
attention to questions of violence and militarism, we also need to pay 
attention to questions of historical injustice, power, agency and voice 
when we design peace education interventions in situations of pro-
tracted conflict. 
While schools can do this by employing critical pedagogy, informal 
spaces can also be a site for social change. These informal spaces 
impinge on the everyday experiences of youth, as we demonstrated 
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through the case analysis of Burhan Wani. In addressing complex 
conflict like that in Kashmir, ‘resistance lies in self-conscious engage-
ment with dominant, normative discourses and representations and 
in the active creation of oppositional analytic and cultural spaces’ 
(Mohanty 1989). It is with the goal of providing tools and helping 
youth make sense of dominant discourses in the Valley that we 
advance feminist education for peace for its emancipatory potential 
to address these challenges.
conclusion 
We wish to conclude by emphasising that a singular narrative of 
peace, or conflict, is problematic, and thus there is a need to pay 
attention to the continuum of violence. Situations of protracted 
conflict are characterised by distance, differentiation and a narra-
tive of ‘us’ and the other. Youths, in many instances, pick up guns 
because of their lived experiences of dehumanisation and alienation 
that underlie this complex narrative of us and the ‘other’. In order to 
provide tools and the space to make sense of these experiences, we 
advocate a feminist education for peace as a pathway to shift narra-
tives, through pedagogy, from dehumanisation to re-humanisation 
of the other. While the practices must be context specific, we see crit-
ical-feminist pedagogy, such as bell hooks’ ‘engaged pedagogy’ as 
foundational for building a feminist education for peace in Kashmir. 
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Learn from Kurdish Women’s Liberation 
Movements to Imagine the Dissolution  
of the Nation-state System 
Eda Gunaydin
This chapter focuses on the Kurdish women’s liberation movements 
of Rojava, an autonomous administration region in north-east Syria 
(NES). These women theorise that ending war requires a dissolu-
tion of the nation-state system. There are three key elements to the 
solution to ending war offered by Kurdish women’s liberation move-
ments. First, the solution is grounded in jineology, a woman-centred 
theory, that makes explicit critiques of Western feminism and the 
nation-state model. Second, the solution relies on the self-governance 
model of democratic confederalism, which is a non-state, munici-
pal form of governing. Finally, the solution draws on two connected 
understandings of self-sustainability, which help articulate a clear 
and potent view of women’s autonomy. This radical solution to the 
enduring conflict in the Middle East requires placing the legitimacy 
of use of violence into the hands of the people, including women, 
rather than into the hands of the state. If communities are trained 
and organised to defend themselves and to engage in collective self-
defence, it is argued, peace becomes more attainable, because it is the 
current system of states that perpetuates violence. 
In exploring this solution, the chapter adopts a postcolonial 
feminist approach. This approach requires paying attention to the 
ways of knowing that are subjugated by our current political ordering 
(Milliken 1999), which tends to see Middle Eastern women as passive, 
silent victims in need of saving (Spivak 1988). The chapter focuses 
on Kurdish women’s activism in NES, and uses original translations 
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of these female militants’ work. Kurdish women’s self-representa-
tions – that is, what they themselves say about their values, beliefs 
and goals – show that these women are political actors in their own 
right, possess their own political theories, and have formed their own 
women’s rights movements (Bell 2014; Yegenoglu 1998). In other 
words, it is important to be attentive not just to what these women 
‘do’ as part of building peace, but also how they theorise about it. 
The chapter therefore explores both the practical and theoretical 
implications of the jineological solution to ending war through the 
dissolution of the nation-state system. 
In the first part of this chapter, I provide a description of the Rojava 
region and a brief history of the groups operating in the region. Next, 
I explore jineology, the theoretical approach used by Kurdish women 
to address long-standing conflict in the Rojava region. The ‘solutions’ 
to war offered by jineology – rejection of the nation-state system, 
governance in a system of democractic confederalism, and the promo-
tion of self-sustainability through ecological awareness and collective 
armament – have been embraced by Kurdish women. Rather than 
seeing this as an explicitly feminist solution, Kurdish women view 
many of these jineological principles in contrast to Western feminism, 
as they associate Western feminism with capitalism and statism. 
Nonetheless, the jineological principles endorsed by Kurdish women 
are concerned with challenging patriarchy and they view patriarchy 
as intersecting with these other forms of hegemony. 
I first illustrate how Kurdish women’s access to education and knowl-
edge production is an empowering mechanism used to challenge 
patriarchy. I proceed to explain the tenets of democratic confeder-
alism, a model of non-state governance implemented in Rojava that 
has been envisioned as a means to bring peace to the Mesopota-
mian region. A key element of democratic confederalism is women’s 
involvement in governance and engagement in political life, another 
element of jineology that challenges patriarchy and statism. Finally, I 
examine how principles of self-sustainability are key to ending war, 
as these principles enable women to fend for and defend themselves 
rather than relying on the state. In sum, this chapter offers a feminist 
solution to ending war that moves beyond state-centric feminist 
imaginings and is inspired by the knowledge of Kurdish women. 
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the ‘kurdish question’
The Kurds are a large, stateless ethnic group, numbering up to 25 
million, and living in northern Syria, south-east Turkey, northern 
Iraq and western Iran. Within these nation-states, the Kurds are an 
ethnic minority who have at times wished to form a nation-state of 
their own. The ‘Kurdish question’ has therefore long been a conten-
tious issue. In 1978, inspired by global decolonisation movements, 
the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), initially a Marxist-Leninist 
political party, was formed, and it fought for an independent state 
of Kurds in Turkey (Öcalan 2015, 1). States’ attempted ‘solutions’ 
to the ‘problem’ have historically involved policies such as assimila-
tion, banning Kurdish language and culture, and mass incarceration 
or even genocide. For example, in Syria, before the outbreak of the 
civil war in 2011, Kurdish political activity was banned (Yildiz 2005, 
106); Syrian Kurds were systematically stripped of citizenship rights 
(Human Rights Watch 1991, 88); members of the Democratic Union 
(PYD) political party, which maintains the paramilitary forces dis-
cussed in this chapter, were often detained en masse and kept as 
political prisoners (Human Rights Watch 2009). In Iraqi Kurdistan 
in the 1980s, the Ba’athist government used chemical and neurolog-
ical weapons against Kurdish populations to displace over 1 million 
and kill over 100,000 (Yesiltas 2014, 51).
The Kurdistan Communities Union (KCK) is an umbrella organ-
isation of which the PYD and PKK are members. In 2005, the KCK 
abandoned separatism and sought to establish democratic confed-
eralism, eschewing the pursuit of a separate state for Kurds (Öcalan 
2005). Since 2012, the landscape of Kurdish politics has altered after 
the PYD took control over a large swath of northern Syria. This 
was made possible by the PYD’s practice of maintaining a paramil-
itary force, which allowed the group to meet the security needs of 
the region after Assad’s forces withdrew from the area. In 2013, the 
PYD, in coalition with other political parties, declared autonomy and 
started self-governing. Rojava, or the Autonomous Administration of 
North and East Syria, is the name given to the region of northern Syria 
administered under the model of democratic confederalism. Prior to 
the Turkish invasion of the region (2016–present), Rojava comprised 
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around one fifth of the Syrian landmass. The PYD paramilitary force 
has two main arms – the People’s Protection Units (YPG), and its 
female counterpart, the Women’s Protection Units (YPJ). The YPG 
grew rapidly out of a core of mobile, PKK-trained elite fighters, with 
the addition of civilian volunteers (Arango 2012; Knapp et al. 2016, 
137–8; VICE Media 2013). Taken together, the YPJ/YPG is the armed 
wing of the PYD, who, from 2016 onwards, formed the majority of 
the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). The group was seen as respon-
sible for the defeat of the Islamic State (ISIS) in Syria and is the most 
significant ally to the West in the conflict with ISIS.
The Kurdish women’s liberation movement draws heavily upon the 
theory of Abdullah Öcalan, founder of the PKK. Öcalan coined the 
term ‘jineology’ and invented democratic confederalism, the system 
of government implemented in Rojava. Other Öcalan (or ‘Apoist’) 
influences in Rojava include fighters and politicians wearing Öcalan’s 
likeness on their uniforms; the use of Apoist slogans and songs; and 
swearing an oath on Apoist principles (ecology, self-defence, dem-
ocratic autonomy) when they join the YPG and YPJ (Dirik 2015a; 
RT 2015). In addition, the general education system in Rojava is 
based upon these Apoist principles. With an absence of universities 
in northern Syria, Rojava created a system of women’s and asayish 
academies. At academies, trainees in the military or in the political 
movement, as well as any interested parties, are required to receive 
revolutionary education in ‘women’s and people’s freedom’, which 
involves studying Öcalan’s work (Kendal and Oak 2016; Üstündağ 
2016, 204). We can look to both the Rojava movement’s written 
works and their direct political activities to learn more about their 
post-state solution to war. 
‘jineology’ instead of feminism
This section details the origins and rationale of jineology and how it 
makes an essential part of a Kurdish feminist solution to ending war. 
Since it is not possible to provide an exhaustive account of jineol-
ogy, this section will focus specifically on the ways Kurdish women 
articulate their critiques of Western feminism and their own vision 
of liberation. The section begins with a discussion of the ways that 
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jineology emphasises the interlinkages of all forms of hegemony, 
including patriarchy, with the states system and the devaluation of 
women’s knowledges, before moving to explicit critiques of Western 
feminism offered by jineology.
Jineology is a philosophy that consists of the Kurdish word for 
woman, ‘jin’, and the suffix -ology, as a ‘science of ’. Jineology advo-
cates a rejection of multiple, intersecting forms of hegemony, not 
only patriarchy. Jineology identifies other forms of hegemonic power, 
including the nation-state and capitalism as contributors to women’s 
oppression (JA 2015, 19). Therefore, the Kurdish women’s libera-
tion movement has directed its struggle simultaneously against both 
nationalist oppression and gender oppression. This makes sense 
when considering that Kurdish women have been oppressed both 
by patriarchy and the Syrian state. To that end, jineology espouses 
an awareness that nation-statism has been fundamentally imbricated 
with patriarchy; the nation-state reproduces patriarchy because the 
nation-state is intrinsically hegemonic and masculinist (Dirik 2014). 
Jineologists therefore use the formulation ‘statism-sexism-powerism’ 
to capture the indivisibility of these hegemonies (JA 2015, 103).
Jineology’s project is to ‘de-other’ women, giving them access both 
to learning and to knowledge production. According to this approach, 
positivism is viewed as an approach to knowledge cultivated in the 
West, primarily by men, that leads to a science which is ‘confined to 
the appearance of things, which it equates with reality itself ’ (Öcalan 
2015, 15). This understanding of positivism sees that whatever is not 
the (male) self is designated as ‘other’, and whatever the self cannot 
observe of the other is deemed unknowable. This critique runs 
through works of jineology, which attempt to recover the ‘unknow-
able’: knowledge about women. It calls itself a corrective science of 
women, studying their lives to produce knowledge that ameliorates 
the assumption that she is merely a ‘defective’ version of a man and 
compensates for her absence throughout intellectual history. Its goal, 
then, is to rehabilitate aspects of female existence, such as ‘women’s 
work’, that are traditionally belittled (JA 2015, 44).
In September 2014, northern Syria’s first ever university, the Mes-
opotamian Social Sciences Academy, opened in Qamishlo (Rojava 
Report 2014). An example of re-centring women’s knowledges at the 
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university is the delivery of classes on folklore by older women (Dirik 
2015b). Folklore has been a way of knowing about the world that is 
particular to Kurdish women, who historically have only been able 
to pass on these stories outside of formal institutions. In addition, 
women in Rojava have also established over twenty Women’s Edu-
cation and Research Centres, where women can access classes on 
practical skills, as well as ‘culture and art’ (Knapp et al. 2016, 70). 
Women in Rojava have also started their own radio show; a press 
association called the Kurdish Women’s Press Association (RAJIN); 
a newspaper called Dengê Jiyan (Voice of Life); and opened women’s 
centres such as one in Qamishlo, which ‘investigates and documents 
cases of domestic violence’ (Knapp et al. 2016, 66, 67, 70, 74). These 
initiatives reflect the jineologist project of making women visible 
in the history of thought, art, media, and politics in Rojava. These 
projects are a core means of creating both a gender-equal as well as a 
self-organised society, because they provide alternatives to tradition-
ally patriarchal institutions. In Kurdish women’s liberationists’ view, 
dismantling positivism and patriarchy contributes to dismantling all 
other forms of power too.
While these initiatives may reflect elements of Western feminism, 
jineologists are clear that their philosophy is distinct. I will outline 
three specific critiques jineologists make of Western feminism before 
linking these to the feminist solution offered in this chapter. First, for 
female participants of the reconstruction in northern Syria, jineol-
ogy actually surpasses Western feminism because rejecting each of 
these forms of hegemony – that is patriarchy and positivism – rather 
than patriarchy alone, leads to the establishment of a more sustain-
able peace. This is because, in their view, jineology is more holistic, 
incorporating all of society. For example, at the height of the Rojava 
revolution, both men and women were required to take classes on 
jineology and ecology, and jineology is embedded in the area’s gov-
ernance model rather than being treated as a ‘rights-based side issue 
that puts the burden on women’ (Dirik 2015a, 4).
Second, to jineologists, Western feminism has become co-opted 
by capitalism and liberalism, or what Kurdish women’s liberationists 
dub ‘capitalist modernity’. As jineologists state in Introduction to Jin-
eology (JA 2015, 94): ‘we have to salvage the female sex from [both] 
Learn from Kurdish Women
79
religious, feudal backwardness and the objectifying, commodifying 
approach of capitalism’. This is because: 
liberalism, which replaced the sexist society [a previous stage of 
history], was not satisfied with only exploiting women for profit in 
the home. In addition, liberalism has achieved … the sale of woman 
in the marketplace as a commodity. Men only turn their labour into 
commodities, whereas women’s bodies and souls are commodified 
too. […] This is the trap that modernity has sprung for women. 
From turning women into fodder for advertisements, to sex and 
pornography, these are tools of exploitation. (JA 2015, 139)
A practical example can help illustrate this quotation. YPJ fighters 
have often criticised the tendency in the West to commodify their 
activities. In October 2014, for example, H&M launched a line of 
khaki jumpsuits resembling, and inspired by, the YPJ’s uniforms. 
After widespread criticism, the company was forced to issue an 
apology and recall the clothing (Taylor 2014). YPJ fighters, such 
as Zilan Diyar (2014), criticised the transformation of the women’s 
political struggle into a ‘fashion trend’. A month prior, twelve young 
YPJ fighters, including a 12- and 14-year-old, were featured in an 
editorial for the fashion magazine Marie Claire. In photographic por-
traits, the women appeared posing in their uniforms, holding their 
Kalashnikovs in their arms (Griffin 2014). Fighter Dilan gave the 
following statement about this phenomenon: ‘Isn’t it odd that a cap-
italist consumerist magazine that objectifies women appropriates us 
in this way? It’s ridiculous’ (quoted in Letsch 2015). 
In critiquing liberalism, capitalism and, finally, the state, jineolo-
gists advocate for a movement that focuses on holistic anti-system 
principles (JA 2015, 85). They write:
Because feminism has not overcome the dominant masculine 
system; continues with a statist mentality; and has not surpassed 
a Eurocentric positivist-orientalist point of view, feminism offers 
few solutions to women’s realities in the Middle East and other 
regions of the world. (JA 2015, 88) 




This section explores the theory of anti-statism embedded in jin-
eology in more detail, showing how it underpins the solutions 
implemented during the Rojava revolution, including the rise of mil-
itancy. Öcalan’s book Democratic Confederalism (2015) explains that 
the KCK abandoned nationalism and separatism a decade ago. He 
argues that it is the idea of the nation-state that created the ‘Kurdish 
problem’ in the first place. In his view, states use violence to force 
citizens to take on a single identity (one nation), rather than allowing 
for ethnic, religious and national plurality. This valuing of plurality 
can be observed in Rojava, for example in the dropping of the name 
‘Western Kurdistan’ (in favour of Rojava, and now NES) in order to 
include other religious and ethnic minorities in its territory. Further-
more, the first lines of Rojava’s Social Contract (2014) are: 
We, the people of the Democratic Autonomous Regions of Afrîn, 
Cizîre, and Kobanê, a confederation of Kurds, Arabs, Assyrians, 
Chaldeans, Arameans, Turkmen, Armenians, and Chechens …
Öcalan also views nation-states as irreparably undemocratic due to 
their connection with capitalism. Nation-states are viewed as inher-
ently serving the ruling class, and therefore are an enemy of the 
people. Moreover, on this view, war occurs because states are seeking 
to redistribute capital (Öcalan 2015, 13). This state-capitalism for-
mation is one perspective on history that Apoist Kurds dub ‘capitalist 
modernity’. 
By contrast, the Rojava movement considers itself to be building 
‘democratic modernity’. Democratic modernity requires a non-state 
polity, which its adherents argue is the sole pathway to democracy 
and peace. While states are seen as sites of power and coercion, 
democratic modernity relies on voluntary participation, collec-
tive consensus and direct democracy. What can be observed here 
is a radical untethering of democracy and peace from the need to 
establish a nation-state. Members of the Rojava movement see them-
selves as operationalising an entirely new type of non-state polity in 
democratic confederalism. This system of self-governance has been 
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described as the ‘most radical experiment in democracy and gender 
equality in the world’ (Gupta 2016). 
Administratively, democratic confederalism refers to the goal of 
establishing a series of linked but self-governing democratic auton-
omous regions, that is, the cantons of Rojava (Güneser 2015). At its 
largest, Rojava was composed of three cantons: Afrin, Kobane and 
Cizre. 
In Rojava, the smallest possible autonomous unit was theorised 
as the commune, which brought together up to 350 families or 
households. By contrast, the nuclear family was viewed as capitalist 
modernity’s smallest collective unit, which democratic confeder-
alism views as a site of women’s oppression and which communes 
are envisaged as eventually replacing (Omrani 2015). The commune 
is supposed to restore politics and the process of democracy to 
the everyday and to replace the abstract and static nation-state. 
Communes hold weekly gatherings, and members attend general 
meetings as well as any relevant autonomous meetings (for example, 
of the Women’s Committee). 
The commune model was represented as a means of restoring the 
people’s natural sense of morality, or ‘social ethics’, which they had 
been alienated from, and which had been replaced by externally 
imposed law (Dirik 2016). This could also be called direct democ-
racy, instead of representative democracy. Most disputes were to be 
resolved at the communal level without involving any institutional 
bureaucracy. In 2016, many, though not all, inhabitants of the region 
had joined a commune (B. 2016). By their own account, over 75 per 
cent of Kurdish women became politically active in the wake of the 
Rojava revolution (Bengio 2014). All the way up the administrative 
chain, from the commune to the city to the canton level, there is a 
quota for one male and one female co-president, and a minimum 
requirement of 40 per cent representation of women. The principle of 
dual leadership is also referred to as hevserok (Knapp et al. 2016, 69).
On the ground, during the peak of its stable governance (2014–18), 
Rojava resisted implementing state-like or top-down structures, albeit 
with varying levels of success (Schmidinger 2018, 134). Although not 
always successful, principles of democratic confederalism include: 
communes should not submit to higher governance structures, but 
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rather maintain autonomy despite them; and communes should con-
tinually appropriate state functions, with the objective of eventually 
making them redundant (Üstündağ 2016, 203). 
Understanding the logics governing democratic confederalism 
clarifies why supporters of the Rojava movement have represented 
democratic confederalism as a solution to the Kurdish conflict. For 
example, it may appear puzzling that the Rojava Social Contract 
(2014) ‘recognises Syria’s territorial integrity’, while its militant activ-
ities, which have involved repelling both Syrian and Turkish state 
forces, are suggestive of a desire to secede. However, these non-state 
democratic autonomies do not require the state to be overthrown first; 
instead, individuals self-govern at the radically local level despite, and 
regardless of, the state (Dirik 2014). Democratic confederalism is 
seen as a feasible solution to the ‘Kurdish problem’ not only in Syria, 
but also Turkey, Iran and Iraq (Öcalan 2015, 34–41), and therefore as 
a means of securing lasting peace in the region. This is because the 
proposed solution does not require secession to occur, nor therefore 
the replacement of one patriarchal nation-state with another. 
self-sufficiency: ecology and collective  
self-defence 
The third element of the solution of dissolving the state system 
proposed in this chapter is the principle of self-sufficiency, which has 
two components. The first is the idea of ecology, which says that we 
must find new, less masculinist ways of viewing our relationship with 
our environment. To Hawzhin Azeez (2016), member of the Kobani 
Reconstruction Board, ecology refers to the idea that societies must 
consider:
[t]he limitations we experience as a community and the resources 
we have access to. […] To be ecological on our own terms means 
to preserve the cultural, traditional values within the community. 
Ensuring that communities are organic, natural, and traditional as 
they have always been – not mega-malls, structures and buildings 
that are not natural to the way the community lives here. 
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Ecology therefore differentiates itself from patriarchal capitalism, 
which sees nature as something to be exploited. Returning to ‘tra-
ditional’ practices, such as cooperative greenhouses and animal 
husbandry (B. 2016), has allowed Rojava to combat the wheat mono-
culture previously imposed on the region. It has also granted women 
improved economic self-sufficiency. One way in which women have 
implemented the notion of ecology is by establishing a women- and 
girls-only village called Jinwar, where residents live communally, 
grow their own food, and even run their own school (Alesali and 
Zdanowicz 2019).
The second component of self-sufficiency relates to the idea of 
collective self-defence, including women’s armament. The core aim 
of this concept is to redistribute the means of violence as widely as 
possible (Üstündağ 2016, 199). Women’s militias are a mainstay of 
KCK organisations, and women arming themselves is viewed as key 
to equality in the movement. Self-defence reduces war by taking the 
means of force away from the state, which is believed to be the core 
perpetrator of violence. Üstündağ (2016) points out that the idea 
of women’s wings as a means of achieving peace also evolved from 
Öcalan’s experiences in the PKK, which have helped inform the prac-
tices of the YPJ. Throughout the 1980s, the PKK’s leftist goals risked 
co-option by guerrilla leaders who monopolised arms and informa-
tion, and the party nearly devolved into paramilitary forces without 
political aims. As a result, in 1993, Öcalan encouraged the formation 
of an independent women’s army and other autonomous institu-
tions, which ‘not only guaranteed women’s protection against men 
… but also disrupted channels of secrecy, transformed relations with 
locals, and effectively developed an opposition to the abuse of power’ 
(Üstündağ 2016, 200). The ethos of women’s militias is therefore 
part of a long-existing practice of democratising the means of force. 
Because much of the fighting that the YPJ engage in is defensive in 
nature, it has also been likened to a rose: a flower defending itself 
from attack (Knapp et al. 2016, 139). 
Women comprise between 20 and 45 per cent of the YPG (simi-
larly to the PKK) (Cousins 2014; Sputnik 2016; Terrorism Research 
and Analysis Consortium 2016). In Rojava, any woman over the 
age of 18 can enlist at a YPG/YPJ centre. Following this, they attend 
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and receive training at one of the military academies located in each 
municipality, before they are assigned to handling security on access 
roads or defending their home cities (Knapp et al. 2016, 151–2). A 
recent development in Rojava has been the proliferation of addi-
tional self-defence groups beyond the YPG/YPJ and the police force 
(asayish). Other non-Kurdish militias include the Yezidi women’s 
militia, Êzîdxan Women’s Units, and the Bethnahrain Women’s Pro-
tection Forces for Assyrian women. In addition to these Yezidi and 
Assyrian women’s groups, further examples include Sutoro, a self-
defence militia for Syriac Christians, as well as the Hêza Parastina 
Cewherî (HPC) (B. 2016; Quinn 2015). They exist to further devolve 
and decentralise military power to the commune level, and for each 
religious and ethnic group to acquire self-sufficiency. To be clear, 
this solution is not simply about ‘arming women’, but about promot-
ing self-defence and shifting force away from the state because of the 
state’s historic use of violence. It therefore counters the conventional 
monopolisation of force observed in state systems.
Despite containing a diverse population, including multiple differ-
ent ethnic groups who have now been armed, Rojava remains relatively 
peaceful internally. In their view, this is because of their emphasis on 
plurality, decentralisation and autonomy. Kurds see themselves as 
having the right to defend themselves only against hegemonic forces. 
In the case of ISIS, the YPG/YPJ fought against the group’s virulent 
misogyny. In the case of the Turkish invasion of the region, YPG/YPJ 
has intermittently engaged in battle against these state attacks. Self-
defence also extends into the ideological realm, discussed above, 
where Rojava participants claim the right to defend themselves from 
epistemological or ‘symbolic’ attacks by making decisions, and pro-
ducing knowledge, about themselves. It is for this reason that Women’s 
and Youth Committees were put in place, as they retained veto power 
over decisions that affected them; it is also for this reason that women’s 
and asayish academies exist, and that jineology was created. 
conclusion
This chapter has considered the activities of the YPG and YPJ in 
northern Syria. Their solution to ending war is to dissolve military 
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power at the state level and empower individuals to be self-sufficient, 
militarily, ecologically and economically. The chapter has shown that 
nation-states cannot solve the problems created by nation-states, and 
therefore suggests that one arm of the fight against oppression must 
involve critiquing and dismantling the state system, understood as 
fundamentally imbricated with patriarchy. One of the most effec-
tive means of dismantling the state system, in these Kurdish women’s 
view, is to implement democratic confederalism. A core part of this 
requires reclaiming the means of violence from the state and placing 
it into the hands of the people, including women. 
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Queer Our Vision of Security 
Cai Wilkinson
THE TRUTH IS:
Security is a lie.
Your genes will not protect you.
Liberal leaders will not protect you.
The military will not protect you.
Marriage will not protect you.
The government will not protect you.
LGBT organizations will not protect you.
Money will not protect you.
The closet will not protect you.
Assimilation will not protect you.
(Pink Tank 2005, 23)
To be queer – that is, to not be gender conforming and/or heterosex-
ual – is to know that security is a lie. It is to know that one’s personal 
safety is always precarious, and that institutions that are supposed 
to help often harm. It is to experience how definitions of security 
exclude and erase queer bodies and lives, with the assumption of 
protection replaced by experiences of gender/ed policing and pun-
ishment for ‘failing’ to be the ‘right’ kind of man or woman. It is to 
understand just how deeply gender is woven into systems of power 
and violence at every level, from the international to the intimate. It 
is to know that because of how your gender identity and/or sexuality 
are perceived, because of who you are, you are inevitably and unavoid-




This chapter will explore queering ‘security’ as a feminist solution 
to ending war. The erasure and othering of queer bodies and lives 
directly contributes to the perpetuation of war and everyday violence 
through the (re)enforcement of binary and essentialist norms of 
gender and sexuality. Drawing on queer experiences of insecurity at 
borders, in bathrooms and in bedrooms, this chapter uses a queer 
feminist lens to show how queering our definitions of security is 
an important feminist solution to ending war. Queering ‘security’ 
enables us to transcend existing logics of security and imagine and 
practise security for all people, regardless of their gender and/or 
sexual orientation. Queering ‘security’ also allows us to challenge 
what constitutes war, and the spaces and places in which institution-
alised violence occurs.
what is a queer solution? 
While queer is often used as a synonym for lesbian, gay, bisexual and 
transgender (LGBT), or to describe people who are not heterosexual, 
in this chapter it is used as the antonym of straight. Straight is a term 
that brings together sexuality and gender and highlights how heter-
osexuality requires the ‘correct’ performance of gender in order to 
be recognisable to others. Queer, in contrast, is used here to denote 
people who do not conform to the norms and ideals of the hetero-
patriarchal gender order of man/woman due to their sexuality and/or 
gender identity and/or presentation. Especially given its long history 
of being used as a pejorative term – a weapon of everyday warfare 
– against LGBT people and the inevitable contentiousness of reclaim-
ing words (Rocheleau 2019) it should not be assumed that queer is a 
word that people will use to describe themselves.
As a verb, queer works to denaturalise and destabilise the categories 
of gender and sexuality that are built into our societies, challenging 
assumptions that heterosexuality and binary gender(ed) identities are 
‘normal’, rather than just ‘common’. This process of queering enables 
us to see how existing norms of gender and sexuality contribute to 
insecurity and legitimise gender policing, making it possible to blame 
queers for the structural and physical violences that they experience. 
In this sense, queering aligns with, and extends, the work that fem-
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inists have done – and continue to do – in showing how women’s 
experiences of in/security and violence differ from those of men due 
to the ways heteropatriarchical structures and institutions perpetu-
ate masculinism, a ‘totalising worldview that implicitly universalises 
and privileges the qualities of masculinity, and in doing so subordi-
nates and “others” alternative ways of understanding, knowing and 
being’ (Nicholas and Agius 2018, 5). Just as feminists have argued 
that women’s voices and bodies must be explicitly included in our 
accounts, analyses and (re)actions, so queer activists and academ-
ics argue that the voices and bodies of non-heterosexual and gender 
non-conforming voices and bodies must be included if we are to suc-
cessfully challenge heteropatriarchal norms that continue to position 
anyone who is not a heterosexual cisgender straight-acting (that is, 
not queer) male as less worthy of a secure existence. 
This is not to say that there are not tensions between feminist and 
queer agendas. While both are committed to advancing the inclusion 
of groups of people who are marginalised on account of their gender, 
there is considerable diversity within and across feminist and queer 
communities in how gender is defined and how it is understood to 
structure experiences of exclusion (Pearce et al. 2020). Darcy Leigh 
(2017, 355) explores the differences between the two approaches 
directly in her examination of the ‘uneasy alliance’ between Femi-
nist International Relations (IR) and Queer IR. Leigh explains that 
the central reason for the unsettled relationship between the two 
approaches is the ‘many different strands of feminist and queer poli-
tics’ that they contain, raising challenging questions about each others’ 
commitments and understandings of structures of power and mar-
ginalisation within their own communities as well as beyond them.
Despite these differences, which reflect those of feminist and queer 
politics more widely, Leigh argues persuasively that these tensions 
can be productive and outlines what a commitment to both perspec-
tives looks like for IR: 
Queer Feminist International Relations must operate within/from 
these tensions: expanding analysis far beyond ‘where are the [white, 
cis, heterosexual] women?’ even while continuing to ask ‘where 
are the women and femmes?’; making sex, sexuality and sexual 
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deviance central without losing sight of gender; disrupting binaries 
and fixed identities without losing the political leverage that some-
times comes with them; and acknowledging entanglements with 
the institutions Feminist and Queer IR seek to transform while 
also resisting being neutralized by assimilation. (Leigh 2017, 355)
A queer feminist analysis of security, therefore, means making explicit 
the connections and overlaps between the experiences of queers and 
other groups that experience marginalisation and insecurity, and 
highlighting how subjugation of the female/feminine/femme and 
corresponding veneration of the (able-bodied, white, normatively 
masculine) male re/produce existing dynamics and configurations of 
in/security. 
why queer[ing] security? 
It’s hard to quantify and pin down. It’s not just bathrooms. It is 
locker rooms. It is getting misgendered by your professor. It’s all 
sorts of little worries you have throughout the day that have this 
cumulative effect of dampening your zeal or making you more 
tired. It cramps your potential when you have to spend so much 
time thinking about how other people might or might not hurt you. 
We will never know, right now, the full potential of trans people 
in our society because we have to spend so much time living, just 
trying to survive. (Mitch Kellaway, 27, He/him, cited in Lang 2016)
The process of queering our definitions of security begins from the 
premise that queer ‘lives are lived, hence liveable’ (Scheman 2011, 
210). This statement may seem obvious, but as Mitch’s reflection 
above demonstrates, the insecurity of being queer means that it 
cannot be taken for granted. Queer lives are frequently endangered 
by hetero- and cis-normative assumptions about relationships, identi-
ties and bodies, to say nothing of deliberate denials of queer existence 
and attempts to eliminate us politically and physically. Consensual 
same-sex sexual conduct between adults continues to be criminalised 
in 62 countries, including 6 in which the death penalty is possible. A 
further 55 offer no specific legal protections to same-sex attracted 
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people, with just 66 countries providing broad or constitutional pro-
tections against discrimination based on sexual orientation (ILGA 
World: Mendos 2019, 178). Trans and gender-diverse people, mean-
while, are even more vulnerable: according to the 2017 F&M Global 
Barometer of Trans Rights, just 3 per cent of countries offered legal 
protections for transgender people sufficient to be classed as ‘protect-
ing’, whereas 76 per cent of countries had so few – if any – provisions 
that they are most accurately described as ‘persecuting’ (Dicklitch-
Nelson et al. 2019). 
These statistics – and many, many more like them – point to the 
fact that for queer people, a multitude of everyday insecurities creates 
a state of everyday war that requires constant vigilance and pre-
paredness lest one get caught in a skirmish with either those who 
deliberately oppose LGBTQ human rights or those who have simply 
never considered the realities of queer lives. In either case, lives are 
put at risk, and, for some, made unliveable. As Catherine Baker 
poignantly describes, the filter between security and insecurity is ‘so 
much more fragile when you are queer’: 
Something about your body and how you live in it – your queerness 
– and where on the planet you are doing whatever you are doing 
means that you at least think about in/security, sometimes, in the 
everyday, in a way that a straight white man living somewhere as a 
citizen has under normal, peacetime circumstances never consid-
ered that he would have to do. (Baker 2017, 110)
Given this, queering security not only challenges mainstream 
approaches to security, which often erase queer lives and bodies, but 
also challenges mainstream understandings of war as a contained 
and finite activity. In fact, a queer approach to war asks us to reverse 
Clausewitz’s dictum, and consider that politics is a continuation of 
war by other means, touching all aspects of life from the bathroom to 
the bedroom and everywhere in between. 
Moving beyond our initial premise, therefore, queering security 
requires that we ask what everyday conditions make queer lives im/
possible? In order to explore the solution of queering security and 
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to answer this question about everyday insecurity, this chapter visits 
three sites of queer insecurity: borders, bathrooms and bedrooms.
Although the experience of queer insecurity is ontological, its inten-
sity and impact on an individual’s everyday life varies significantly, 
especially within the wider societal dynamics of marginalisation 
generated by racism, ablism, classism, poverty, criminalisation, xeno-
phobia and colonialism. Yet while privilege undoubtedly protects, the 
fierce significance of gender and sexuality for both individuals and 
collectives means that privilege is always precarious and liable to be 
undone. Being queer in the contested territory of society means that 
it is always possible that one’s efforts to keep the gender(ed) peace are 
not enough. Everyday security can always be eroded or even com-
pletely washed away. The consequences of being queer transform 
from abstract risk to calculating immediate probabilities of violence 
in real time. These calculations require that queer individuals contin-
ually ask: How will this person react? How vulnerable am I? How can I 
stay safe, or at least limit harm? 
sites of everyday war: borders,  
bathrooms and bedrooms
While insecurity may be experienced anywhere, there are particular 
everyday spaces and situations in which queer people are vulnera-
ble. These are often in gendered spaces that reproduce binary hetero 
logics and therefore influence how others respond to their own 
and others’ sexuality and/or gender identity. At borders, in bath-
rooms and in bedrooms (that is, when dating or having sex), queer 
people are disproportionately likely to experience violent reactions 
as their non-conformity with societal norms of gender and sexuality 
provoke confusion, consternation, disapproval, denial and disgust. It 
is no coincidence that these locations are all ones in which security 
is deemed to be of particular importance, and perceived threats are 
responded to with particular potency. 
In the rest of this section, I consider queer experiences at borders, in 
bathrooms and in bedrooms (that is, navigating potentially intimate 
encounters) and how the gendered and/or sexualised security logics 
of these spaces (re)produce insecurity for queer people. All three sites 
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are ones in which the ongoing positioning of queer people’s non-
conformity with norms of gender and sexuality as a constant Other 
is particularly tangible. The realities of travelling, peeing and dating 
while queer clash violently with the gendered boundaries that encir-
cle and structure individual, societal and state imaginaries of security. 
At best, queer people and their bodies are highlighted as an 
anomaly, a deviation from the (binary, straight, gendered norm) that 
is justifiably treated with suspicion, facing questions like: Why can’t 
you just act normal? What sort of freak would want to look like that? At 
worst, queers are a threat that cannot be tolerated, their alleged trans-
gressions of the masculinist and heterosexist binary gender order 
provoking consternation, panic and even violence, meeting ques-
tions and abuse such as: You know this is the ladies’ room, right? But 
you don’t look like a woman! You’re disgusting! You don’t belong here! 
There’s a man in women’s restroom! Get out! I’ll call security! If you 
won’t show ID, you’ll need to leave the restroom and come with us, sir 
(see Lopez 2016).
Borders
Every time I have to go through the Gender Tube [airport body 
scanners] there’s always a moment of hesitation that I can feel from 
the TSA [Transport Security Administration] agents when they 
have to decide whether to scan my body as a man’s or a woman’s. 
Sometimes, I can hear them quietly talking among themselves as 
they speculate on my genitals. Sometimes they’ll ask me if I have 
anything in my pockets or some other random inquiry presumably 
in an attempt to parse my voice, which is equally as androgynous. 
The worst times are when my chest is flagged as an anomaly and a 
male TSA agent feels me up. (James Factora, 21, they/them, cited 
in Ettachfini 2019)
As the above quote highlights, for queer people, going through 
security screening at an airport is often to find oneself caught in a 
clash between ‘different epistemic sources of knowledge about gender 
– individual narrative or gender presentation, the classification as M 
(male) or F (female) on the document one carries, and one’s body’ 
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(Currah and Mulqueen 2011, 558). Put more simply, with the push 
of a (pink or blue) button, who you are becomes a potential cause for 
alarm and the liveability of your queer life becomes suspicious and a 
target for heightened scrutiny. Are you a man or a woman? Are you 
one of those freaks? What are you really?
The 2015 US Transgender Survey reported that ‘Forty-three 
percent (43%) of transgender identifying individuals who went 
through airport security in the past year experienced at least one 
issue related to their gender identity or expression’, including incor-
rect pronoun or title use, being patted down or having their luggage 
searched for gender-related reasons, or having the name or gender on 
their identity documents questioned (James et al. 2016, 222). People 
whose bodies do not correspond to that expected of their perceived 
gender are particularly prone to encounter ‘gender trouble’, to borrow 
the title of Judith Butler’s 1990 book. Even if the TSA agent presses 
the button that reflects your gender identity (assuming that there is 
one), the presumed correspondence of identity and body must still be 
navigated. Trans men report being flagged for pat-downs due to the 
scanner reading the absence of normatively male genitalia as incon-
gruent with their gender presentation, although others report that 
their prosthetic genitalia also triggered the alarm (Capener 2019; 
Stafford 2015). Similarly, transgender women have found themselves 
flagged for having ‘anomalous’ groin areas (Rogers 2015), while some 
intersex people have reported that they trigger alarms regardless of 
which button is pushed (Viloria 2017).
‘Border security’ practices, including airport security practices and 
biometric scanners, perpetuate and compound insecurities for those 
whom Puar (2010, 2, cited in Quinan 2017, 156) calls ‘other others’: 
Black women have repeatedly reported being subjected to intrusive 
‘hair pat-downs’ following false positive readings caused by their 
hair (Medina et al. 2019), and there have been instances of women 
using breast prosthetics after mastectomies as part of cancer treat-
ment being ordered to undergo additional pat-downs or searches 
(Holstege 2013). Muslim women wearing hijabs have complained of 
harassment from TSA agents (Rojas 2018), and the Sikh Coalition 
(2019) has noted that Sikhs of all genders ‘continue to face dispropor-
tionately higher rates of secondary screening by TSA in comparison 
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to the average traveler’ – something that they have in common with 
people with disabilities, who have long reported multiple instances of 
inequitable treatment at checkpoints (Morris 2018). 
All of these examples point to the dangers of being ‘not average’ 
according to societal norms. Deviation from the racialised, ablist, 
embodied norms of gender that are programmed into the scanner 
and reinforced by TSA agents’ protocols results in intensifications 
of othering that punish, police and securitise difference. You don’t 
present as a woman/man should, therefore you are wrong, different, 
aberrant, abnormal, dangerous, threatening. 
Few would argue that the experience of being flagged for addi-
tional investigation during security screening is not unpleasant and 
intrusive. Yet too often the response is to justify the practice as being 
necessary ‘for the greater good’, rather than recognise the uncomfort-
able reality that the othering of those who do not conform to society’s 
norms is a deliberate part of the theatre of security that is performed 
at airports. After all, without their insecurity – that is, without their 
humiliation and dehumanisation – how could we possibly know that 
the system is working and that we are protected from ever-stealthy 
and devious enemies that threaten our way of life? It’s unfortunate and 
I really feel for them, but the policies are there for a reason, you know.
Bathrooms
There’s always in the back of my mind that anything I do, espe-
cially if I’m in someplace where people know I’m trans, if I even 
blink wrong, if I look the wrong way, if I spend too much time in 
the bathroom, [or] if I do anything besides get in and get out, that 
somebody is going to accuse me of something. My bathroom visits 
are surgical strikes … you do one thing without collateral damage. 
(Brynn Tannehill, 41, She/her, cited in Lang 2016)
Public bathrooms continue the logic of national borders, with gender 
policing central to ensuring that only the ‘right’ people enter.1 Rather 
1 At least in locations where public bathrooms are commonly designated as either 
male or female. While all-gender bathrooms are gradually becoming more common, 
it remains the case that gender segregation of public bathrooms is the global norm. 
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than relying on formal processes and documentation, however, 
the first line of defence for men’s or women’s bathrooms is fellow 
bathroom users’ perceptions of your conformity with the relevant 
gender norms. One must be recognisable as a ‘normal’ man or a 
woman if one wishes to be confident they can pee in peace. Bath-
rooms are powerfully gendered and sexed spaces. Should someone 
decide that you don’t look sufficiently like a woman or a man for 
their liking, the onus is on the now-questionable queer to prove 
that they are not, in fact, in the ‘wrong’ bathroom or face the con-
sequences. Think fast: how are you going to prove you’re in the ‘right’ 
bathroom? Can you? Is there time to leave before the first fist hits or 
security arrives? You can’t blame them for it; if you’d just do something 
about how you look, this wouldn’t happen.2
In the intimate spaces of bathrooms and bedrooms, we can see the 
fragile logics and violent consequences of masculinism writ large. 
Masculinism is an underlying ethos and worldview that universa-
lises and privileges the qualities of masculinity while subordinating 
alternative ways of being (Nicholas and Agius 2018, 5). Public bath-
rooms are spaces that exemplify masculinism. Public bathrooms 
have become a battleground for gendered heteronormative standards 
that ‘marginalize people whose bodies deviate from normative male 
embodiment, such as people who are unable to urinate at urinals for 
medical, anatomical, or social reasons’ (Davis 2017, 200–1).
As Heath Fogg Davis goes on to argue, this reductionist and abso-
lutist sex segregation perpetuates insecurities at both individual and 
systemic levels. It ‘harms everyone because it constricts our individ-
ual freedom to say who we are in relation to the categories of male 
and female, regardless of how we appear to others and who is in 
our care while we are in public’ (Davis 2017, 201), thereby reinforc-
ing normative assumptions about gender identities and roles. More 
widely, sex-segregated public bathrooms generate ‘sex-based disad-
vantage’ by hindering women and others who do not conform to 
ableist and masculinist norms from freely accessing public spaces 
(Davis 2017, 210). The idea of ‘peeing in peace’ seems more aspira-
2 A comment made to me when I was a graduate student and had been asked to 
leave a bathroom on campus. 
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tional (and unattainable) than ever when there may not be any toilets 
provided in the first place, or when what is available is unusable due 
to poor maintenance, inconvenient locations, long wait times, and/or 
insufficient consideration that caregiving frequently crosses sex and 
gender categories. 
Yet gendered imaginaries of security continue to dictate the organ-
isation, design and use of public bathrooms. Facilities for women are 
‘positioned as both especially safe and (potentially) especially danger-
ous’, a framing that has led some to argue vehemently that permitting 
trans and queer people to use the bathroom aligned with their gender 
identity is a violation of women’s rights and safety (Jones and Slater 
2020: 838–9). Underpinning this claim is a rigid understanding of 
sex and gender as binary and essential, with queer and trans lives the 
price that must be paid to maintain existing logics of security even as 
they perpetuate insecurity for all. 
Bedrooms
I happened to cross the street, thinking that two other people were 
female, which they weren’t. And we engaged in conversation and I 
guess a friend of mine must have realised you know, that was a guy 
instead of a girl and he yelled out, you know, what it was. And as I 
pushed away, you know, trying to leave, I guess he – he must have 
pushed back. You know, I was drunk so I got enraged, you know. 
And then I attacked. (James Dixon, cited in Maigne 2019)
The victim of the attack described above was Islan Nettles, a 21-year-
old transgender woman. In statements to the police, Dixon said he 
was flirting with Islan, but then turned on her when friends made 
him aware that she was transgender and mocked his apparent interest 
in her. Dixon’s punch knocked her to the ground, and Dixon hit 
her again while she lay on the ground. Five days later, having never 
regained consciousness, Islan died of the head injuries that she had 
sustained. In 2016, Dixon pleaded guilty to her manslaughter and 
was sentenced to 12 years in prison (McKinley Jr 2016).
The circumstances of Islan’s death were far from uncommon. 
Between 1 January 2008 and 30 September 2019, Transgender 
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Europe’s Trans Murder Monitoring (TMM) project registered the 
murder of 3,314 trans and gender-diverse people around the world. 
The vast majority of those killed were transwomen, and more than 60 
per cent were sex workers (TGEU 2019). These figures point to the 
fact that for queer people, especially (but not exclusively) transgender 
women, safer sex begins with not getting killed or attacked by one’s 
prospective intimate partner before even getting to the bedroom. 
In bathrooms, at borders and in bedrooms, the violence faced by 
queer people is not coincidental. Rather, it reflects the systematic and 
instutionalised dehumanisation of those deemed to threaten the het-
eropatriarchal gender order. One of the clearest manifestations of this 
is the persistence of the so-called gay or trans panic defence, ‘a legal 
strategy which asks a jury to find that a victim’s sexual orientation 
or gender identity is to blame for the defendant’s violent reaction, 
including murder’ and downgrade the severity of the charges 
(Holden 2019). This defence remains permissible in all but nine US 
states (Fitsimons 2020), as well as in South Australia (Nielsen 2020), 
a tangible indication of how male violence continues to be condoned 
in the everyday war to secure masculinity against the queer enemy. 
It’s either them or us! 
queer visions of security for all
Ending war, defined strictly as military violence, is insufficient. We 
must end both structural violence and physical and psychological 
violences if everyday war is to end. Ending war and violence requires 
both a queer vision of what security means and also a commitment to 
de-centring masculinism, cis-heterosexism, ableism, racism and other 
forms of domination in processes of securitisation/militarisation. By 
way of illustration, consider queer activist Mattilda Bernstein’s (2017) 
surprisingly positive response to President Trump’s announcement 
that he would reinstate the ban on trans people serving in the US 
military. She writes:
At last, here was step one in a three-point plan for dramatic struc-
tural change, handed right to us: Step 1: Ban trans people from 
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serving in the military. Step 2: Ban everyone from serving in the 
military. Step 3: Ban the military. (Bernstein 2017)
Bernstein continues that in these three simple steps: 
we could free up the resources to fund everything we’ve ever 
dreamed of in this country – universal housing and health care, a 
guaranteed minimum income, safe houses for queer and trans kids 
to escape abusive homes – you name it. With redistribution of the 
hundreds of billions of dollars allocated to the military every year 
(nearly half the entire federal budget), surely the slogan ‘A better 
world is possible’ could become more than an aspirational refrain. 
(Bernstein 2017)
By destabilising and denaturalising our understandings of how 
security is both gendered and sexualised, and the ways in which this 
perpetuates violence, processes of queering open up space for us to 
imagine alternative definitions and practices of security that are more 
inclusive of all genders and sexualities, and for all ‘other others’. To 
queer security, therefore, is not simply to seek emancipation (helping 
people survive the current system through reforms), but to foster 
liberation (revolutionary change and dismantling of patriarchy). 
Ending war cannot just be about a rejection of militarism, but rather 
must involve challenging all forms of violence so that queer bodies 
and lives cease to be battlegrounds in an everyday war. 
references 
Note: The URLs were last accessed on 24 June 2021.
Baker, Catherine (2017) The filter is so much more fragile when you are 
queer. Critical Studies on Security 5(1): 109–112. 
Bernstein Sycamore, Mattilda (2017) Swords into marketshare, The 
Baffler, 21 September. Available at: https://thebaffler.com/latest/swords- 
into-marketshare 
Capener, Aaron (2019) FTM packing and airport security | Avoid airport 




Currah, Paisley and Mulqueen, Tara (2011) Securitizing gender: Identity, 
biometrics, and transgender bodies at airports. Social Research 78(2): 
557–582.
Davis, Heath Fogg (2017) Why the ‘transgender’ bathroom controversy 
should make us rethink sex-segregated public bathrooms. Politics, Groups, 
and Identities 6(2): 199–216. 
Dicklitch-Nelson, Susan, Buckland, Scottie Thompson, Yost, Berwood 
and Rahman, Indira (2019) Global LGBT Human Rights Trends: 2011–
2017 Data for 197 Countries. Lancaster, PA: Franklin & Marshall College. 
Available at: www.fandmglobalbarometers.org/results/ 
Ettachfini, Leila (2019) The horrible things that happen to trans people going 
through airport security. Vice, 28 August. Available at: www.vice.com/en_au/
article/qvgbv5/transgender-airport-security-harassment-experiences-tsa 
Fitsimons, Tim (2020) N.J. bans gay and transgender ‘panic defenses’. 
NBC News, 23 January. Available at: www.nbcnews.com/feature/
nbc-out/n-j-bans-gay-transgender-panic-defenses-n1120416
Holden, Alexandra (2019) The gay/trans panic defense: What it is, and how 
to end it. Member Op-Ed, American Bar Association, 1 April. Availa-
ble at: www.americanbar.org/groups/crsj/publications/member-features/
gay-trans-panic-defense/ 
Holstege, Sean (2013) Phoenix airport screening draws angry 
complaints. USA Today, 12 October. Available at: www.usatoday.com/
story/news/nation/2013/10/11/phoenix-airport-screening-draws- 
angry-complaints/2970589/ 
ILGA World: Lucas Ramón Mendos (2019) State-sponsored Homophobia 2019: 
Global Legislation Overview Update. Geneva: ILGA. Available at: https://
ilga.org/downloads/ILGA_World_State_Sponsored_Homophobia_
report_global_legislation_overview_update_December_2019.pdf 
James, S.E., Herman, J.L., Rankin, S., Keisling, M., Mottet, L. and Anafi, 
M. (2016) The Report of the 2015 U.S. Transgender Survey. Washington, 
DC: National Center for Transgender Equality. Available at: https://
transequality.org/sites/default/files/docs/usts/USTS-Full-Report-Dec17.
pdf 
Jones, Charlotte and Slater, Jen (2020) The toilet debate: Stalling trans pos-
sibilities and defending ‘women’s protected spaces’. Sociological Review 
68(4): 834–851.
Lang, Nico (2016) What it’s like to use a public bathroom while trans. Rolling 




Leigh, Darcy (2017) Queer Feminist International Relations: Uneasy alli-
ances, productive tensions. Alternatif Politika 9(3): 343–360.
Ley, Heather (2019) Team Minot Wonder Women. Minot Air Force Base 
News, 12 March. Available: www.minot.af.mil/News/Article-Display/
Article/1782779/team-minot-wonder-women/ 
Lopez, German (2016) Women are getting harassed in bathrooms because 
of anti-transgender hysteria. Vox News, 19 May. Available at: www.vox.
com/2016/5/18/11690234/women-bathrooms-harassment
MacKenzie, Megan (2009) Securitization and desecuritization: Female 
soldiers and the reconstruction of women in post-conflict Sierra Leone. 
Security Studies 2(18): 241–246.
Maigne, Juliette (2019) Trans woman’s killer used the ‘gay panic defence’: It’s 
still legal in 42 states. Vice News, 21 July.
McKinley Jr, James C. (2016) Man sentenced to 12 years in beating death 
of transgender woman. The New York Times, 19 April. Available at: www.
nytimes.com/2016/04/20/nyregion/man-sentenced-to-12-years-in-
beating-death-of-transgender-woman.html 
Medina, Brenda, ProPublica and Frank, Thomas (2019) TSA agents say 
they’re not discriminating against black women, but their body scanners 
might be. ProPublica, 17 April. Available at: www.propublica.org/article/
tsa-not-discriminating-against-black-women-but-their-body-scanners-
might-be 
Morris, John (2018) What we learned at the 2018 TSA Disability Meeting. 
Wheelchair Travel, 13 August. Available at: https://wheelchairtravel.org/
takeaways-2018-tsa-disability-conference/
Nicholas, Lucy and Agius, Christine (2018) The Persistence of Global Mas-
culinism: Discourse, Gender and Neo-colonial Re-articulations of Violence. 
Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Nielsen, Ben (2020) SA led the way for many reforms, so why is ‘gay panic’ still a 
defence? ABC News, 3 June. Available at: www.abc.net.au/news/2020-06-03/
proposal-to-abolish-gay-panic-defence-in-sa/12311350
Pearce, Ruth, Erikainen, Sonja and Vincent, Ben (2020) TERF wars: An 
introduction. Sociological Review 68(4): 677–698. 
Pink Tank (2005) We will not protect you. Available at: www.againstequality.
org/files/we_will_not_protect_you_2005.pdf 
Quinan, Christine L. (2017) Gender (in)securities: Surveillance and 
transgender bodies in a post-9/11 era of neoliberalism. In: Matthias Leese 
and Stef Wittendorp (eds) Security/Mobility. Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, pp. 153–169.
Wilkinson
104
Rocheleau, Julie (2019) A former slur is reclaimed, and listeners have mixed 
feelings. NPR Public Editor, 21 August. Available at: www.npr.org/sections/
publiceditor/2019/08/21/752330316/a-former-slur-is-reclaimed-and-
listeners-have-mixed-feelings
Rogers, Katie (2015) T.S.A. defends treatment of transgender air traveler. 
The New York Times, 22 September. Available at: www.nytimes.
com/2015/09/23/us/shadi-petosky-tsa-transgender.html 
Rojas, Nicole (2018) Fourteen women claim TSA harassed them for wearing 
hijabs at Newark Airport. Newsweek, 8 June. Available at: www.newsweek.
com/fourteen-women-claim-tsa-harassed-them-wearing-hijabs-newark-
airport-967771 
Scheman, Naomi (2011) Queering the center by centring the queer: Reflec-
tions on transsexuals and secular Jews. In Shifting Ground: Knowledge 
and Reality, Transgression and Trustworthiness. Oxford: Oxford Univer-
sity Press, pp. 111–144.
Sikh Coalition (2019) Statement of Sim J. Singh, Senior Manager of 
Advocacy and Policy, at Hearing on ‘Perspectives on TSA’s policies to 
prevent unlawful profiling’, Committee on Homeland Security, 4 June. 
Available at: www.sikhcoalition.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/TSA-
Hearing-6.4.19.pdf 
Stafford, Zach (2015) TSA agents who flag trans people cause trauma and don’t 
make us safer. The Guardian, 24 September. Available at: www.theguardian.
com/commentisfree/2015/sep/23/tsa-agents-transgender-people-trauma 
TGEU (2019) TMM update Trans Day of Remembrance 2019. Available: 
https://tgeu.org/tmm-update-trans-day-of-remembrance-2019/
Viloria, Hida (2017) Fear of flying – or at least the TSA – while intersex. 




Abolish Nuclear Weapons: Feminist, 
Queer, and Indigenous Knowledge  
for Ending Nuclear Weapons 
Ray Acheson
This chapter will explore nuclear abolition as a feminist objective to 
ending war. It explores the role of intersectional feminism in shaping 
activism against the bomb. The bomb itself is the most extreme expres-
sion of violence and control of the patriarchal, racist and capitalist 
world order. Those who possess or desire nuclear weapons argue that 
the mere possession of the bomb prevents conflict and deters attack. 
Nuclear weapons are discussed in the abstract, as magical tools that 
keep us safe and maintain stability in the world. But nuclear weapons 
are not abstract. They are made of radioactive materials. They are 
made to destroy flesh and bone. To melt the skin from our bodies. To 
reduce entire cities to ashes.
To the majority of people struggling daily under this oppressive 
order, the abolition of nuclear weapons may not seem like a priority. 
When confronting settler colonialism, imperial intervention, war, 
mass incarceration, poverty, displacement, environmental devasta-
tion, and violence in our homes and communities, nuclear weapons 
may seem like an abstraction indeed. But these weapons are part of 
the spectrum of institutionalised violence. They are the pinnacle 
of a state’s monopoly on violence, the ultimate signifier of domina-
tion. These weapons can manifest extraordinary violence in a single 
moment – extreme death, destruction, and despair.
Thus, to resist injustice requires attention to the role nuclear 
weapons play in our world order, at the intersection of patriarchal, 
racist, colonial and capitalist oppressions. We must privilege voices 
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and perspectives of those who are historically overlooked, ignored or 
ridiculed. Doing so means changing the conversation, changing the 
location of conversations, and diversifying the participation in con-
versations about nuclear weapons. 
This chapter is grounded in the belief that nuclear weapons aboli-
tion work must contribute to broader struggles for social justice. I seek 
to engage with feminist, queer and Indigenous writing, not to distract 
from other structural and physical oppressions these activists target. 
Rather, I believe that nuclear abolitionists can learn from other activ-
ists working against systems of patriarchy, racism and colonialism. It 
is useful to recognise various perspectives and experiences that revolt 
against hegemonic normative structures and systems of thought; 
nuclear abolition requires us to challenge social ordering and logics of 
knowledge production that give ‘social and political difference their 
discursive power’ (Eng 2013, 4). This chapter proceeds with an over-
view of the history of nuclear weapons and feminist efforts to abolish 
them, before engaging with a range of scholars to learn how to con-
tinue to resist and craft efforts to abolish nuclear weapons. 
nuclear weapons, intersectional oppressions  
and myths of security
The history of nuclear weapons is a history of colonial exploitation. 
Nuclear-armed states have tested bombs outside of their territories, 
often in colonies or lands they deemed inferior (Hawkins 2018). 
When nuclear-armed governments have conducted tests on their own 
territories, it has primarily been on Indigenous lands. For example, 
the Western Shoshone Nation in the south-western United States is 
the most bombed nation on Earth (Johnson 2018). In a statement 
to the negotiations of the United Nations (UN) Treaty on the Pro-
hibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) in July 2017, 35 Indigenous 
groups declared, ‘Governments and colonial forces exploded nuclear 
bombs on our sacred lands – upon which we depend for our lives and 
livelihoods, and which contain places of critical cultural and spiritual 
significance – believing they were worthless’ (Indigenous Statement 
2017). Delivered by Karina Lester, a Yankunytjatjara-Anangu woman 
from South Australia, the statement highlighted that Indigenous 
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people ‘never asked for, and never gave permission to poison our soil, 
food, rivers and oceans. We continue to resist inhumane acts of radi-
oactive racism.’ 
Activists in the United States have long recognised the racism 
inherent in the practice of nuclear weapon policy: ‘The atomic 
bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki were inextricably linked to 
colonialism and racial equality’ (Intondi 2015, 22). Coretta Scott 
King, Dr Martin Luther King Jr, W.E.B. Du Bois and others elabo-
rated the inseparability of nuclear disarmament, the end of colonial 
empires and civil rights (Intondi 2015). 
Similarly, feminist scholars have mapped the connections between 
militarised masculinities, the quest for dominance in international 
relations, and nuclear weapons. Carol Cohn’s (1987a, 1987b) exam-
ination of the gendered discourse on nuclear weapons provided the 
foundations for a feminist analysis of nuclear war, nuclear strategy 
and nuclear weapons themselves. Drawing upon a Hindu national-
ist leader who, after India’s 1998 nuclear weapon tests, explained, ‘we 
had to prove that we are not eunuchs’, Cohn et al. (2006) argued that 
statements like this are meant to ‘elicit admiration for the wrathful 
manliness of the speaker’ and to imply that being willing to employ 
nuclear weapons is to be ‘man enough’ to ‘defend’ your country. 
They also examined how disarmament is ‘feminised’ and linked to 
disempowerment, weakness and irrationality, while militarism and 
attaining nuclear weapons are celebrated as signs of strength, power 
and rationality (Cohn et al. 2006).
Feminists also observe how masculinised expectations for political 
leaders may be coupled with anxieties about sexual performance and 
reproduction, emphasising that ‘technostrategic speak’ is enforced to 
signal elite ‘expertise’ (Eschle 2012). In discourses that defend nuclear 
weapons as necessary for security, ‘the protector’ is coded as mascu-
line and ‘the protected’ as feminine. These discourses reinforce, and 
play into, fantasies of ‘real men’ and masculinity as defined by ‘invul-
nerability, invincibility, and impregnability’ (Eschle 2012). Feminists 
criticise a masculinised approach to security, specifically in realist 
International Relations theory that accords status to nuclear weapons 
as both markers of masculine domination (capable of inflicting 
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violence) and masculine protector (capable of deterring violence) 
(Duncanson and Eschle 2008). 
Nuclear-armed states seek to discredit those who demand the abo-
lition of nuclear weapons. Proponents of nuclear weapons seek to use 
a logic of rationalism and power to defend their possession of these 
weapons while seeking to ‘feminise’ opponents of nuclear weapons 
by claiming they are emotional and irrational. In the development of 
the UN Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons negotiations, 
the representatives from nuclear-armed states berated governments 
and activists pushing to ban the bomb. In one case, a Russian ambas-
sador suggested that those wanting to prohibit nuclear weapons are 
‘radical dreamers’ who have ‘shot off to some other planet or outer 
space’. In another, a UK ambassador said the security interests of ban-
proponents were either irrelevant or non-existent. A US ambassador 
asserted that banning nuclear weapons might undermine interna-
tional security so much it could even result in the use of nuclear 
weapons (Acheson 2019a). These assertions exemplify patriarchal 
techniques – including victim-blaming and gaslighting. The message 
is clear: if you try to take away our toys of massive nuclear violence, 
we will have no choice but to use them, and it will be your fault. This 
discourse that presents anti-bomb activists as ‘emotional’, ignores the 
effects that nuclear weapons inflict on people and denies individuals 
the space to express their concerns about these genocidal tools. This 
is a form of gaslighting – insisting that these weapons are a source of 
security and accusing anyone who thinks otherwise of being emo-
tional, overwrought, irrational, or impractical (Acheson 2018).
Those who determine what is considered realistic, practical 
and feasible are men and women of incredible privilege; elites of 
their own societies and in the global community – such as politi-
cians, government personnel, military commanders, and ‘national 
security’ practitioners and academics. This field often ignores people 
affected by nuclear weapons development, testing, stockpiling, use, 
or threatened use. The common narrative is that nuclear weapons 
are required in a world where there will always be those who want to 
retain or develop the capacity to wield massive, unfathomable levels 
of violence over others. Elites who possess nuclear weapons argue 
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they are ‘rational’ actors who must retain nuclear weapons for protec-
tion against irrational others. 
For example, in 2018, the US government asserted that past com-
mitments to nuclear disarmament were out of date and out of step 
with today’s ‘international security environment’ – ignoring that the 
international security environment is heavily affected by the US gov-
ernment’s own actions, including its build-up of its nuclear arsenal. 
The Trump administration articulated a new approach to nuclear 
weapons policy, focused not on what the US can do for nuclear dis-
armament but what the rest of the world can do so the US – the most 
heavily militarised country in the world – can feel ‘safer’ (Acheson 
2019b). 
This logic insists upon the notion that states are always at odds with 
one another, rather than collectively pursuing a world in which mutual 
interdependence and cooperation could guide behaviour through an 
integrated set of common interests, needs and obligations (Acheson 
2019a). Feminists dispute that security can be ‘possessed or guaran-
teed by the state … It is a process, immanent in our relationships 
with others and always partial, elusive, and contested’ (Duncanson 
and Eschle 2008, 15). Security is not an object or an achievement, it 
is a process that depends on the interactions of many moving parts. 
Security cannot be reached through weaponisation but through our 
relationships to one another and with our environment – and these 
are always changing, as are we. ‘How we live, how we organize, how 
we engage in the world – the process – not only frames the outcome, 
it is the transformation’, writes Michi Saagiig Nishnaabeg scholar and 
activist Leanne Betasamosake Simpson (Simpson 2017, 19).
deconstructing and reconstructing normativity
To abolish nuclear weapons, we must devalue them. Feminism, along 
with queer and Indigenous experience and activism, is essential to 
the process of deconstructing and reconstructing what is consid-
ered normative about nuclear weapon acquisition. We must privilege 
voices and perspectives of those who are usually overlooked, must 
change perspectives about what is realistic and rational, and must 
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offer alternative ways to organise and engage in relationship in inter-
national society. 
Feminist, queer, and Indigenous writing attempts to disrupt the 
status quo and build something in its place by challenging what is 
considered normative and credible. These approaches provide three 
tangible tools useful for resisting and abolishing nuclear weapons: 
changing the conversations that are happening; changing the location 
of these conversations, and diversifying the participation in these 
conversations. 
Changing the conversation helps us deconstruct, disrupt and change 
normative frameworks of thought and action. In her ground-break-
ing study of gender, queer feminist scholar Judith Butler (1999, xxiii) 
argues: ‘The naturalized knowledge of gender operates as a preemp-
tive and violent circumscription of reality.’ Power is not static; it 
operates in the production of frameworks of thought. In challenging 
power, Butler suggests we need not just to critique the effects of insti-
tutions, practices and discourses that the powerful create – we need 
to ask what possibilities emerge when we challenge the assertions of 
what is normative, and challenge what is taken in mainstream under-
standings to be common ground or absolute reality. ‘No political 
revolution is possible without a radical shift in one’s notion of the 
possible and the real,’ says Butler (1999, xxiii).
A feminist, queer, and anti-racist analysis of nuclear discourse 
helps to deconstruct nuclear weapons as symbols of power and tools 
of empire. The association between nuclear weapons and emblems 
of power is not inevitable and unchangeable but a gendered social 
construction that upholds a patriarchal, racist and capitalist order. 
Nuclear disarmament begins by highlighting how the value of nuclear 
weapons is socially constructed (Acheson 2016). 
Challenging normative discourse is also helped by changing 
the location within which these discussions take place. Queer and 
Indigenous activists have articulated challenges to the dominant 
understandings and social orderings of sexuality, gender, rights, race 
and citizenship, not just through courts and other social institutions 
of the powerful but also through outright challenges to those insti-
tutions. For example, for some queer activists it is not sufficient for 
LGBT rights to be ‘recognised’ or ‘tolerated’ by heterosexist societies 
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when queer lives are being destroyed and diminished in multifaceted 
ways. Assimilation risks allowing privileged members of marginal 
groups to access the status quo, while vulnerable members of these 
communities continue to be stigmatised and oppressed (Cohen 
1997). ‘Queer struggles aim not just at toleration or equal status but 
at challenging those institutions and accounts’ (Warner 1993, xiii). 
This may offer an approach based not on integrating into dominant 
structures but on transforming ‘the basic fabric and hierarchies that 
allow systems of oppression to persist and operate efficiently’ (Cohen 
1997, 437). 
Similarly, some Indigenous activists maintain that it is not suffi-
cient for Indigenous communities to be granted certain rights on 
certain land by the very settler colonial governments that conducted 
campaigns of genocide against them. They fight for environmental 
protections and rights as citizens of First Nations, not of the states 
that continue to steal, rape, murder and destroy their bodies, land 
and water with which they live (Driskill et al. 2011; Estes 2019). 
Indigenous activists and scholars recognise that systems set up by the 
heteropatriarchal settler colonial state are not systems in which those 
seeking protection from the violence inherent to those systems will 
receive it. Within these parameters and spaces, the settler colonial 
state will always dominate interactions with Indigenous populations. 
As Simpson (2017, 45) writes:
The state sets up different controlled points of interaction through 
its practices … and uses its asymmetric power to ensure it always 
controls the processes as a mechanism for managing Indigenous 
sorrow, anger, and resistance, and this ensures the outcome remains 
consistent with its goal of maintaining dispossession.
Nuclear-armed states utilise similar processes in order to maintain 
control of and dominance over issues related to nuclear weapons. 
Diplomats and activists alike get excited about a rare UN Security 
Council meeting on nuclear weapons, but the traditional spaces in 
which international interactions on nuclear weapons occur – such 
as within Non-proliferation Treaty meetings and the Conference on 
Disarmament – are regulated by and do not challenge the power of 
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those that possess the bomb. Similarly, the ways that a settler colonial 
state may try to promote Indigenous culture in a narrative about the 
‘multicultural mosaic’ of the country, without challenging the dis-
possession upon which the state is based, is reminiscent of how the 
nuclear-armed states and their allies call for ‘bridge building’ and 
‘dialogue’, fundamentally arguing that the radicals opposed to nuclear 
weapons need to calm down and get back in line.
Thus, opposing these systems requires creativity about how and 
where change is made. Consider how nuclear activists turned to the 
UN General Assembly to prohibit nuclear weapons. The interna-
tional diplomatic forum in which nuclear disarmament negotiations 
are ‘supposed’ to take place – the Conference on Disarmament, based 
at the UN in Geneva – is closed to activists and to the majority of UN 
member states. It has only 65 states as members, and each is given an 
absolute veto over every decision the forum can take, including the 
establishment of its agenda. No substantive work has taken place in 
this forum since 1996, yet the nuclear-armed governments maintain 
that it is the only forum in which questions of nuclear weapons can 
be credibly discussed. By taking the issue to the General Assembly, 
the rest of the world’s governments rejected the structure of oppres-
sion imposed upon them by the nuclear-armed, forging a new path 
outside of ‘credible’ channels in order to allow the voices and interests 
of those not in control of massive world-destroying arsenals not only 
to be heard, but to hold court. 
This change in location was also imperative in terms of how diplo-
mats worked to change their own government’s policies. In the early 
years of working towards the nuclear ban treaty, diplomats and activ-
ists gathered outside of established institutions to discuss, think, and 
learn. In these small-group discussions at various sites in the world, 
the individuals involved could work with each other to develop argu-
ments and strategies to take back to their own national institutions 
in order to bring their government on board with pursuing and even 
leading the way for a new treaty. If this initial work had taken place 
within pre-existing processes or institutions, the objective to ban 
nuclear weapons might have been shut down before it had a chance 
to crystallise into a credible policy goal. It allowed people to come 
together to discuss ‘radical’ or ‘unrealistic’ ideas in novel spaces, and 
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resulted in a solution to a seemingly intractable problem. Consciously 
or not, the decision to turn to alternative forums allowed marginal 
positions on nuclear weapons to inform progressive change by queer-
ing the process. These alternative spaces permitted ‘a political agenda 
that seeks to change values, definitions, and laws which make these 
institutions and relationships oppressive’ (Cohen 1997, 444–5). 
Essential to the task of challenging what is considered norma-
tive and from where challenges can be mounted is to consider who 
is included in the conversation – by diversifying participation. In 
dissenting from normative frameworks of heteropatriarchy and colo-
nialism, for example, some Indigenous queer and feminist scholars 
and activists work to interrogate and challenge what or who is a 
subject, what or who is considered credible and legitimate, what or 
who can be a source of knowledge and intellectualism. In this work, 
they critique the intellectual frameworks colonial regimes employ in 
order to suppress identities and opposition, and ‘hold heteropatriar-
chal legacies accountable to change’ (Driskill et al. 2011, 19).
In the context of nuclear weapons, the dominant voices are men 
representing government or academic institutions in nuclear-armed 
states – people who directly benefit from the production of theories 
and perspectives that justify the possession and continued develop-
ment and modernisation of nuclear arsenals. These ‘authorities’ often 
deny and dismiss anti-nuclear activists, often ignoring those who 
have suffered from the development, testing, and use of these bombs.
Presently, there has been a concerted push to include women in 
nuclear weapons-related dialogue and negotiations. The Treaty on 
the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, for example, recognises that the 
‘equal, full and effective participation of both women and men is an 
essential factor for the promotion and attainment of sustainable peace 
and security’, and expresses the commitment of its states parties to 
‘supporting and strengthening the effective participation of women 
in nuclear disarmament’. Such calls for ‘women’s participation’ in the 
fields of nuclear weapon policy and other militaristic pursuits are 
often premised on a legitimate concern at the lack of gender diversity 
in these discussions or institutions. But ‘adding women’ is not only 
insufficient, it also risks further legitimising the institutions, prac-
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tices, and policies that many seeking ‘gender equality’ would arguably 
like to change. 
The nuclear policy field is dominated by cisgender heterosex-
ual white men who compose a self-described ‘nuclear priesthood’ 
that espouses normative masculinised perspectives on security and 
weapons. A recent study published by New America (Hurlburt et al. 
2019) paints a portrait of the sexism and gendered stereotypes, and 
noted that there were high levels of attrition of women in the field. 
Women (mostly white, cisgender women) who did successfully par-
ticipate in nuclear policy institutions were often forced to prove their 
competency by ‘mastering the orthodoxy’ and having to ‘master the 
technical details before you could have an opinion’ (Hurlburt et al. 
2019). The very few women who succeed in this sector are celebrated 
as crossing the divide from ‘feminine’ arms control to ‘masculine’ 
nuclear war planning. Former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense 
for Nuclear and Missile Defense Policy Elaine Bunn explained, 
‘There was the soft, fuzzy arms control side and then there was the 
real military side, the deployment side, and I felt like I had to prove 
my bonafides on the other side.’ She remembered a mentor telling her 
if she was going to stay in the Defense Department, she needed to ‘do 
the targeting, the hard side of this, not just the arms control side’, or 
she would not be taken seriously. 
One interviewee, a graduate fellow at the National Nuclear Security 
Administration, argued that, as a woman of colour, she wanted to 
interrogate the impacts of nuclear policies not just on women but also 
on Indigenous communities and communities of colour: 
We detonated some of our strongest weapons in Bikini Atoll and 
in Micronesia and the Marshall Islands. It wasn’t the suburbs of 
Montana that we were doing that in … Whether it’s criminal justice 
policy or national security policy, when we talk about who is a 
valuable life, black and brown people are the last in the line of that 
list. (Hurlburt et al. 2019) 
However, other women interviewed in the study expressed they did 
not consider civilian impacts to be important or useful. One inter-
viewee suggested that nuclear weapons have had a positive impact on 
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women and others because of the number of women that they have 
saved through nuclear deterrence. 
These women policy-makers’ statements demonstrate that ‘adding 
women’ to nuclear policy discussions is not enough to ensure that 
meaningful change can be achieved. This is further amplified by the 
fact that, as of January 2019, the chief executive officers of four of 
the United States’ biggest weapons-producing companies – Northrup 
Grumman, Lockheed Martin, General Dynamics, and the weapons-
wing of Boeing – were women. The Pentagon’s top weapons purchaser 
– the Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International 
Security Affairs – as well as the Undersecretary for Nuclear Security 
are also women (Brown 2019). These women are not challenging the 
patriarchal structures and systems that have created the militarised 
world order – they are actively maintaining it and profiting from 
it. In March 2019, the Minot Air Force Base celebrated an ‘all-
women missile alert’, during which only women were responsible for 
launching nuclear missiles at the site for 24 hours. For the occasion, 
they donned a special patch with Wonder Woman emblazoned on it. 
One of the women who took part in the mission said, ‘There’s a lot 
of beauty in an all-female crew standing together as a part of history 
to accomplish the mission for the three ICBM [inter-continental 
ballistic missiles] wings’ (Ley 2019). 
As feminist scholar Cynthia Enloe says, ‘You can militarise 
anything, including equality’ (in Hayda 2019). Women have been 
advocates for nuclear weapons, at times leveraging their position as 
mothers and wives to justify this support. Former US Ambassador to 
the UN, Niki Haley, appealed to her status as a mother to justify her 
defence of nuclear weapons. ‘First and foremost, I’m a mom, I’m a 
wife, I’m a daughter’, she said at a press conference where she opposed 
the negotiation of an international treaty prohibiting nuclear weapons 
(Democracy Now! 2017). ‘And as a mom, as a daughter, there’s nothing 
I want more for my family than a world without nuclear weapons. But 
we have to be realistic.’ She identified the desire for disarmament with 
her womanhood but connects her desire to ‘protect’ her family to the 
‘necessity’ of retaining nuclear weapons.
This idea that nuclear weapons possession is a realistic credible 
policy is inherent to the normative security discourse deployed in 
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nuclear-armed states. Adding women to the discussion does not, on 
its own, challenge the normativity of these claims. Women gaining 
access to these discussions are primarily from the same class, back-
ground, perspective and identity as the men that are already there. 
The vast majority of women who hold any positions within the 
nuclear or broader ‘security establishment’ in the United States are 
white, heterosexual, cisgender, middle- or upper-class women. They 
are primarily interested in climbing the ladder and ‘breaking the glass 
ceiling’, not in challenging or reconfiguring the instructions or struc-
tures to which they have been granted acceptance. Adding women to 
discussions of nuclear policy, particularly in ‘traditional’ spaces, does 
not guarantee a different perspective. Women are as socialised into 
militarised ideas of security, and can support politics infused with 
the notion of threat. Presenting militarised solutions to ‘threats and 
enemies’ is legitimised when decision-making sites are perceived to 
provide ‘equal opportunity’ for participants of different identities. 
In an effort to establish their legitimacy, state actors sometimes 
even embrace the language of their critics – describing themselves or 
their foreign policy as feminist. Assertions of ‘feminist foreign policy’ 
by governments is a means to legitimise their leadership despite these 
states’ continuation of arms transfers, their participation in wars or 
military interventions, and their refusal to come to terms with their 
status as settler colonial states. The use of the label ‘feminist’ reflects 
what Duriesmith (2019) calls the ‘cynical use of gender program-
ming to legitimise other forms of violence’.
The Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom 
(WILPF) has always stood in solidarity with the bombed over the 
bombers. WILPF works for peace and disarmament and against the 
arms industry, capitalism, racism and environmental destruction. 
WILPF was a member of the International Campaign to Abolish 
Nuclear Weapons (ICAN), which led the efforts to achieve the Treaty 
on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. During this period of work, 
ICAN included many women, queer-identified folks, activists of the 
global South, representatives of affected Indigenous communities, 
atomic bomb survivors, and others who had experienced the impacts 
of nuclear weapons. This was part of a concerted effort to diversify 
the participation in conversations about these weapons. The partic-
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ipants in policy-making about nuclear weapons matter: it matters 
who is at the table, because diversity of participation is the only way 
to help ensure diversity of perspectives. 
It is also vital to take an intersectional approach to issues of equality, 
justice and security within our work for nuclear abolition. Drawing 
from feminist, queer and Indigenous activism, it is in the recogni-
tion of the complementarity of our struggles that we can find resilient 
strategies to change it. Water Protectors at Standing Rock identified 
the oppressor not just as the US government, the military or capitalist 
corporate interests. They understood that heteropatriarchy, racism 
and imperialist pursuit of empire are at the core of the challenges they 
face in trying to protect land and water from the violence of pipe-
lines (Estes 2019). Queer activists see political promise in a ‘broad 
critique of multiple social antagonisms, including race, gender, class, 
nationality, and religion, in addition to sexuality’ and in ‘a broad-
ened consideration of the late-twentieth-century global crises that 
have configured historical relations among political economies, the 
geopolitics of war and terror, and national manifestations of sexual, 
racial, and gendered hierarchies’ (Eng et al. 2013, 1). 
In the context of nuclear weapons, this means recognising that 
campaigning for nuclear disarmament without understanding the 
racist, patriarchal and capitalist injustice these weapons represent in 
international relations and local experiences does a disservice both 
to fighting for disarmament and for justice. Our critique of nuclear 
weapons needs to also be a critique of the settler colonial state, which 
believes that it can conduct nuclear tests or store nuclear waste on 
stolen lands. It needs to be a critique of racism, with attention to the 
bodies and lands upon which nuclear weapons are tested and used. 
It needs to critique patriarchy, with a mind to how nuclear weapons 
involve gendered norms, and how they are used to reinforce social 
hierarchies, control and domination.
An intersectional approach to nuclear disarmament also means 
ensuring that the voices and perspectives of those who experience the 
violence of nuclear weapons and of the intersection of these oppres-
sions are leading our critiques and our work. This includes looking to 
the lessons of others who have struggled to make change from non-
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normative and marginalised positions, learning from them and being 
led by them. 
It means not simply relying on established institutions to ‘allow’ us 
to participate, or to settle for minor accommodations within those 
institutions. A critique of nuclear weapons in the locations and with 
the language of nuclear weapons proponents will not work. At best it 
may help achieve slight reductions in numbers of warheads or missiles, 
or the establishment of arms control regulations and non-prolifera-
tion initiatives. It does not get us to abolition. Only by situating our 
critique in the struggles of Indigenous, queer, feminist and anti-rac-
ist activists can we honestly account for nuclear weapons, what they 
do, and who they are really ‘for’. Only by rethinking our relation-
ship to existing institutions, which tend to co-opt participants into 
the status quo rather than providing opportunities for participants to 
change things ‘from the inside’, can we start to think about alternative 
spaces and relationships to engage in meaningful processes. Much 
more work remains to be done, and the more we can learn from each 
other’s theories and practices of action and participation, the better 
impact we will have across a range of social justice struggles.
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Make Foreign Policies as if Black and 
Brown Lives Mattered 
Yolande Bouka
So make no mistake, because we acted quickly, a humanitarian 
catastrophe has been avoided and the lives of countless civilians – 
innocent men, women and children – have been saved. 
President Barack Obama on the military 
intervention in Syria (2011 weekly radio address)
This chapter argues that to end wars, we need to reimagine the world 
as one where Black and Brown people’s lives matter. In this vision, 
racialised groups’ vulnerabilities to, and experiences with, physical 
and structural violence would inform foreign policies when evaluat-
ing cost and benefits of war and military interventions. Reimagining 
this world is not a project of science fiction. It is a necessary endeav-
our for which Black feminist thought, anti-colonial scholarship, 
and Feminist International Relations scholars have laid the founda-
tions. Grounding foreign policy in these theoretical traditions has the 
potential to help us rethink war, promote peace, and preserve human 
dignity.
There are multiple ways to reimagine a world in which Black and 
Brown lives matter. This chapter imagines such a world by asking 
readers to challenge current justifications for war. Too often, military 
interventions are waged in the name of civilian protection and pro-
motion of democracy. These claims obscure the underlying foreign 
policy priorities of political and military elites. Military interventions 
place racialised and vulnerable groups at a disproportionate risk of 
extreme and long-term violence. This chapter argues that in order 
to end war, we must not only pay attention to the circumstances in 
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which militarised interventions are deployed but must also interro-
gate the gendered and racialised implications of moral justifications 
of war. We must critically assess the reasons for intervening, the rules 
of engagement on the ground, and the type of peace-building strat-
egies used for, on, and against Black, Brown, or otherwise racialised 
people. 
This chapter foregrounds feminist and anti-colonial approaches 
to examine contemporary military interventions as a continuation 
of masculine, colonial and imperial projects. First, it seeks to dem-
onstrate the global hierarchy where human lives are valued based 
on where they are situated along the colour line. I ask why and how 
powerful states choose to intervene in the name of the ‘responsibil-
ity to protect’ (R2P) when, for the most part, civilians in zones of 
interventions end up suffering disproportionately from the direct 
and indirect impacts of war. Second, this chapter seeks to illustrate 
how gendered protection discourses and practices used to legitimate 
war and interventions obscure how women and girls are dispropor-
tionately burdened by militarised responses to threats. Ending war 
requires us to see the connection between war, colonial logic, and 
masculine logics of militarisation. 
In this chapter, I use W.E.B. Du Bois’ conceptualisation of racism 
as a root of war and echo Sojourner Truth’s provocation that Black 
women (and other women of colour) do not benefit from the same 
level of protection as their white counterparts in military inter-
ventions. I also draw on Black feminist theory, including Kimberlé 
Crenshaw’s concept of intersectionality. Black feminist thought has 
helped illuminate the deep and layered forms of insecurity that 
Black and Brown men, women and children face before, during and 
after war. In this chapter I draw on intersectionality to examine and 
rethink the cost of war. I argue that intervening actors often measure 
the cost and utility of war in ways that ignores the impact on Black 
and Brown bodies. 
When we apply Crenshaw’s analytical tool of intersectionality to 
understanding war, we see that, ultimately, Black women face over-
lapping and interdependent systems of vulnerabilities. In militarised 
conflict, the ‘personal is political’: violence increasingly blurs the 
lines between home front and battlefront. As such, an intersectional 
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approach is necessary to disentangle the racist and sexist logics of 
war and their gendered and racialised consequences. This chapter 
invites the reader to unequivocally accept the equal worth of racial-
ised civilians and consider using Black feminist epistemologies in 
understanding war and oppression. In short, to end wars, we must 
think about how to cease exploitative conditions that lead to politi-
cal violence.
In laying out this feminist solution to ending war, and the 
reimagining of a world in which Black and Brown lives matter, I 
begin by explaining how modern-day military interventions follow 
a long tradition of colonial and imperial projects. I draw on feminist 
and anti-colonial thought to critique the logics of humanitarian 
intervention and activities that ignore and erase racialised individuals. 
The chapter will then use the 2011 intervention in Libya to illustrate 
that, despite ‘women and children’ being used as a justification for 
humanitarian intervention, the militarised response increased the 
insecurity of civilians in Libya and the surrounding region. The case 
study will be analysed to show how racial dynamics influenced the 
decision to intervene and the selected modes of engagement. Finally, 
the chapter offers its solution by putting forth the types of data 
and criteria that should be taken into consideration when deciding 
to engage in military solutions and reflections on the conditions 
necessary to prevent their use.
rethinking intervention and war as  
extensions of masculine colonial rule 
The end of the Cold War prompted new ideas about the world 
order, war, and the role of women in global politics. Indeed, the 
1990s saw the collapse of the Soviet Union, the end of the Namibian 
War of Independence, and the diversity of Third Wave Feminism. 
This global feminist movement cemented its principles during the 
Nairobi and Beijing conferences on women (1989 and 1995). There 
was a great deal of optimism about broader conceptualisations of 
collective security and neoliberalism as foundations for peace and 
security. Similarly, international feminist coalitions pushed for the 
inclusion of women in all aspects of political life, including peace 
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and security. By 2005, both the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) and 
the Women, Peace and Security agenda had emerged as part of a 
United Nations (UN)-endorsed discourse and practices on civilian 
protection, international intervention, and women and security. Yet, 
the 1990s, also hailed as the ‘long peace’ because of the reduction in 
direct wars between so-called superpowers, erased the experiences of 
many communities around the world that continued to face war and 
insecurity. While the number of inter-state wars decreased, the West 
engaged in a series of interventions, directly or by proxy, in the name 
of the promotion of democracy and security in the global South. 
These interventions were often violent, steeped in colonial framings 
of security, and put women of colour at great risk of structural and 
physical violence. 
Instead of unlocking more peaceful conditions for women around 
the world, many of the post-Cold War interventions not only 
deepened gendered vulnerabilities but also pushed a ‘New World 
Order’: a global agenda of Western saviourism and dominance. In 
most cases, public and international discourses about the impetus 
for intervention revolved around civilian and gendered protections 
norms. However, these norms also became tools to reframe political 
goals along the colour line without fully considering the short- and 
long-term consequences of militarised responses on those they 
claimed to protect. 
One of the first post-Cold War interventions was the Gulf War 
(1990–91), where the United States led an offensive in response to 
Iraq’s invasion and annexation of Kuwait. While President George 
H.W. Bush focused his arguments on Saddam Hussein’s violation of 
human rights at home and abroad, the war and the sanctions that 
were later imposed resulted in civilian deaths during and follow-
ing combat operations, crippled the economy, and restricted access 
to basic services, all while furthering US interests in the region. 
Similarly, when the UN intervened in Somalia (1993), the multidi-
mensional mission assumed a complete take-over of the state in the 
name of humanitarian imperatives. However, by 1995, the mission 
had failed, and reports emerged detailing abuse of civilians by peace-
keepers. While other less militarised interventions such as in East 
Timor fared better, UN missions in Rwanda, Bosnia, and Haiti were 
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marred by neocolonial and racist power struggles between powerful 
states, and were disastrous for women. Three decades later, despite 
a sustained UN presence in global conflicts, thousands of African 
Union (AU) troops, and the intensification of the use of unmanned 
combat aerial vehicles (combat drones), civilians – particularly 
women – are more exposed to violence than ever. 
feminist and anti-colonial critique  
of interventions 
Feminist and anti-colonial analyses of military interventions help us 
to understand how gender and race shape the design and implemen-
tation of violent militarised responses in a way that sustains white 
supremacist capitalist patriarchy (hooks 2000). African American 
sociologist W.E.B. Du Bois proposed the colour line as analytical tool 
to understand the ‘relations of the darker to the lighter races of men 
in Asia and Africa, in America and the islands of the sea’ (1903, 19). 
He saw racism as an organising principle of global power relations 
and ultimately as one the root causes of the First World War (Du 
Bois 1915). Du Bois’ concept of colour line is key to understanding 
the history and trajectory of humanitarian intervention (Vitalis 2000, 
342). 
Kimberlé Crenshaw’s (1989) concept of intersectionality helps us 
take stock of layered forms of insecurity, and the overlapping and 
interdependent systems of vulnerabilities to masculine violence of 
the international system. Rooted in Black feminist thought, inter-
sectionality refers to the ways in which multiple systems of power 
intersect and create specific types of compounded oppression. Inter-
sectionality operationalises the concept of ‘simultaneity’ developed 
by the Combahee River Collective (1977), identifying that issues of 
race, class, gender and sexuality intersect and operate simultaneously. 
Intersectionality is a prism that allows us to examine how these inter-
secting identities result in specific types of power matrixes based on 
one’s position. 
Like Third World and transnational critical feminisms, I advocate 
a transnational understanding of intersectionality that ‘places 
importance on the intersections among gender, ethnicity, sexuality, 
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economic exploitation, and other social hierarchies in the context 
of empire building or imperialist policies characterised by historical 
and emergent global capitalism’ (Grabe and Else-Quest 2012, 159). 
As such, not only nationality but also its position along Du Bois’ 
global colour line matter. Black and other racialised women, and 
their vulnerabilities, enter into conversation with local, national and 
international determinants of peace and security; intersectionality 
helps us to conceptualise women’s relation to war in the international 
system.
An anti-colonial analysis of the global world order sheds light on 
how interventions sustain neocolonialism and coloniality. While 
colonialism operates in specific locations and is bounded in time, 
‘coloniality refers to a specific matrix of power, in which political, 
economic, cultural, racial, gender, and epistemic hierarchies that 
were established or emerged as part of the colonial administration 
remain ingrained in current power relations’ (Azarmandi 2018, 72). 
For example, most African states gained their independence in the 
1960s, thereby officially and legally ending colonial rule. However, in 
addition to the neocolonial economic structures that tethered them 
to Western imperialism, neocolonialism is reproduced in the produc-
tion of knowledge about what Africa is and should be, a conversation 
that disproportionately takes place from a Western perspective. One 
of the most insidious manifestations of the continuity between coloni-
alism and coloniality is the persistent way in which imperialism aims 
to cast doubt on the inalienability of African sovereignty. From the 
1890 Brussels Conference Act, which legitimised European control 
of African territories under the guise of improving ‘the moral and 
material conditions of existence of the native races’, to the economic 
policies imposed by the World Bank and the International Monetary 
Fund through the structural adjustment programmes that devasted 
African economies, to the language of ‘state failure’, which became 
a catch-all term that created an ahistorical hierarchy of govern-
ance capacity along the colour line, there has been an uninterrupted 
project calling into question African countries’ full membership in 
the community of states (Niang 2018; Wai 2014 2018). 
Coloniality and white supremacy in the international order repro-
duce themselves through military interventions. Some scholars have 
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argued that colonial norms are no longer legitimate and that interven-
tion practices have moved away from the ‘might is right’ approach to 
organisation of violence towards a conceptualisation of state interest 
that embraces the normative inclusion of non-white Western people 
into the global community of people deserving humanitarian inter-
ventions (Finnemore 2003). However, critical scholars disagree with 
this assessment (Owens 2004). Instead, they point to the durability 
of colonial logic of ‘civilizing interventions’ that have shaped human-
itarian interventions and the Global War on Terror (Anghie 2004; 
Knox 2013; Wai 2014). 
The colonial logic of intervention maintains stereotypical and 
racialised discourses of non-European cultures as deficient and in 
need of humanitarian intervention to rescue passive and powerless 
victims (Owens 2004, 360). Labelling non-Western states as ‘failed’ or 
‘rogue’ mimics 19th-century colonial international law, where rogue 
states – which are a source of instability within the international order 
– require intervention and transformation into liberal, democratic 
and stable states (Anghie 2005). Democracy then simply becomes 
the face of imperialism (Du Bois 1925). Within this colonial logic, 
those who make decisions about interventions and are permitted to 
intervene are sitting in Western capitals. Ultimately, these states claim 
for themselves the right to what Mbembe argues to be the ultimate 
expression of sovereignty: ‘the power and the capacity to dictate who 
may live and who must die’ on a global scale (Mbembe and Meintjes 
2003, 17). For powerful Western states, sovereignty trumps human 
rights, yet these states also use human rights selectively to justify 
interventions when it suits their foreign policy goals (Okpotor 2017, 
76–7). Moreover, it is on the frontier of the colour line that new war 
technologies, such as combat drones, are deployed in the name of 
minimising causalities among foreign Western fighters, all the while 
ignoring Black and Brown casualties incurred from this technology. 
Ultimately, military interventions are means to promote and protect 
the continuation of hegemony rather than create an alternative world 
order (Owens 2004). 
While leaders often use the protection of civilians, and particu-
larly that of women and children, as a moral justification to go to war, 
feminist scholars point to the nefarious effects of the logic of mascu-
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linist protection on which discourses and practices of international 
interventions rely (Young 2003). The masculinist logic operates in a 
Hobbesian understanding of the world where disorder and violence 
characterise human behaviour. Relying on a benign conceptualisa-
tion of masculinity that focuses on chivalry and virtue, the masculine 
actor sees himself as entitled to deploy his protective shield to protect 
those under his dominion (Young 2003, 4). This logic is binary in 
nature, where there are those doing the protection and those in need 
of protection. One of the central features of the masculinist logic is 
that persons who are being ‘protected’ are in a subordinate position 
and therefore concede a critical distance from how and where deci-
sions about military interventions are made (Young 2003, 4). In the 
international system, masculinist protection logic uses the language 
of civilian ‘woman and children’ protection, that produces a narrative 
that feminises entire populations. These (often racialised) pop-
ulations are cast as weak and in need of protection through the 
deployment of masculine violence via military intervention (Ling 
2002). Along the colour line, this logic also pathologises Black and 
Brown men, reproducing stories of white Western saviours needing 
to protect Brown women from Brown men (Mohanty 1984). When 
taken together, anti-colonial and feminist critique clearly illustrate 
white supremacy within the masculinist protection logic. Logics of 
masculinist protection erase the experiences and lives of those the 
intervention is purported to ‘save’. 
Feminists have challenged human rights and civilian protec-
tion framing in military interventions, noting that these militarised 
responses to security threats often do not contain feminist sensitiv-
ity. Despite UN Security Council Resolution 1325 and the Women, 
Peace and Security agenda, the lack of feminist consciousness in 
the UN Security Council has devastating consequences for women’s 
security. The diversity of women’s experiences before and during a 
humanitarian intervention is not adequately attended to in the col-
lective security process (Heathcote 2018, 205). Women on the other 
side of the colour line are not only marginalised by patriarchy when 
it comes to issues of security, but also by gender, nationality and 
race. Their voices and concerns are often ignored in the design and 
implementation of humanitarian intervention. Despite claims of pro-
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tection, many of these interventions have brought disproportionate 
and unbearable costs to the people (often gendered and racialised) 
who were supposed to be protected. For example, after decades of US 
and allied intervention, Afghanistan has been deemed one of worst 
places in the world to be a woman. It is therefore essential to inter-
rogate the protectionist claims of interventions, when the evidence 
suggests that such interventions can be harmful. 
the case of libya
The 2011 military intervention in Libya illustrates how colonial-
ity and the masculinist protectionism logic permeates international 
interventions. It also highlights the contradictions between the 
stated objectives of civilian protection and the actual outcomes and 
impacts of military interventions. The Libyan case points to how 
powerful Western countries legitimise their foreign policy objec-
tives through the UN Security Council and dismiss interested parties 
on the other side of the colour line in favour of Western-led milita-
ristic approaches. Of equal importance is the way in which decision 
processes were marked by the near-absence of concrete engagement 
with women and civilian groups about the nature of the intervention. 
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) leadership chose 
to focus its engagement with men-led military actors on the ground, 
which unsurprisingly had devastating consequences for Black and 
Brown civilians in Libya and the region.
On 19 March 2011, NATO, under US leadership, launched a 
military intervention against Libyan forces. The intervention took 
place shortly after the beginning of the Libyan Civil War, where 
rebel forces took up arms against forces loyal to Colonel Muammar 
Gaddafi following mass protests to oust the regime. When violence 
escalated during the Benghazi protests, human rights organisations 
reported that government forces targeted an increasing number of 
civilians. Without consulting women’s groups in Libya or the region, 
(Heathcote 2018, 6) the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1973 
to demand an immediate ceasefire, impose a no-fly zone, and author-
ise the international community to protect civilians. Libyan forces 
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violated these provisions and Resolution 1973 became the basis for 
military intervention. 
The United States, the United Kingdom, and France drove the 
efforts to authorise military intervention in Libya. Washington, DC, 
London and Paris framed their rationale in civilian protection, which 
gave them the legal basis to successfully advance their military objec-
tives, while working intensely within and between their governments 
to end the Gaddafi regime. Their unilateral recognition of rebel forces 
as a legitimate government blatantly violated basic principles of state 
sovereignty. Meanwhile, at the AU in Addis Ababa, debates raged 
about how to handle the Libyan Civil War. For many, the AU’s medi-
ation-based response was simply inadequate and seemed to prove 
the alleged incompetence of the regional organisation. Influenced by 
the revolutionary nature of the Arab Spring in Tunisia and Egypt, its 
constitutive opposition to unconstitutional changes in government, 
and its own civilian protection norm, the AU struggled to be mili-
tarily decisive and offered, instead, a weak mediated solution (Abass 
2014). Ultimately, NATO, well in charge of the situation, dismissed 
the AU’s mediation efforts by cutting safe passage for AU representa-
tives attempting to go to Libya. NATO’s casual dismissal of the AU’s 
mediation should be seen not only as evidence of their lack of faith 
in the AU’s capacity, but also as an indication of the hierarchy of who 
gets to decide the meaning of ‘all means necessary’ to protect civilians 
and what the ‘legitimate order’ in Libya should look like. Ultimately, 
military intervention prevailed.
The immediate goals of the military intervention – to depose 
Gaddafi and stop his government from killing civilians – were 
achieved without protecting Libyan and other African women. The 
bombings, the intensification of confrontations between factions, 
and the ensuing collapse of the regime resulted in tens of thousands 
of dead and wounded, and exposed civilians to mass displacement 
and significant gender-based violence. NATO countries that par-
ticipated in the interventions, such as France, the UK, the US and 
Canada, did not send troops on the ground, but instead bombarded 
Libyan installations and forces while providing overt support to rebel 
forces. The seven months of aerial operations may have limited the 
risks to NATO forces and cost of the interventions, but this approach, 
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combined with the lack of long-term policy following the fall and 
death of Gaddafi, left Libyan civilians and women in particularly vul-
nerable positions, caught between the loyalist forces, rebels and the 
international community. 
reimagining foreign policy and intervention  
as if black and brown lives matter 
What would the world look like if we reimagined foreign policy and 
intervention as if Black and Brown people, and particularly women, 
mattered? What would the world look like if we dismantled the hier-
archies that differentiate the value of lives based on where they are 
located along the colour line and replaced them instead with a system 
where human dignity was equally afforded to all? How transforma-
tive would it be if, to assess the potential benefits of an intervention, 
decision-makers developed security policies that took a long view 
approach that acknowledged that wars are not time bound: that is, 
that the violence often starts before the first explosion and its conse-
quences are felt well beyond the silencing of the guns? This requires 
a broad framework that looks at the cost of intervention and war in 
terms of the impact on those we aim to protect and at what it would 
take to eliminate the need for militarised interventions. Drawing on 
radical critical thought, we need to push for foreign policy rooted in 
the abolition of systems of oppression that create conditions ripe for 
violent conflict. 
A first step towards this would be to draw on epistemologies that 
centre human experiences to understand war, which can give us a dif-
ferent understanding of war from the perspective of those who live 
in and through it. In foreign policy, wars are often defined in terms 
of military objectives, battle-related fatalities of troops in combat, 
equipment deployed, and military manoeuvres. Decision-makers 
should follow in the footsteps of critical scholars and rectify the tra-
ditional exclusion of the perspectives of women, people of colour, and 
other marginalised communities by making their lived experiences 
of war central to their analysis (Enloe 2010; Harding 2015; Schwartz-
Shea and Yanow 2012; Sylvester 2013). A cost–benefit analysis of the 
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interventions should pay attention to the special modes of oppres-
sion, discrimination and victimisation faced by people of colour, and 
particularly women of colour, in the international system to under-
stand who really pays the price of war and how (Du Bois1903; Fanon 
1991; Mama and Okazawa-Rey 2012). By looking at how civilians 
on the other side of the colour line from hegemony experience war, 
decision-makers will be able to account for the activities, mundane 
and extraordinary, that shape how conflicts unfold. This will enable 
them to pay attention to individuals and their bodies as sources of 
analysis of the content of war and its violence (Scarry 1985; Sylvester 
2013). 
Such an approach would enable decision-makers to truly assess 
civilians’ needs, and also to understand how the means and conse-
quences of interventions often run counter to such needs. Making 
sense of war and intervention in this way enables decision-makers 
to truly assess not only what civilians stand to gain from interven-
tion but also what they stand to lose from it. An assessment matrix 
that considers how racialised and vulnerable civilians experience 
international military interventions offers clarity on how said inter-
ventions can make large groups of people unsafe. How actors make 
war and deploy interventions matters. Each mode of intervention 
and weaponry decision comes with their own strategic advantages 
and drawbacks, but also varying degree of impact on civilians. From 
permanent militarisation of society, devastation of the environment 
and infrastructure, to high levels of civilian casualties, these tools 
deployed to bring peace maim, kill and devastate. 
The geography of intervention is also relevant. Increasingly, the 
blurred lines between home front and battlefront disrupt civilian lives 
and bring violence uncomfortably close to communities. It may mean 
that fighters return home to their families after long days of fighting 
and violently impose their militarised authority in their homes and 
neighbourhoods. People’s livelihoods and ability to sustain them-
selves and their families can be threatened by the violence. When the 
disruptions become too much to bear, people in affected countries 
who have the means and opportunity may leave their communities 
or countries in search of safety. Displacement upends lives, reduces 
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access to basic services, and increases people’s vulnerabilities to 
violence, malnutrition and infectious diseases. Moreover, displace-
ment’s corollaries are gendered as women become more vulnerable to 
sexual and gender-based violence and negative health outcomes on 
the road or in camps. Finally, instead of calculating tolerance thresh-
olds for casualties based on the number of foreign soldiers’ lives lost 
during interventions, decision-makers should focus on the poten-
tial loss of Black and Brown civilians’ lives and humanise the victims 
from affected countries. 
Designing foreign policy that values Black and Brown lives 
would account for the long-term impacts of war on affected soci-
eties. It would account for the entire neighbourhoods devasted by 
the violent death of loved ones (Enloe 2010). It would account for 
the large number of people with disabilities and long-term injuries 
as a result of the war (Hermansson et al. 1996). It would account for 
the complexities of reintegrating communities after months or years 
of displacement (Baines and Gauvin 2014). It would account for the 
months and years of schooling and training lost by children and 
young adults, and vanished employment opportunities (Verwimp 
and Muñoz-Mora 2018). It would account for increased domestic 
violence in homes (Østby et al. 2019). It would account for the time 
and resources necessary to rebuild roads, schools and sanitation 
systems, and how this impacts the day-to-day of survivors (Le and 
Nguyen 2020). It would account for emotional trauma and how it can 
potentially be passed down from one generation to the next. Inter-
estingly, the physical and emotional scars of war and intervention 
also affect foreign soldiers who are deployed in affected countries. 
And the costs for them and their families are too often ignored as 
well (Enloe 2010). The idea here is not to ignore civilian protec-
tion because interventions are deadly. Instead, it calls for the radical 
acceptance that, in many cases, the full cost of militarised responses 
often runs counter to stated objectives. We must interrogate the nor-
malisation of the use of force in the name of human rights and push 
for more sophisticated alternatives. If this reimagined assessment 
of the cost of war and intervention results in a tally that is prohibi-
tively high in terms of Black and Brown lives, then we need to put our 




Despite the discursive centring of civilian protection as a justifica-
tion for military interventions, critical scholarship points to the 
neocolonial foundations of such deployments. An anti-racist and 
intersectional approach to understanding war interventions demon-
strates that not only are these Western-led missions often based on 
racist tropes that infantilise and subordinate societies on the other 
side of the colour line, but that they are also a step into the logic 
of masculine protection and thus reinforce the patriarchal structures 
of the current world order. To end war, or at the very least reduce 
the need for these types of wars, we need to develop foreign policies 
that centre those who disproportionately suffer from the immediate 
and long-term consequences of oppression, war and interventions. 
As such, we need to put the experiences of Black and Brown people, 
and women of colour in particular, at the centre of our assessments 
and discussions about the utility of interventions as a means to 
address security and human rights concerns. To dismantle systems of 
oppression internationally, there must be a commitment to dismantle 
them domestically. After all, how societies treat racialised citizens at 
home will often inform their foreign policy towards people of colour 
abroad (Du Bois 1925; Pailey and Niang 2020). Finally, valuing Black 
and Brown lives in foreign policy and international relations for the 
promotion of peace means engaging in the radical dismantling of all 
forms of exploitation. For it is by abolishing neocolonialism, capital-
ism, white supremacy and patriarchy that we will find freedom for 
one and for all.
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Draw on Ecofeminist and Indigenous 
Scholarship to Reimagine the Ways  
We Memorialise War 
Sertan Saral
In this chapter, I propose reimagining the ways we memorialise 
war – particularly in state-sponsored national war memorials – as a 
feminist solution to ending war. I do this in three steps. First, I estab-
lish the cultural and economic significance of these public spaces. 
Second, I problematise the ways that national war memorials, specifi-
cally the Australian War Memorial (Canberra) and the National Mall 
World War II Memorial (Washington DC), ask us to remember war. 
Specifically, I dispute the assumption that the purpose of these state-
sponsored projects is to educate the population or reflect solemn 
national remembrance of the lives lost in war. Instead, I show how 
war memorials idealise the figure of the soldier (mostly embodied 
by neurotypical unmaimed white heterosexual cis men) and abstract 
accounts of war. I argue that the effect of this idealisation and 
abstraction is to reproduce attachments to nation, and through these 
attachments, deflect accountability for the enactment of violence. 
Crucially, while reflection and mourning are possible in war 
memorials, the reproduction of attachments to nation forecloses any 
thought that might be given to questioning the basic assumption – 
that war is necessary and inevitable – eliciting a follow-on assumption 
that there will always be more war. In the third section of this chapter, 
I outline the potential of feminist reimagining of war memorialisa-
tion; reimagining that resists current models of memorialisation 
by standing with a coalition of anti-war movements, expanding on 
campaigns like the Make It Right Project in the United States, and 
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refusing the settler state’s authority to tell or recognise war stories 
through its processes of war memorialisation. This intervention in 
memorials is important as a feminist project as it highlights one way 
that patriarchy and militarism permeate the everyday and entangle 
us in war’s machinery (Terry 2017, 4). A feminist solution to ending 
war requires challenging war memorials as neutral public spaces and 
instead making visible the patriarchal, colonial and militarist myths 
reproduced in these spaces.
war memorials as sites of study:  
why they are important
War memorials are iconic. The language and look of Western war 
memorials share common characteristics. Generally speaking, they 
are immaculately landscaped spaces made by commissioned artists 
and designers, their aesthetic starkly contrasting with the subject 
they represent. They can include statues depicting key figures (almost 
exclusively white men) of history, names of dead soldiers or a symbol 
to represent them, inscriptions by famous world leaders commem-
orating the deaths of soldiers, dates of key events (usually battles) 
in the war being represented, and many other shared features. The 
stated function of war memorials can be taken for granted, assuming 
that they are strictly objects and sites of edification, remembrance 
and mourning, an outlet for national grief. Some memorials are 
iconic, such as the Lincoln Memorial and Washington Monument, 
which appear in innumerable television shows and movies. There are 
public holidays dedicated to commemorating soldiers who died in 
war, such as Anzac Day in Australia, where these sites are utilised for 
public gatherings to underscore the day’s meaning. War memorials 
are spaces that are held in exceptionally high regard by the public and 
the state. They are often perceived as inviolable, sacred sites. 
The Australian War Memorial is situated in close proximity to the 
state’s centre of power and attracts over 1 million visitors per year 
(Australian War Memorial 2018). The National Mall in Washing-
ton DC is similarly located and popular (accounting for scale and 
the US’s position as global superpower), with over 25 million visitors 
per year, more than Yellowstone National Park, Yosemite National 
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Park and the Grand Canyon combined (Braxton and Line n.d., 1). 
The Australian War Memorial, built in 1941, has grown into a site 
that commemorates Australian soldiers who died while in service 
throughout the history of the forces. It is described on its govern-
ment website as ‘a shrine, a world-class museum, and an extensive 
archive’ (Australian War Memorial n.d. a). Consider how, in 2014 
when protesters against the Australian government’s ‘terror raids’ 
against Muslim citizens held their demonstration on the grounds of 
the Lakemba War Memorial in a suburb of Sydney, the media and 
public reaction was one of revulsion against what was perceived to be 
a violation of ‘sacred’ ground (Godfrey 2014). Echoing these narra-
tives, the US National Parks official website describes the Washington 
DC World War II Memorial in terms with religious connotations, 
such as ‘sacrifice’, ‘ritual’ and ‘tribute’ (National Parks Service 2015). 
War memorials hold widespread popular appeal and are often viewed 
as sacred sites and yet this only represents one way in which they are 
important sites of study for ending war.
National war memorials attract large-scale funding. The govern-
ment of Australia, between 2014 to 2028, will have committed or 
spent at least AUD 1.1 bn on new commemoration projects (Daley 
2018). As of 2015, Australia spent over AUD 8,800 in commemora-
tive spending for each digger (soldier) killed in the First World War. 
This investment is significantly more than Britain’s and Germany’s 
per soldier figure of AUD 109 and AUD 2 respectively (McPhe-
dran 2015). The Australian War Memorial’s corporate partners 
include military contractors like Boeing and Thales (Australian War 
Memorial n.d. b). In his support for an AUD 500 million redevel-
opment proposal, then Australian War Memorial director Brendan 
Nelson justified the cost stating: ‘Whatever the cost, as one man said 
to me: “We’ve already paid. We’ve paid in blood …”’ (Greene 2018). 
Here we see a direct connection between the type of language used 
in war memorials (‘paid in blood’) to justify the large taxpayer and 
private investment in them. 
In the Women In Military Service For America Memorial in Arling-
ton Cemetery you can find a list of benefactors near the entrance, 
ranging from veterans’ organisations like the American Legion, cor-
porations like Boeing, and states like Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, all 
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of whom made donations in the hundreds of thousands (USD). 
The extreme investments and varied sources of funding muddy the 
assumption that war memorials are sites of commemoration and edu-
cation. Instead, the investments in war memorials demonstrate that 
they are strategically designed to reaffirm the bonds between actors 
(states, corporations, organisations and individuals) invested in war 
making, not war ending.
War memorials are iconic, often considered sacred, essential sites of 
annual national activities. They are well-recognised and well-attended 
national sites. There are political choices in how war is memorialised 
– what is featured and not featured at these sites – which have sig-
nificant implications for how war is understood and remembered. 
Memorials impact public support for war and legitimise the institu-
tions who wage it. Memorials deflect accountability for war’s horrors. 
War memorials curate national memory and stir patriotic sentiment. 
They reproduce attachments to war and the figure at the centre of it, 
the (predominantly cis, male, heterosexed, white) soldier.
problematising the ways national war  
memorials ask us to remember war
Val Plumwood’s (2008) ecofeminist work highlights the problem with 
forming attachments to an idealised ‘homeplace’ without looking to 
the contingent relationships they have to other, discarded, ‘shadow’ 
places. Briefly, our attachments to homeplace or idealised places 
come from imbuing them with the qualities and principles we asso-
ciate with our sense of self. For example, a national war memorial 
may stir patriotic pride and thereby reaffirm an attachment to both 
the place (for example, the memorial and its surrounding locale) and 
the principles and qualities associated with that place (such as pat-
riotism and the willingness to serve one’s country). However, these 
idealised places have a contingent relationship to what Plumwood 
refers to as ‘shadow places’. Shadow places are locales in our environ-
ment that, in the context of a global market of ideas, commodities 
and nationalisms, are by design hidden from view. Shadow places 
provide essential material and ecological support to idealised places; 
they make idealised places possible. 
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The reverse is also true: idealised places make shadow places 
possible. The Second World War left devastation in its wake; however, 
in the World War II Memorial in the National Mall in Washington 
DC, almost all of this is relegated to the shadows or muted because 
it does not comfortably sit foregrounded within this idealised place. 
Even further, the materials procured to construct the memorial and 
its ongoing maintenance are also dependent on unseen labour and 
global supply chains that are maintained by military power. A patriot 
who visits the World War II Memorial in the National Mall is not 
encouraged to think of these things. Plumwood’s work became an 
animating concept that allowed me to view war memorials as sites 
of contest which ‘do’ much more than just educate visitors about war 
and allow for reflection. 
States which sponsor war memorials, these idealised places, are 
engaging in cultural work that reinforces existing power structures. 
In the context of settler colonialism, patriarchy, militarism, national-
ism and capitalism, war memorials are a projection of power. They 
are sites where deep reflection about war is possible. They are also 
sites where mourning can take place. However, they are not designed 
to educate or provide a universal understanding of particular wars 
they represent, even though some designers and artists of war memo-
rials boldly make this claim (Boeschenstein and Mennel 2012). They 
can make this problematic claim and disregard the possibility of 
personal interpretation, perhaps, because war memorials are state 
sponsored. We must be critical of the state’s self-ordained authority to 
tell war stories and be wary of proposals for war memorials that, for 
instance, demand recognition of previously unacknowledged service. 
In her work on the Mohawks of Kahnawà:ke, Audra Simpson (2014) 
argues that recognition reinforces the state’s authority to conduct its 
business. 
Instead, Simpson (2014, 11) argues for refusal, a stance which 
rejects the assumption that state authority is a given. Such forms of 
resistance and refusals of state sovereignty exist in Australia as well, 
such as in the Aboriginal Tent Embassy in Canberra (Foley 2007; 
Nicoll 2013). While the context of refusal in Simpson’s work is specif-
ically located in the urgent tensions between the sovereignties of the 
Mohawks of Kahnawà:ke and the settler state, its provocations may 
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be a necessary baseline from which to reimagine war memorialising. 
A refusal of the state’s authority to give any account of war in the form 
of a war memorial is also a refusal of the state’s authority to mark out 
land used for such memorials as sacred. It is, very directly, a refusal 
of the state’s authority to consecrate military service, and the kinds of 
bodies who embody it, as the highest ideal of citizenship. 
War memorials reproduce abstract and reductive knowledges. It 
is not in the interest of any state’s military to focus on the scars on 
bodies and landscapes if that state wishes to continue pursuing its 
interests unencumbered. The 1946 documentary film Let There Be 
Light, directed by John Huston, drew intimate portraits of return-
ing GIs suffering from what is now understood to be post-traumatic 
stress disorder (PTSD). It was commissioned by the US Army but the 
War Department suppressed its release for 35 years. When asked why 
he thought the department had suppressed the film, Huston pointed 
to the necessity of the myth of the American soldier to maintain 
recruitment:
I think it boils down to the fact that they wanted to maintain the 
‘warrior’ myth, which said that our American soldiers went to war 
and came back all the stronger for the experience, standing tall and 
proud for having served their country well. Only a few weaklings 
fell by the wayside. (Simmon 2012, 6)
In perhaps a moment of lapsed vigilance against the deflation 
of this myth, the US Army, in advance of Memorial Day weekend 
in 2019, asked the following question via their Twitter account to 
veterans and service members: ‘How has serving impacted you?’ It 
received thousands of responses detailing traumatic experiences such 
as sexual assault and combat and the ongoing effects of them (Samuel 
et al. 2019). These are not the sort of experiences that are commonly 
represented in war memorials.
Instead, war memorials abstract war and reduce its memories to 
platitudes to present the goodness of power exercised. They reinforce 
the dangerous notion that power, especially military power, can be 
good if wielded by actors who, we are urged to presume, are ‘innately 
good’, such as the United States and Australia. Through these abstrac-
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tions, war memorials direct our attention away from the horrors 
caused by military and governmental institutions which wage war. 
They maintain our focus on words like ‘sacrifice’, ‘spirit’ and ‘the 
fallen’. These focus words do not conjure images of the horrors of 
war so much as they summon affective tethers to one’s own country 
(Daley 2018). They preserve the scope of the state as a war-making 
institution, instilling trust it will act in good faith in the interests of 
the public. War memorials reproduce attachments to nationhood 
and war within the public by underscoring the perceived necessity of 
war for security and for enacting the ideal principles of nation.
These attachments are unevenly distributed. War memorials typi-
cally celebrate the exploits of men, elevating their status as embodying 
the ideal of the state at the expense of those who embody other (often 
intersecting) markers of identity, such as women and persons with 
disability. Consider the Yininmadyemi Thou didst let fall Memorial 
in Hyde Park, Sydney, by Aboriginal artist Tony Albert, an atypical 
example of a war memorial. It was constructed to foreground the 
service of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people in Australia’s 
military and it shares park ground with the more prominent Anzac 
Memorial (Perkins n.d.). 
The service of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander soldiers was 
previously unacknowledged and unlike conventional war memori-
als, Yininmadyemi does not display a statue or sculpture designed to 
represent men (or a specific man) who served. Instead, the memorial 
is made up of four large bullets, standing upright, and three fallen 
shells. What is foregrounded here is not the figure of the soldier, but 
the object (the bullet) designed for killing, for the purpose of ripping 
through flesh and bone. It is not a glorification of military service, but 
an underlining of a tool used to reap its bloody costs. The artwork 
also highlights what happens after the ‘event’ of war as the memorial 
makes reference to the fact that returning Aboriginal and Torres 
Strait Islander soldiers were not given land as compensation for their 
service, unlike their white brothers in arms, widening the distance 
towards reparative justice for First Nations people and illustrating in 
explicitly material terms the injustice inherent in elevating military 
service as a national ideal in a patriarchal, settler colonial context. 
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Memorials such as Yininmadyemi do not represent normative 
accounts of war, but they do point to the uneven and unjust dis-
tribution of attachments to nation through the idealisation of the 
soldier figure. In a settler state, this also means refusing to acknowl-
edge genocide against Indigenous populations, especially evident in 
memorials like the Australian War Memorial in Canberra, as it does 
not sit comfortably with the idealised figure of the soldier (Nicoll 
2013, 267). With so much violence and atrocity going unaccounted 
for in the interests of preserving this figure and the attachments it 
forms, there is no space to consider questioning the necessity and 
inevitability of war, only to think of it in terms of unavoidable tragedy 
or, to bring forward an anachronism, manifest destiny. In other 
words, war memorials promise more war.
War memorials are also in conversation with one another. Consider 
the topography of physical buildings, monuments and memorials in 
Washington DC. The National Mall neighbours the White House and 
Congress and is described by the Parks Service as ‘America’s Front 
Yard’, connoting its global significance. It is built to impress US power 
upon its visitors. Its memorials are placed deliberately in line of sight 
to these powerful, global institutions. Moreover, there is a straight 
line connecting the US’s favourite wars: the Washington Monument 
(representing the American Revolution), the World War II Memorial 
and the Lincoln Memorial (representing the Civil War). Inscribed on 
a stone slab of the World War II Memorial is the following:
Here in the presence of Washington and Lincoln, one the eight-
eenth century father and the other the nineteenth century preserver 
of our nation, we honor those twentieth century Americans who 
took up the struggle during the Second World War and made the 
sacrifices to perpetuate the gift our forefathers entrusted to us: A 
nation conceived in liberty and justice.
The memorial situates the war it is representing as the 20th cen-
tury’s iteration of the US national myth. It tells a war story which 
reinscribes the principles of the nation’s founding, embodied in the 
figure of the American soldier. It is selective about how and to whom 
these principles are applied as there is no mention of the atrocities 
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committed by the United States in its contributions overall to the 
war, such as the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The 
purpose is not to accurately portray history, but rather to display a 
story of American exceptionalism.
Not positioned on the straight line between the Washing-
ton Monument and Lincoln Memorial are memorials of their less 
favoured wars: the Korean War Veterans Memorial and the Vietnam 
Veterans Memorial. While both are on the National Mall grounds, 
they are surrounded by foliage and less visible. Sitting much farther 
away is the American Veterans Disabled for Life Memorial. Though 
it is identified on maps dotted around the Mall, it is not located on 
the Mall grounds. There is sparse available information in the Mall 
about this particular memorial. As the only memorial I visited which 
described the traumatic experiences in warzones suffered and carried 
by American soldiers in any substantive, material depth, its tucked-
away location is darkly ironic and telling in its relative inaccessibility. 
There is an intentionality, a logic to the placement of memorial sites. 
The proximity and visibility of memorials to one another, as well as 
their proximity and visibility to institutions of power responsible for 
waging war, are symbolic. The most prominent war memorials in the 
National Mall are those which neighbour powerful institutions or 
which sit on a line as if in conversation with one another. The rest sit 
more or less in the shadows, muted.
The Vietnam, Korean, and Disabled for Life memorials partially 
resist the promise of more war. It is therefore necessary to consider 
these sites if we want to change how we practice war memorialisa-
tion. In recent decades, there have been war memorials constructed 
to provide a different account of war, one which complicates popular 
understandings of war or of specific conflicts. Additional examples 
include the Vietnam Women Memorial in the National Mall and the 
Women in Military Service for America Memorial on the Potomac 
River at Arlington Cemetery. The American Veterans Disabled for 
Life Memorial gives an account of the scars carried by returning 
American soldiers, particularly the discomfiting physical scars such 
as the destruction of limbs, that traditional war memorials rarely rec-
ognise in their inscriptions, let alone their sculptures. One inscription 
by a soldier named Dean Winters uncharacteristically refuses to offer 
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hope, ending on this sobering note: ‘Since the war, I’ve been confined 
to a wheelchair and have tried to live a good life. However, I relive the 
war every day.’ The inscription also resists conventional narratives of 
war as event, protracting the way that war is experienced as ongoing, 
reliving, again and again. However, in spite of such inscriptions, the 
memorial is still interested in appropriating these experiences into 
a narrative of nationhood, which should perhaps not come as a 
surprise for a state-sponsored project (National Parks Service 2019). 
An inscription by Horace H. Shaw reads:
The strongest ties between human beings are not cemented 
in safety, luxury, and comfort. It is the sharing together of the 
scanty covering, the insufficient shelter, drinking from the same 
cup, eating from the same plate, the dividing by a hungry soldier 
with a hungrier comrade the last morsel of meat or the remnant 
of a cracker; the binding up of each other’s wounds, the lending 
of courage from one heart to another: these are what create the 
strongest bonds between human beings.
What is striking about this inscription is how, when situated within 
the larger landscape of Washington DC as the centre of American 
global hegemony and military dominance, it reformulates the war 
struggle, the material struggle over things like ‘insufficient shelter’, 
‘drinking from the same cup’, sharing a ‘remnant of a cracker’, into 
a representative narrative of national character. These struggles, we 
are urged to think, are necessary for the creation of ‘the strongest 
bonds between human beings’. They are a necessary condition for the 
formation of attachments between civilians and their nation. There-
fore, even though the American Veterans Disabled for Life Memorial 
offers an alternative glimpse into war, it also reproduces the assump-
tion that the maintenance of these affective bonds requires that 
we must always be at war. In this formulation, the war memorial 
more generally is not interested in ending the reproduction of these 
material scars, but in regenerating a need for them, becoming part 
of a larger war machine that needs bodies ‘preordained for injury 
and maiming’ (Puar 2017, 65). In this formulation, the scar is not a 
warning, a klaxon for stopping war, but a badge of masculine strength 
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and honour, an impetus to seek out more scars. This affective dis-
course idealises and valorises war service, reinforcing the assumption 
that war, while tragic, is unavoidable and inevitable.
a feminist strategy for feminist memorialising
War memorials are not objects designed to dissuade people from 
war; rather they individually and collectively underscore the inherent 
necessity of using state power to go to war. They abstract war and 
render popular understandings of it as immutable. Through these 
abstractions, they deflect accountability for horrors caused, preserve 
the scope of the sponsoring institutions and reproduce attachments 
to nation. There may be exceptions and resistances to this model of 
telling war stories but even these stories are massaged or appropriated 
by the state’s interest in conveying war making or war partaking as a 
net good for the world. By presenting war in this way, the national 
war memorials I explored in this chapter are sites where deep reflec-
tion and radical counternarrative is possible. I seek to challenge the 
assumption that there will (must) be more war.
What, then, would a feminist strategy for memorialising war look 
like? Current memorialising practices by the state mark bounda-
ries on stolen land as the site of a memorial, creating sites to elevate 
military service to the plane of the sacred and ideal, with the figure 
of the soldier (usually white, usually male) as its embodiment. A 
feminist strategy requires a coalition of movements to address this. A 
strategy might include, drawing inspiration from the global climate 
change protest model, confronting how the materials used to con-
struct war memorials are procured. It would make obvious that 
this is dependent on global supply chains maintained and regulated 
through military force. A feminist strategy would confront the settler 
state’s authority to mark out land and consecrate it as the site of a 
memorial project. A feminist strategy could also challenge the state’s 
authority to tell war stories, by protesting on proposed and existing 
memorial sites. Activists could peacefully disrupt events held on 
these sites, events such as Anzac Day, to challenge the re-enactments 
of idealisations featured in memorials. In these confrontations and 
disruptions, this coalition would need to foreground the multitude 
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of accounts of war that are usually relegated to the shadows, that do 
not feature the heroic soldier figure as the only body whose experi-
ence of war counts. 
Such strategies are already taking shape. The Make It Right Project 
is a collaboration ‘dedicated to working with multiple groups – activ-
ists, artists, historians and media outlets – to remove Confederate 
monuments and tell the truth about history’, the history of slavery and 
white supremacy in the United States (Holloway 2018). A feminist 
strategy for memorialisation would need to operate from an ethical 
orientation of standing with (TallBear 2014) a coalition of movements 
resisting and refusing the settler state’s authority to indiscriminately 
wage war. At the heart of the coalition should be resistance to state 
acquisition of stolen lands used to memorialise war. Adopting theo-
retical frameworks as praxis, frameworks like Plumwood’s shadow 
places, would include making visible the shadow places unseen in 
memorials. This solution demands we reproduce attachments to the 
human and the more than human devastated by war. Feminists must 
showcase the myriad ways war permeates everyday life, in order to 
make visible how state-sponsored memorialisation perpetuates war. 
This solution is motivated by and unified with ecological and social 
justice movements. To challenge how war is memorialised is to push 
back against attachments to nationhood. 
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Engage with Combatants as Interlocutors 
for Peace, Not Only as Authorities  
on Violence 
Roxani Krystalli
This chapter advocates engaging with combatants as interlocutors 
for peace as a solution for ending war. Peace processes involve con-
testations over authority. Participants in peace processes engage in 
negotiations not only about how to formally end armed conflict in 
the form of a peace accord, but also about the fundamental meanings 
of peace and violence. In addition to laying out the terms for the 
cessation of hostilities, peace accords (and the justice mechanisms 
that precede or succeed them) set the time periods of violence that 
are formally recognised as armed conflict, determine which actors 
and harms are considered conflict-related, and delineate potential 
remedies for the populations who suffered harm and sanctions for 
those who perpetrated them. All of these distinctions have signifi-
cant implications for those involved in or affected by violence: The 
designation of time periods draws an official – if often artificial – 
line between ‘armed conflict’ and ‘peacetime’, while the delineation 
of conflict-related actors and harms formally defines certain actors 
as victims or perpetrators. In other words, peace processes are exer-
cises in distinction. 
In this chapter, I examine who gets to make these distinctions 
and with what implications. I argue that meaningfully ending war 
requires us to engage with combatants as interlocutors for peace, not 
only as authorities on violence. This, in turn, requires two concrete 
shifts in engagement with combatants during peace processes, each 
of which I analyse in detail in the sections that follow. First, peace 
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processes and their accompanying justice mechanisms need to better 
reflect the terms by which combatants understand their own iden-
tities and roles in the armed conflict, as well as their processes of 
transition out of armed groups, rather than assigning them labels 
that do not reflect their experiences. Second, and relatedly, the act of 
accurately reflecting the names and identities by which combatants 
understand themselves requires those engaged in peace processes to 
view combatants as political subjects. 
Why are these feminist concerns and how might they contribute 
to ending war? The proposed shifts in how peace processes engage 
with combatants reflect an ongoing feminist preoccupation with the 
meanings of political subjectivity in war and peace (Baines 2017; 
Enloe 2014). Relatedly, engaging with combatants in ways that better 
align with the terms through which they understand themselves can 
further feminist commitments to respecting the agency of actors 
involved in war and their narratives about their identities, relation-
ships, and politics (MacKenzie 2009; Parashar 2009). 
These feminist considerations matter for ending war. As existing 
work in Colombia (Rettberg and McFee 2019; Theidon 2009; Ugarriza 
2013) and elsewhere (Jelin 2013; McMullin 2013a; MacKenzie 2009; 
Sriram et al. 2012) has suggested, former combatants’ political aspi-
rations affect the success of their transition to civilian life. Political 
aspirations, in this context, do not refer exclusively to whether former 
combatants form political parties or participate in official, electoral 
politics. Rather, politics also refers to ‘determinations about what 
constitutes power and where power operates’ (Krystalli and Enloe 
2019, 7), as well as to ‘the process of contestation over what is human 
and what is not’ (Baines 2017, 13). When the experience of leaving 
armed groups fails to engage with combatants’ understanding of 
politics (Crane and Vallejo 2018), it may jeopardise the building of 
a sustainable peace.
The rest of this chapter proceeds as follows: I begin by providing an 
overview of my methods and defining key concepts. Next, drawing 
from my in-depth qualitative research in Colombia, I discuss some 
of the terms by which combatants make sense of their identities and 
experiences in order to highlight how peace processes can better 
reflect those understandings. I then turn to combatants’ understand-
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ings of politics and political subjectivity, and the obstacles they face 
in fully engaging as political subjects after leaving armed groups. I 
conclude by summarising the implications of this discussion for 
peace processes.
terms, scope and methods 
In this chapter, I take an intentionally broad approach to the under-
standing of peace processes. Consistent with existing feminist 
research, I do not consider peace processes to be limited to formal 
peace talks that aim to result in a settlement or accord, nor do I view 
such processes to pertain only to those actors formally recognised 
as peace negotiators (Cockburn 2007; De Alwis 2009; Duncanson 
2016; Lederach 2017). While my analysis includes the above actors 
and processes, it also transcends them to explore the making of peace 
as more spatially and temporally fluid. That is, I understand peace 
processes to (a) involve a range of actors, some of whom have no 
formal or official power and are not necessarily represented at the 
peace table; (b) unfold in a variety of spaces, not all of which are 
official sites of negotiation; (c) spill past the temporal horizons of 
‘war’, ‘peace talks’, and formally declared ‘peace’ to include the work 
of peace-building that does not tidily fit into such a linear, teleologi-
cal understanding of violence and its endings.
I focus my analysis specifically on combatants in non-state armed 
groups, as opposed to state armed forces. Even in cases when the 
governing authority of the state is contested or questioned (Arjona 
2016), and even when the state itself has perpetrated acts of violence 
against its citizens (Sandoval Rojas 2013), few would dispute the par-
ticipation of state actors as key interlocutors in peace processes. In 
fact, the state – both through its armed forces and through its civilian 
leadership – often exercises more agency over the design of peace 
processes, dictating other actors’ terms of participation in them. The 
implications of this authority are central to my argument about the 
significance of seeing combatants as interlocutors for peace, and 
not only as specialists in violence. The language by which to refer to 
combatants is itself a site of debate (Kinsella 2011). I refer to these 
individuals and groups by a variety of names – ranging from com-
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batants to insurgents to guerrilleros or guerrilleras – and critically 
analyse the significance of these practices of naming in the discus-
sion that follows.
For this discussion, I rely on in-depth qualitative research in 
Colombia between 2010 and 2018. Specifically, I draw from 57 semi-
structured interviews and life stories with women combatants who 
were in various states of transition from armed groups, ranging from 
recently having laid down their weapons to having lived as civilians 
for over two decades at the time of the interview. My interlocutors had 
been members of different armed groups throughout the Colombian 
territory, including members of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of 
Colombia (FARC), the 19th of April Movement (M-19), the Popular 
Liberation Army (EPL), and the National Liberation Army (ELN). 
Recognising that not all combatants transition out of armed groups 
by participating in state-run processes of Disarmament, Demobilisa-
tion, and Reintegration (DDR), I have also engaged with those who 
laid down their weapons and sought to transition into civilian life 
more informally (Mazurana et al. 2017). I conducted all interviews in 
Spanish myself and refer to all interlocutors by pseudonym. 
My focus on the experiences of women combatants is not born 
out of a gender essentialist, erroneous impression that women are 
‘inherently’ or ‘naturally’ more peaceful. Nor is this motivated by a 
misguided belief that a feminist approach to ending war and building 
peace requires exclusively female interlocutors. Instead, I recognise 
that women do not always get to exercise full agency over the kinds of 
interlocutors they get to be on matters of war and peace. This relates 
both to which women are allowed to speak about conflict and peace, 
and to the topics on which they are invited to share their authority 
and with regard to which women are considered experts (Theidon 
2012). Women’s narrative remit in war is often confined to victim-
hood or, more specifically, to the narration of having experienced 
sexual violence. As Erin Baines writes (2017, 4), the sexually violated 
woman ‘rarely appears as a subject. Instead, her body and her expe-
rience are the object of contending political projections, quests for 
justice, and justifications for war.’ Similarly, analyses of women ex-
combatants’ experiences often focus on the dimensions of forced 
recruitment or captivity, enforcing what Nimmi Gowrinathan (2018) 
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calls ‘an analytical blackout’ that does not allow us to see women 
combatants’ power or politics. I am interested in accounts of women’s 
experiences that allow complicated moments of agency to come to 
the fore and that shed light on how women themselves experience, 
embody, and make sense of politics. 
I complement the insights from these interviews with ethnographic 
observation at sites of transition for combatants, including obser-
vations at designated transition zones for those who had recently 
disarmed (November–December 2017), as well as observations at 
workshops facilitated by international organisations, Colombian state 
agencies, and Colombian non-governmental organisations (NGOs) 
for former combatants (January–April 2010; July–August 2013; July–
August 2016; January 2018). I have used an interpretive framework 
in designing, analysing, and writing up this research, paying particu-
lar attention to narratives, language, emotions, and the meanings my 
interlocutors assigned to their experiences (Wedeen 2010; Wibben 
2010).
naming the process of transition and its subjects
It is a Saturday afternoon in December 2017 and I am sitting with 
Maria in her prefabricated accommodation in one of the transition 
zones for combatants in Colombia who have recently laid down their 
weapons. The walls do not go all the way up to meet the tin roof. 
When the wind blows, it rains dust on Maria’s bed.
The painted road sign at the entrance to this zone declares the area 
to be a called ‘transitional zone of normalisation’. The programme for 
formally disarming combatants had had many names, and so did the 
geographies that correspond to it. These spaces have been called, vari-
ously, zones of ‘reinsertion’, ‘reintegration’, ‘reincorporation’ (Rettberg 
and McFee 2019). Though the nouns themselves change, the politics 
hide in the prefix: ‘re’. What is the ‘re’ available to these former com-
batants in a life marked by ruptures? They lived through the rupture 
of joining an armed group, the ruptures of a war, the often-ignored 
ruptures of leaving an armed group that, for some, supplied not only 
a livelihood, but also a sense of protection, politics, community and 
self. Perhaps normalisation is the honest term, after all. It renders 
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effort visible – the effort of making something normal – even as it 
conveniently sidesteps the question of what normalcy might be. 
Maria tells me that she misses living in the jungle. ‘Not the war, 
not the weapon. The jungle.’ This is a common theme in my con-
versations with combatants laying down their weapons, who resist 
the reduction of all sentimental attachments to their lives in armed 
groups to a form of mere ‘weapons nostalgia’. 
I ask Maria whether a return to the jungle is a possibility for her, for 
her life ‘after’. ‘Could you go back to the jungle to live? Once your … 
process here is complete?’ Everyone seems to use the word ‘process’ 
in Colombia to refer to any bureaucracy related to the war, but there 
is something uncomfortable about it, like using ‘journey’ as a euphe-
mism for a difficult pregnancy or a recovery from cancer. ‘Could you 
go back after your demobilisation is complete?’ I try again.
Maria’s face contracts. ‘I am not demobilised,’ she tells me, raising 
her voice. ‘Demobilisation is a castration. I am disarmed and will stay 
disarmed. But, in my heart, in my politics, I am still a guerrillera.’
What does it mean to still want to be a guerrillera in a world that 
requires that side of a combatant to be ‘normalised’? For Maria, and 
for many women like her, it means a refusal to let go of the terms by 
which she knows herself, her social bonds and her political activities, 
even if she has chosen to lay down her weapons. My conversation 
with Sandra, a former member of the M-19 guerrilla group, further 
illustrates this point. 
‘I call myself an insurgent,’ Sandra told me in an interview in 
February 2018, three full decades after she had stopped being a 
member of an armed group. 
Insurgency, to me, is a political project to transform inequality. It 
could be armed or not – but it does not have to be armed. Leaving 
behind the arms does not mean leaving the political project. I now 
work on insurgent memory initiatives, but I insist that they call me 
an ‘insurgent’, not an ex-guerrillera.
 
When I ask Sandra what she dislikes about the language of ‘ex’, she 
says: ‘It’s the same thing I dislike about the language of demobilisa-
tion. They want us to stay quiet, to lose our mobilisation.’ I interrupt 
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her to clarify who ‘they’ are. ‘The state, the international NGOs, those 
who call us “demobilised”,’ Sandra responds. She continues to explain 
her objections to this language: 
For us, mobilisation is a social and political practice. It can trans-
form from armed to unarmed. Many groups in the history of this 
country – and in the global history of armed conflict and revolution, 
if you take a look at it – have made the choice of that transfor-
mation. But to call us ‘demobilised’ or to refer to our process as 
‘reintegration’ has a different meaning. To me, reintegration means 
‘they are going to be good again’ [se van a volver buenos]. It is a 
denial/negation of politics. We need to recognise that by naming 
things we give them meaning.
I am not suggesting here that all combatants share a single preferred 
way to describe themselves, their identities and their process of tran-
sition out of armed groups. Rather, I posit that a sustainable peace 
necessarily requires this process of naming to be context-dependent 
and to treat former combatants as meaningful interlocutors in their 
own identification. When peace processes privilege the ease of the 
DDR acronym over a sustained discussion with former combatants 
about which identities they are leaving behind and which they carry 
forward into civilian life, they risk jeopardising a lasting, meaning-
ful peace. The risk to peace here lies in the fact that the identities 
that peace processes make permissible for former combatants do not 
always track with their own understanding and experiences, thus 
potentially leading to combatants’ disillusionment with civilian life, 
to stigmatisation in their relationships with other civilians (McMullin 
2013b; Theidon 2009), and to the potential choice to re-enter armed 
groups. The burden of narration here does not lie exclusively with 
peace negotiators. Combatants themselves must articulate what it 
means to be a ‘guerrillera’ in peacetime and how those meanings 
might differ from their wartime connotations.
It may seem paradoxical to claim that treating combatants as inter-
locutors for peace, and not only as authorities on violence, requires 
allowing them to potentially carry forward some of the identities and 
names by which they understood themselves in a wartime context. 
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I would argue, however, that this is indeed a feminist commitment 
– consistent with other feminist commitments to reflect the terms 
by which people know themselves and narrate the ways in which 
violence affects their lives (Kinsella 2011). Feminist scholars and 
other critical analysts have rightfully emphasised the importance of 
allowing victims, survivors, human rights defenders and civil society 
leaders to define themselves in their own terms, as such a self-def-
inition can be an act affirming agency and dignity (Gatti 2017; 
Krystalli 2019; McLeer 1998; Naples 2003). Sandra reminded us: ‘We 
need to recognise that by naming things we give them meaning.’ As 
I discuss in the next section, extending that practice of recognition 
to combatants acknowledges that their naming conventions are not 
exclusively tied to the means of violence; rather, these identities are 
also informed and inflected by multiple meanings of politics (Crane 
and Vallejo 2018). 
political subjects and interlocutors  
on feminist peace
It started with a phone call. Luciana called me on a January morning 
in 2018 to let me know that the collective of female ex-combatants of 
which she had been a founding member was having a meeting. ‘We 
are having a meeting for all those who are studying us,’ she told me. 
Her framing reversed the typical direction of the gaze of research, 
allowing those who were the subjects of research to set the terms of 
the engagement. 
I had first met Luciana in 2010, when I was working as a gender 
and peace-building practitioner. At the time, I was assisting a 
Colombian NGO to incorporate a gender lens into its programs for 
combatants leaving armed groups. In the years that Luciana and I 
had known each other, the interest in female former combatants in 
Colombia, and particularly (but not exclusively) in those who had 
been members of FARC, had surged. The collective of which Luciana 
had been a founding member drew together women who had been 
part of three different armed groups and whose experiences spanned 
over thirty years of the Colombian armed conflict. ‘You are having 
a meeting with all those who are studying you?’ I repeated back to 
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Luciana during our phone call. ‘Haha yes,’ she laughed. ‘There are an 
awful lot [un montón] of people who want to talk to guerrilleras these 
days.’ 
This interest was materially observable at the meeting itself. When 
I arrived in the attic of the Bogotá NGO that had allowed the collec-
tive of former combatants to use its space, I was greeted by 5 women 
who had been members of different armed groups and 13 researchers 
(ranging from Colombian undergraduate students to international 
postgraduate students conducting fieldwork for their PhDs). In the 
middle of the table, in lieu of a centrepiece, there were seven record-
ing devices, ranging from digital voice recorders to iPhones. Over the 
course of the meeting, each time one of the members of the collective 
spoke, the chorus of recorders would travel closer to her. If someone 
started speaking before all the devices were in place in front of her, 
one of her colleagues would remind her to wait. My own recording of 
the day is filled with invocations to ‘speak louder, the recorder won’t 
be able to hear you’.
This choreography suggests a keen awareness on the part of these 
women that they were being studied. Luciana made this explicit in 
her welcome remarks. ‘We are here because you are studying us. I am 
speaking in terms of “you” and “us”,’ she began. ‘For us, your ques-
tions and research topics are sources of reflection. I would like to 
remind you: We are not objects of study. We are people, with voice, 
with politics. We are interlocutors. We are participatory subjects.’ 
Everyone in the room nodded vigorously. 
‘It does not interest us to be passive. We are interested in how our 
work is reflected in the academy, in the sense you make of us,’ Luciana 
continued. ‘We are public women in the best sense of the word. We 
want to be cited, we want to be recorded, we want to have our photo 
taken. Don’t be shy.’ 
I do not relate this information so it can merely serve as ‘back-
ground’ or ‘scene-setting’. Rather, the above reflections and dynamics 
are an integral part of how these women made sense of themselves 
and the power dynamics they enacted and challenged, both within 
armed groups and after their exit from them. Their understanding 
of the kinds of political subjects they wanted to be inflected both the 
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design of their interactions with researchers and the content of those 
conversations. 
Pertinently to this analysis, the women lamented that social imagi-
nations about former combatants as political subjects did not permit 
their engagement with peacetime feminism. ‘I am more of a peace 
activist than an ex-combatant in my identification,’ Cecilia said. ‘Me 
too,’ Luciana agreed. ‘We have been working for peace far longer than 
we have been involved in war.’ Despite these self-identifications, par-
ticipation in feminist peace-building spaces remains challenging. 
‘Whenever there is a forum or dialogue on women’s participation in 
peace, they do not know where to put us,’ Cecilia said. Alexandra 
added: 
When I find myself among civil society feminist women, I gener-
ally remain in silence. Whenever I make an intervention, there is 
not enough trust for anyone to contradict me. Among themselves, 
they [civil society feminists] argue all the time. But when I make an 
intervention, it ends there. My opinion is not considered normal.
Lightening the atmosphere, Mariana intervened, ‘or maybe you are so 
brilliant, nobody contradicts you’. But Alexandra disagreed: 
Not at all. It is simply not an equal exchange. I remain in silence 
and it is a silence of exclusion. Among feminists, that costs me a 
lot. We cannot speak of ‘the feminism’. There are many feminisms. 
Feminism in Colombia carries with it the stereotypes of pacifism. 
Women like us are contaminated by war.
These women were not suggesting that they have been excluded from 
all spaces altogether – rather, they pointed out that their participation 
had been limited to an expectation that they narrate gendered harms. 
‘You should see the questions we get from journalists, even from 
women journalists.’ Lina said. ‘Did they rape you? Have you shot a 
gun? And what do you do when you get your period in the jungle?’ 
I followed up with Luciana in an interview after this event to better 
understand what a broader engagement with combatants as interloc-
utors for peace might look like. Her starting point, echoing the earlier 
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analysis, was that ‘demobilisation is depoliticisation’. What, then, is 
meaningful political engagement? ‘To be a political subject means 
to participate in civil and political life,’ Luciana said. In a different 
interview, Vanessa offered a similar understanding. ‘Political subjects 
make interventions on what it means to live as a collective, on the 
organising principles of society. This does not always have to pass 
through talking about the war.’ In other words, Vanessa was empha-
sising the importance of directing broader questions about life in 
armed groups at former combatants, as well as having wider curiosity 
about the meanings and practices of politics and peace, as opposed 
to only wanting to know about the violations that women may have 
experienced within armed groups. The discussion at the ex-combat-
ants’ collective elaborated on this theme:
What is the political? What does the political mean? It means col-
lective action for social transformation. […] Women’s participation 
in politics is political. The environment is political. The family is 
political. We, in general, are political – our life, action, words are 
political. Taking up arms is political, leaving arms is political. 
A key theme in this analysis, therefore, is the importance of 
engaging with women combatants as political subjects and as full 
interlocutors for peace. This type of engagement would require actors 
engaged in peace-building and conflict resolution to recognise that 
women combatants are not only suitable interlocutors about viola-
tions they experienced or about experiences of coercion. They are 
also authorities on agency, volition and various subjects of politics, 
including both formal/electoral politics and the politics of everyday 
life. Importantly, I am not claiming that combatants should receive 
this treatment in peace processes while other participants (including 
many civil society actors) remain excluded from formal and informal 
peace negotiations (Dayal and Christien 2020). Rather, I am arguing 
that this fuller engagement should extend to all people involved in 
and affected by war, including combatants, rather than elevating com-
batants above other groups due to their prior involvement in violence. 
In other words, the shift I advocate in this chapter requires that we 
acknowledge that combatants’ previous experiences in armed groups 
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do not render them unknowledgeable about the making of peace. 
Rather than treating combatants’ membership in armed organisa-
tions as invalidating any expertise beyond violence, peace processes 
would benefit from engaging with them as complicated interlocutors 
(Baines 2017), with a variety of sources of knowledge, authority and 
expertise, and diverse visions on war, peace and politics. 
conclusion: challenges and opportunities
A number of challenges are likely to arise through engaging with com-
batants as interlocutors for peace, not only as authorities on violence. 
First, combatants themselves will need to openly and fully recognise 
the harms they and the groups of which they were a part perpe-
trated. Without such a recognition, civil society – and, in particular, 
victims/survivors of these harms – are likely to see any demands for 
more meaningful interlocution with combatants as an attempt to 
evade accountability or to deny participation in violence. Second, 
such a process of meaningful engagement with combatants will likely 
require difficult conversations within feminist peace organisations. 
For many feminist groups, pacifism is a key tenet of their politi-
cal priorities; engagement with armed actors, therefore, may seem 
antithetical to both the mission of the organisation and to their inter-
pretation of feminism. Third, combatants themselves are likely to 
have different interpretations of the meanings of peace and politics. 
Combatants may have different perspectives on their preferred iden-
tities, and a differing sense of themselves and the processes of war 
and peace making. Reflecting this diversity of perspectives and expe-
riences in the mechanisms of peace-building will require in-depth, 
long-term, context-sensitive engagement. 
In this chapter, I have proposed expanding the frame of engage-
ment with combatants in processes of ending war and building peace. 
An expanded frame is an invitation. It is a call to orient our curios-
ity in different directions and to see a range of actors and practices 
we may have otherwise missed. In practice, this means neither inval-
idating former combatants’ perspective as peace-builders because of 
their potential involvement in violence nor elevating their expertise 
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Recognise the Rights of Nature 
Keina Yoshida1
This chapter argues that the protection of, and living in harmony 
with, nature is a key feminist solution to conflict prevention. The 
destruction of the natural environment and resource scarcity is a 
major root cause and catalyst of conflict. Women’s participation as 
leaders in this process is vital to preventing conflict and securing sus-
tainable peace. This is not a new solution: women from around the 
world, including many Indigenous communities, have long called for 
the protection of land, forests, rivers, oceans and traditional ways of 
life. Peace activists have also called for disarmament on the basis that 
the military-industrial complex is one of the greatest culprits that 
pollutes our environment, and ecofeminists and feminismos terri-
toriales have drawn attention to the nexus between the exploitation 
of women and the exploitation of land (Ulloa 2016). It is therefore 
important to recognise that this solution is built upon the histories, 
struggles and knowledges of many peoples, including groups from 
around the world who have long advocated for environmental pro-
tection (Matsui 1999).
As we approach the 20th anniversary of the United Nations’ (UN) 
Women, Peace and Security framework (WPS), many women’s 
rights groups have increasingly called upon states to recognise the 
‘slow violence’ of climate change as a threat to international peace 
and security (George 2014). There have also been calls to include 
the environment within the WPS framework, in recognition that the 
environment plays a key role in conflict prevention and peace-build-
1 This research was funded by the Arts and Humanities Research Council as part 
of the Feminist International Law of Peace and Security Project at the London School 
of Economics. 
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ing efforts (Kronsell 2018; Yoshida 2019). The UN’s peace-building 
architecture recognises that development, peace and security, and 
human rights are interlinked and mutually reinforcing, but fails to 
include the environment within this formulation. Yet, the protection 
of the natural environment, biodiversity, and species survival and 
diversity is clearly an integral part of conflict prevention. As Chris-
tina Voigt (2015) has argued, the ‘protection and preservation of the 
natural environment, integrity of ecological systems, and the survival 
of species are positive conditions for peace’. The question then 
becomes: How do we guarantee those positive conditions for peace? 
How do we guarantee the integrity of the ecosystems which sustain 
us? How do we prevent drought, deforestation, and the social and 
political instability that is amplified by climate-related security risks? 
In this chapter, I suggest integrating the rights-of-nature approach 
in the WPS agenda as a tangible and necessary move towards recog-
nising that sustainable peace also includes environmental peace. This 
perspective means adopting a lens which is intersectional. Intersec-
tional theory draws attention to the multiple and often overlapping 
forms of oppression and ‘brings women into view’ along with other 
forms of social category or status to consider their lived experiences 
(Ní Aoláin and Rooney 2007; Cespedes-Baez and Yoshida 2021). 
This approach to intersectionality also demands a move away from 
an anthropocentric worldview (Quadros de Magalhães and Ribeiro 
de Souza 2013) and instead embraces a framework which includes: 
protecting environmental rights defenders;
recognising the rights of nature; 
guaranteeing nature’s regeneration; 
developing the conception of environmental reparations. 
Protecting and living in harmony with nature is identified as a 
feminist solution to ending war, and the integration of the rights of 
nature is offered as a specific articulation of this solution. In exploring 
this solution, this chapter draws on a variety of feminist perspectives, 
including Indigenous and ecofeminist scholarship. It also engages 
with the ideas of the rights of nature, and environmental conflict and 
environmental peace. Before we examine how to integrate a rights-
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of-nature approach in the WPS agenda and discuss why the rights of 
nature are integral to preventing global conflict, the following section 
outlines why there can be no peace without environmental peace. 
environmental conflicts and  
environmental peace 
Environmental degradation, climate change, the destruction of ‘the 
Earth, our home’, the extinction of species and ways of life, have all 
resulted in increasing calls for action beyond the multilateral talks 
on carbon reduction. All over the world, there is growing advocacy 
to protect the environment given the climate emergency in which 
we live. There is recognition of widespread governmental and cor-
porate neglect of ecological wellbeing, where these powerful entities 
have prioritised profit before sustainable livelihoods and ecosystems. 
Increasingly, human rights organisations are drawing attention to 
how environmental harm and extractivism, including the demand 
for minerals, raw materials and hydrocarbons, are disproportion-
ately affecting the human rights of certain communities (Raftopoulos 
2017). 
But how are environmental protection and climate change con-
nected to conflict prevention? The environment relates to conflict in 
multiple and complicated ways. The environment is a direct target in 
war, with examples including napalm and biological weapons being 
dropped to kill people and erase vegetation, as well as weapons and 
toxins affecting the natural environment. Pipelines which are blown 
up in forests cause pollution affecting the livelihoods of local people, 
who are dependent on forests and rivers, and the burning of oil fields 
causes environmental harm. At the same time, precious resources are 
commodified and geographical areas become targeted on the basis 
of these resources which are extracted to fund conflict. The environ-
ment therefore may be targeted to sustain conflict. Environmental 
wellbeing is an integral part of successful post-conflict settlements. 
Desertification, disasters, extreme weather, deforestation, the 
destruction of biodiversity, the scarcity or abundance of ‘natural 
resources’ – all are implicated in creating conditions of insecurity 
and undermining sustainable peace. According to Stockholm Inter-
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national Peace Research Institute’s (SIPRI) policy brief on Climate 
Change, Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace, ‘international efforts to 
build and maintain peace are not yet taking these emerging challenges 
systematically into account’ (Krampe 2019). These challenges are 
considered in an emerging field of practice and scholarship known as 
‘environmental peacebuilding’, which has been described as centring 
the core challenges of violent conflict and adverse environmental 
change (Ide 2020). While there has been a rise and acknowledgement 
of the importance of the environment in relation to ensuring sus-
tainable peace, there has been little gender analysis in that field of 
literature and practice (Fröhlich and Gioli 2015).
The environmental peace-building literature and practice explains 
that, if the environment forms part of the conflict matrix, it should 
also be part of the solution in creating conditions of peace. This 
can be via environmental justice in the form of equity (including 
concepts such as intergenerational equity), equal distribution and 
benefit sharing, and access to justice via participation in decisions or 
consultation around natural resources and natural entities. Thus, for 
example, the Inter-American Court on Human Rights has confirmed 
that states must ensure that Indigenous communities are consulted 
prior to any licences being granted to companies which would affect 
their territories and livelihoods. Furthermore, any such licences or 
contracts should ensure that the Indigenous community receives a 
reasonable benefit from any developments and that no such devel-
opments should take place until there is a prior and independent 
environmental and social impact assessment. Environmental justice 
might also be through the special protection of zones of environmen-
tal importance prior to and during conflict, including Indigenous 
lands (Jacobsson and Lehtonen 2020). Or it might be through more 
radical concepts which consider that unsustainable consumption and 
extractive practices must be halted given the impact on the environ-
ment and on Indigenous and women’s rights (Herrero et al. 2014).
For example, in 2017, following eleven years of community 
advocacy, El Salvador decided to ban the El Dorado mining project 
which presented a risk to the Lempa River, a water source for 77 per 
cent of the Salvadoran population. Antonia Recinos, an activist at the 
heart of the struggle, is reported as commenting: 
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Mining is irreversible death. Experiences in other countries 
where mining projects are developed have shown that the great-
est damage is upon the bodies and lives of women. (cited in Platero 
and Malik 2017)
Recinos’ comment signals how mining is death, in the literal sense, 
for women environmental rights defenders who are targeted and 
killed for protecting their land and territories from development 
and also in a metaphorical sense, with Indigenous and other women 
speaking out about the spiritual and ecological violence which is 
caused by extractive industries and how this affects women’s rights as 
guardians of knowledge about the land. 
In addition to inter-state, international and civil wars, other types 
of conflicts occur within state boundaries in the form of social-
environmental or ecological conflicts. These conflicts often concern 
the tension between the state, corporate activities and communities 
with large-scale and mega-development projects, affecting the rights 
of local and Indigenous communities to their ancestral lands and 
ways of life. This tension has led to the murder and deaths of many 
environmental land defenders around the world who have sought 
to protect forests, rivers and their homes (Cajete 2000; Norman 
2017). These protests have been met with a ‘zero tolerance policy’ by 
governments and authorities, who have been complicit in vilifying 
and stigmatising those protecting the environment, even labelling 
environmental activists as ‘terrorists’ (Raftopoulos 2017), or complicit 
in their failure to protect.
Some of the literature on human rights and social-environmen-
tal conflicts has emphasised that extractive industries and the 
development of mega-projects have the effect of mutating con-
flicts, displacing populations and polluting natural entities. There 
is a ‘political ecology’ of war (Le Billon 2001), and social conflicts 
occur when there is injustice and profit is placed above biodiversity 
and worldviews which take spiritual and cultural links with nature 
seriously. The types of large-scale projects associated with extractive 
industries result in myriad human rights abuses, including gender-
based violence against women and trafficking in human beings (UN 
Special Rapporteur on Trafficking 2018). Despite the development 
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and ‘greening’ of human rights, people on the frontline continue to 
see their human rights, including the right to a healthy environment 
and their rights to culture, violated frequently and egregiously. 
These tensions raise questions around what ‘peace’ means for 
biodiversity and the environment following agreements to cease hos-
tilities in internal or international armed conflicts. In Colombia, as 
part of the debate on the 2016 peace accord, human rights lawyers 
have argued that ‘there will be no peace without environmental 
peace’ (Rodriguez Gavarito quoted in McNeish 2017). Subsequently, 
academic literature and reports of non-governmental organisations 
(NGOs) have recorded in Colombia and in other countries: 
The links between mining, internal displacement and trafficking 
for sexual exploitation; 
The use of paramilitaries to suppress protest by environmental 
rights defenders; 
The targeting, smear campaigns and criminalisation of environ-
mental rights defenders, including through the use of civil litigation 
suits against them;
Human rights violations, including a difficulty accessing justice 
around environmental rights violations (Menton and LeBillon, 
2021).
While unsustainable extractivism, unequal distribution of land and 
income, limited democratic participation and environmental destruc-
tion can be a cause of conflict, the environment is also an important 
factor which brings communities together and which can create the 
conditions for peace. This must include peace for all peoples who seek 
to protect biodiversity and the rights of natural entities themselves. 
The rights of nature cannot be legally protected on one hand, while 
those who attempt to protect those rights are targeted and have their 
human rights violated. One simple solution to preventing conflict 
is to ensure that states respect, protect and fulfil their human rights 
obligations towards environmental rights defenders who are attempt-
ing to protect their livelihoods, and also nature. Further, states should 
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ensure that there is access to justice and that concepts such as envi-
ronmental justice are taken seriously. 
wps and the rights-of-nature approach 
While many feminist scholars have called for a human rights approach 
and an approach which takes into account socioeconomic rights and 
justice as a condition for peace, it is important to ensure that envi-
ronmental justice and rights are also included within the theory and 
practice of conflict prevention. This is because the environment sits 
at an important intersection of the lives of the vast majority of people, 
including women. Women who live in the forest, women who are 
responsible for water management, rural women, have expertise and 
understanding of the intersections of environmental and gender 
justice as fundamental to the conditions of peace. Peace activists such 
as Helen Kezie-Nwoha have argued that food and water security are 
central to women’s concerns and conceptions of peace and yet these 
are not prioritised within frameworks such as the WPS framework. 
The concerns over food and water insecurity are being exacerbated 
by climate change, which in turn makes populations vulnerable to 
conflicts over resources which are scarce.
As the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against 
Women (CEDAW) has recently noted, women and girls experience 
greater risks, burdens and impacts of climate change and disasters; 
and women and girls in conflict situations are particularly exposed 
to these risks. These disasters compound pre-existing inequalities, 
limiting women’s access to water, food, land and agricultural inputs. 
Women and girls are therefore more likely to face losses related to 
their livelihoods, and negative gender stereotyping means that they 
are less able to adapt to climatic conditions (CEDAW 2018). Further, 
it is recognised both in the environment and development literature, 
and in the international human rights law framework, that envi-
ronmental degradation is differentially experienced on the basis of 
gender (Gururani 2002). 
Practically, there is increasing recognition that while the environ-
ment and women are vulnerable to being targeted in conflict, women 
are often excluded when it comes to making decisions about natural 
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resource and environmental management. Women’s participation as 
leaders in answering these questions is therefore vital to preventing 
conflict and securing sustainable peace. As the CEDAW Commit-
tee has emphasised, the ‘participation of girls and young women in 
the creation, development and implementation and monitoring of 
policies and plans on climate change and disaster risk reduction is 
essential, as these groups are often overlooked despite the fact that 
they will experience the impacts of these phenomena throughout 
their lifetimes’ (CEDAW 2018, para. 32). Participation also includes 
valuing and respecting local traditional knowledge held by women in 
agricultural regions and by Indigenous populations. 
In practice, this has led to programmes which focus on ensuring 
greater participation of women in natural resource management 
in post-conflict situations. This mirrors what Shubhra Gururani 
has described as ‘a veritable industry of “gender and environment” 
scholars, experts and planners committed to the empowerment 
and uplift of rural women’ (2002, 230). She argues that this has not 
resulted in an understanding of the complexities that shape gender 
relations, also due to a lack of understanding of how nature is also 
‘socially made and remade’. In other words, it is insufficient to trans-
form society towards ‘greener’ conditions if we do not challenge the 
power relations and assumptions that are being made both about 
gender and nature itself. 
While General Recommendation No. 37 by the CEDAW Com-
mittee provides states with important guidance in relation to their 
obligations, some scholars have queried the role of international 
law in protecting the environment and promoting peace. Across the 
conflict spectrum and in so-called peacetime, many different legal 
regimes often apply concurrently to regulate the actions of states 
and non-state actors. The International Law Commission (ILC) 
has recently produced a number of reports examining the topic and 
enacting a number of draft principles which are aimed at enhanc-
ing protection of the environment, including through ‘preventative 
measures for minimising damage to the environment during armed 
conflict’ and also through ‘remedial measures’. The ILC encourages 
states to designate areas of major environmental and cultural impor-
tance as protected zones. Significantly, the principles recognise the 
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special relationship between Indigenous peoples and the protection 
of the environment. While the draft principles signal an important 
reminder that states must do more to ensure that measures are taken 
before a conflict begins, many scholars have queried and criticised 
the role that international law plays with respect to environmental 
protection. As Christine Voigt (2015) has noted: 
The sheer number of existing laws, principles, case law, regulations, 
standards and so on that address environmental protection already 
constitute a vast and complicated apparatus of international legal 
norms. Yet, with environmental degradation, political stress and 
conflict continue to rise despite such norm density.
The point here is not that there are insufficient laws to protect the 
environment, but rather that too many laws already exist which pri-
marily see nature as a resource for wealth generation (Borràs 2017) 
or to be managed by sovereign states in the manner that it sees fit, (as 
long as it does not harm other states). As Usha Natarajan and Kishan 
Khoday (2014, 573) have argued ‘international environmental law 
and general international law are structured in ways that systemi-
cally reinforce ecological harm’. Christine Chinkin and Mary Kaldor 
(2017, 89) have explained that recent scholarship in international law 
has demonstrated ‘its complicity in silencing and reconstructing the 
subaltern, supporting assertions of title to colonised territories and 
legalising colonial exploitation of peoples and resources’. 
Therefore, some international lawyers have called for an approach 
to recognise the rights of nature and the greater protection of ecosys-
tems (Gianolla 2013). This framing rejects an anthropocentric view 
of the world and recognises the intrinsic value of natural entities such 
as forests, rainforests, rivers and wildlife. Feminist approaches to the 
international law of peace and security have also called for a new 
approach to the international framework which advances ‘positive 
peace rather than militarism, and ensure[s] environmental sustaina-
bility rather than degradation’ (Otto 2018, 2). It is part of what David 
Boyd (2017), the current UN Special Rapporteur on the Environ-
ment and Human Rights has termed a ‘legal revolution’ with respect 
to recognising these natural entities as legal persons. It is an approach 
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which is Earth-centred and which emphasises our interdependency 
with nature. This is the rights-of-nature approach. 
The rights-of-nature approach has gained constitutional status in 
some countries, with the Constitution of Ecuador being the first to 
include it (Boyd 2017; Article 71 of the Constitution of Ecuador). 
Within these rights, which grant legal personhood to natural entities 
such as rivers, forests and lakes, there is also a right for nature’s regen-
eration. The Constitution of Ecuador acknowledges that nature has 
a right to exist, persist, maintain and regenerate its vital cycles. It is 
not simply property for exploitation by those who hold power within 
the country or by multinational companies. This is important since 
many conflicts relate to grievances around natural resource distribu-
tion and destruction. For the environmental defenders in Honduras, 
Brazil, Colombia and in many other countries, there is no peace while 
their lands and environment are being destroyed. 
It is instructive to consider examples of how the rights of nature can 
be invoked in practice. Rather than conceiving of the environment as 
a subset of human rights law, the rights of nature acknowledges the 
intrinsic value of nature. In Colombia, a number of legal decisions 
have granted protection to natural entities, in the context of mining, 
such as the Atrato River case (T-622 of 2016). In this case the Con-
stitutional Court of Colombia ordered the protection of the rights to 
life, health, water, food security, a healthy environment, culture and 
territory. The judgment provides: ‘Recognition of the Atrato River, 
its basin, and tributaries as an entity subject to rights of protection, 
conservation, maintenance and restoration by the State and ethnic 
communities.’ As a result, a government representative and commu-
nity representative were put in charge of the legal representation of 
the river’s rights, making them ‘the guardians of the river’. Legal cases 
such as the Atrato River case demonstrate an awareness of security 
which is linked to human rights and environmental rights, rather 
than militarisation and securitisation.
In addition to this exciting development, which creates obligations 
to combat illegal mining and measures the socio-ecological impacts 
of mining, there have been a number of other cases recognising the 
rights of rivers and the right to protect them from pollution (Herrera-
Santoyo 2019). In a significant case, the Colombian Supreme Court 
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declared the Colombian Amazon as a subject of rights and as such 
the state was required to reduce deforestation (Ardila Sierra 2019). 
Specifically, in the post-conflict or post-peace agreement context, the 
investigative branch of the Colombian Jurisdiction for Peace (JEP) 
has found that nature was a victim of the Colombian conflict (Ces-
pedes-Baez and Yoshida 2021).
While the judgments recognising the rights of nature are an impor-
tant step towards reconceiving a legal conception of the environment, 
questions remain as to why the death rates and targeting of environ-
mental defenders remain so high when local communities are simply 
trying to protect against environmental degradation and protect 
nature rights. These socio-environmental conflicts require peaceful 
solutions, and feminist solutions, in order to ensure that there is sus-
tainable and equitable peace. 
the solutions 
So far in this chapter, we have discussed the importance of women’s 
participation and valuing women’s expertise and knowledge with 
respect to the environment. As a part of this solution, we need to 
make sure that women’s groups, particularly Indigenous women, 
forest dwellers and those who have a spiritual relationship to the land 
not only participate but are also consulted in post-conflict contexts 
about how the Earth and their territories can best be repaired. Too 
often the environmental and gender action plans that follow in post-
conflict settings are run separately and without any awareness of 
how the environment intersects with women’s livelihoods. A more 
integrated approach would therefore recognise that gender equality 
measures must include environmental protection, and environmen-
tal protection should ensure that gender is adequately budgeted and 
accounted for. In such a way, local populations, including women’s 
groups, will be able to share their knowledge and expertise on how to 
integrate the rights-of-nature approach, thus far excluded from WPS 
action plans, in a manner which is consistent with their own entan-
gled relationship with nature. 
We have also seen how legal systems can reconceive their relation-
ship to natural entities such as forests and rivers moving from a lens 
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of property ownership to one which takes into account other world-
views that respect nature’s rights to regenerate. We have touched on the 
importance of concepts such as environmental justice, which include 
equity and distribution of benefits derived from natural resources. 
We have also discussed how states must respect their human rights 
obligations and protect, rather than target, environmental human 
rights defenders. These are all part of the feminist solutions to con-
flict prevention, since conserving a healthy environment is important 
for the wellbeing of all of us, and to ensure that socio-environmental 
and other conflicts over natural resources do not develop or escalate. 
Integrating a rights-of-nature approach in the WPS framework in 
an intersectional way means respecting and protecting ancestral and 
Indigenous lands. It also involves a deeper integration of environ-
mental peace-building projects with WPS planning, beyond a focus 
on the management of natural resources. Focusing on the rights of 
nature provides an important shift away from a state-centric and 
anthropocentric standpoint and instead recognises nature as its own 
agent. It challenges us to listen to the trees, rivers, flora and fauna, 
and to the people who dwell most closely with them. It is a feminist 
solution to ending war because it forms part of feminism’s utopian 
challenge to imagine a better world, to decentre the capitalist extrac-
tivist patriarchy, and to live in harmony with others. 
conclusion 
As we reach the 25th anniversary of the Beijing Declaration and 
Platform for Action, it is important to recall that it recognised ‘women’s 
experiences and contributions to an ecologically sound environment 
must therefore be central to the agenda for the twenty-first century’. In 
the same way, women’s leadership on an ecologically sound environ-
ment is a key solution for conflict prevention given the intersections 
between environmental destruction, conflict and gender inequal-
ity. As I have argued, the failure to place gender equality at the heart 
of environmental peace-building risks entrenching gendered power 
structures and fails to take into account women’s leadership and 
expertise on the environment (Yoshida 2019). This chapter develops 
that thought further to suggest a solution to the problem. Instead 
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of simply adding gender to the environmental peace-building pot, 
in order to create the conditions for peace and to prevent conflict, 
we must adopt a radical and transformative approach to the ways 
in which we protect our planet. One solution could be to integrate 
the rights-of-nature framework into the WPS agenda. This would 
provide an Earth-centred approach to conflict prevention and help to 
join up frameworks which currently remain siloed. 
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Create Just, Inclusive Feminist Economies 
to Foster Sustainable Peace 
Carol Cohn and Claire Duncanson
War cannot be ended without transforming the conditions that are 
at the root of wars, including – centrally – the currently dominant 
economic model, which exacerbates inequalities and drives envi-
ronmental crises. In this chapter, we argue that building inclusive, 
just and sustainable economies is an important feminist solution to 
ending war.
Although there is a rich feminist scholarship that outlines alter-
natives to the currently dominant economic model of extractivist, 
neoliberal capitalism (see e.g. Balakrishnan et al. 2016; Bauhardt 
and Harcourt 2018; Leach 2015; Raworth 2017), this literature rarely 
addresses matters of war and peace. In this chapter, we make those 
links, while drawing on the insights of feminist economists, feminist 
political ecologists and feminist development scholars. We see build-
ing inclusive and sustainable economies as crucial to ending war in 
all contexts, a global, general solution if you like. But here our focus 
will be specifically on countries emerging from war, and on the poli-
cies and practices they could adopt to produce a more inclusive, just 
and sustainable peace. 
We focus on post-war countries, in particular, because they are in 
some ways the hardest case. Wars typically reorient and distort econ-
omies, and often leave the infrastructure of the pre-war economy in 
tatters. The economic resources needed for remedy, repair, rebuilding 
and transformation at the end of a war are massive and urgent, even 
while the country’s coffers are likely to be depleted. And post-war 
countries are infamously in danger of slipping back into war (Mason 




Yet post-war contexts also present us with ‘windows of opportu-
nity’ (Rees and Chinkin 2015). The period immediately following a 
war’s political settlement can be a moment of great potential: large 
amounts of external support flow in; constitutions are drafted; infra-
structure is (re)built; economic plans are drawn up; and the social, 
political and economic arrangements that will structure the post-war 
society are being set. The United Nations (UN) has recognised this to 
some extent with its advocacy of ‘building back better’. (UNDP 2008) 
Here we argue for something much more transformative than the UN 
has in mind, and we draw on the feminist economics and feminist 
political ecology literature to suggest not so much improvements to 
capitalism but radical alternatives. Nothing less is required, we think, 
in order to end war and achieve gender-just and sustainable peace. 
And the alternatives developed in these contexts can be models with 
much greater applicability in countries which are ‘stable’ but which 
suffer from the same neoliberal, extractivist economic system. 
A key part of building inclusive, just and sustainable economies is 
a transformation in the ways care and nature are valued in post-war 
economies. To make this argument, we first introduce key critiques 
that feminist economists and ecologists have made of dominant 
post-war economic recovery models. In the second section, we 
introduce feminist theorising about the importance of organising 
economies around the values of care and provisioning, and the dif-
ference this would make to post-war recovery. In the third, we draw 
attention to the ways feminist ecologists prioritise care of nature 
and value ecological sustainability over extraction and depletion of 
resources, and we argue this must be central to sustainable peace. The 
fourth section suggests some practical ways to achieve inclusive, just 
and sustainable economies, including progressive ways of generating 
revenue, and the creation of an active state that is participative, trans-
parent and accountable, and that prioritises social provisioning and 
environmentally sustainable forms of development.
feminist perspectives on dominant  
post-war economic recovery models
Right now, the economic recovery policies imposed on states 
emerging from armed conflict are a recipe for repeatedly falling back 
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into armed violence, rather than a solution to war. The economic 
recovery prescriptions of the donor community – international 
financial institutions (IFIs), banks, governments in the global North 
– most often rely on the large-scale extraction and export of natural 
resources, along with privatisation and the shrinking of the public 
sector as part of post-war economic rebuilding. While they posit 
that these measures will lead to economic growth, that economic 
growth will lead to jobs and rising incomes, and that this will con-
tribute to building peace and preventing relapse into war, too often 
the promised jobs and gains in living standards fail to materialise at 
a meaningful scale (see Cohn and Duncanson 2020; Mlinarević et 
al. 2017). Although these policies may lead to aggregate economic 
growth of GNP, they tend to concentrate wealth and deepen inequal-
ities, while at the same time depleting and degrading the ecosystems 
upon which lives and livelihoods depend. Any profit that is achieved 
is the result of downloading the costs onto women and other margin-
alised groups, and onto the planet; the peace, if any, that emerges is 
thus superficial and precarious. 
The analyses of feminist economists and ecologists can be used to 
help us understand how and why these economic recovery policies 
can fall so far short and have such deleterious effects – because their 
analyses illuminate the distortions and exclusions built into the foun-
dational economic theory upon which the recovery prescriptions are 
based. Feminist economists and ecologists critique not only the neo-
liberal version of capitalism, driven by powerful economies and IFIs 
since the 1970s; more deeply, they critique the fundamental assump-
tions of capitalism found in classical and neoclassical economic 
thought. 
One of their fundamental insights is that capitalism privileges 
the monetised aspects of the economy while ignoring the sphere of 
social reproduction or unpaid work, which includes both subsist-
ence production (particularly significant in much of the developing 
world) and the unpaid care work (for family, friends and neighbours) 
that keeps the social fabric together (Bauhardt and Harcourt 2018; 
Benería et al. 2015). A second element of their critique notes that 
capitalism is not geared towards universally meeting human needs, 
but to generating profits, which is accomplished, in part, by produc-
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ing and then meeting an endlessly proliferating set of human wants 
– among the subset of the population with sufficient resources to 
pay. Third, capitalism ignores the dangerous consequences of its deg-
radation of the environment and fails to acknowledge the benefits 
for human well being that societies derive from the ecosystems we 
inhabit. Its measure of success, ever-increasing GDP, is a measure 
which is disastrous for the environment (Philipsen 2015). 
In sum, capitalism is a model which prioritises profit genera-
tion from the exploitation of ‘surplus’ value from labour and from 
the planet; an extractivist approach to both humans and the natural 
world, rather than an approach focused on human sustenance, the 
repair and recovery of the social fabric, or ensuring adequate and sus-
tainable livelihoods for all. An approach to post-war countries that 
focuses on the recovery of the capitalist economy, then, will be quite 
different from one directly focused on the recovery of the people and 
ecosystems that have been ravaged by war (Cohn and Duncanson 
2020). In the next sections, we draw on some of the key insights of 
feminist economic thinking to provide a roadmap for doing things 
differently.
transforming economies by revaluing care,  
and the implications for sustaining peace 
A key approach of feminist economics has been to point out that a 
vast range of things are as important as paid work in determining 
the wellbeing not only of individuals and families, but also of the 
economy itself (Folbre 2001). Centrally, there is care work. What may 
first come to mind as ‘care work’ is taking care of children, sick people 
and the elderly. This work is not only carried out mostly by women 
but is also considered to be ‘women’s work’ (Budlender 2010). In cap-
italist and patriarchal societies that makes it easy to take this work for 
granted when it takes place, unpaid, within the family (Benería et al. 
2015; Waring 1988), and to devalue and pay low wages for it when it 
takes place in the paid economy. 
But feminists also think of care work more expansively, as caring 
not just for people and the varied needs we each have (not only to 
have good health, but for example, to learn, to grow, to feel safe and 
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secure), but also for our homes, our communities and our planet. We 
also mean it to include the entire economic, social and physical infra-
structure that makes all those kinds of work possible. The myriad 
types of care work required to sustain society have been brought into 
sharp relief by the 2020 coronavirus pandemic; for example, caring 
for one’s family in the home cannot be done without the people 
working in supermarkets and pharmacists; many of those workers, 
as well as workers in health care, cannot be present to provide that 
care without childcare centres and schools for their children; com-
munity health cannot be safeguarded when workers lack paid sick 
leave and thus must keep working even when they are ill and perhaps 
contagious; and without substantial unemployment insurance or 
guaranteed minimum incomes, the most basic elements of care – 
shelter, running water, and food on the table – are beyond the reach 
of many. 
Feminists point to the oft-neglected insight that all of us are from 
the start interdependent – as people who need, give and receive care 
(Tronto 1993). Care needs to be acknowledged as a central aspect of 
human life and valued as such: 
Care is not a parochial concern of women, a type of secondary 
moral question, or the work of the least well off in society. Care 
is a central concern of human life. It is time we began to change 
our political and social institutions to reflect this truth. (Tronto 
1993, 180)
Feminists thus advocate for a fundamental reorientation of our 
economies to facilitate this broad understanding and prioritisation 
of care. This includes a rethink of how paid employment and unpaid 
care and domestic work are organised, with responsibilities for unpaid 
care and domestic work more evenly distributed between women and 
men, and between households and society. It also includes every thing 
from changes to urban planning, including water and energy provi-
sion, to how we conceive of and structure education, and how we 
structure and deliver social services (see UN Women 2015). 
How might this key insight of feminist economics – the impor-
tance of valuing care, and of reorienting economies to facilitate care 
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– transform the priorities of post-war economic recovery policy? 
And how would this transformation help avoid a return to war, and 
lead to peace that is more sustainable?
Space does not permit a comprehensive account, but even if we 
restrict our analysis here to just one sphere of care work, health care, 
the benefits of an approach to post-war economies that privileges 
care – and the infrastructure to support it – are obvious and at least 
threefold. 
First, providing universal, easily accessible state-funded health 
care is crucial for building equitable, just and sustainable peace 
because health care needs at the end of a war are likely to be acute, 
numerous, widespread and, of course, gendered (see e.g. DeLargy 
2013; Rai et al. 2019). In addition to the pent-up need for medical 
services which were not available or accessible during the war, the 
specific health sequelae of war include not only direct, and some-
times gender-specific, wounds (such as amputations, traumatic 
fistula, effects of chemical weapons, psychological trauma), but also 
unvaccinated populations, the spread of contagious diseases, and 
poverty- and malnutrition-related ill-health. But while the needs are 
great, access to health care is likely to be minimal. War destroys vital 
health infrastructure, both physical (clinics) and social (death and 
displacement of doctors and nurses). To the extent that health care 
facilities still exist, access is still likely to be undermined by security 
concerns, lack of mobility, and destroyed roads. As we have noted, 
women often shoulder the burden of care for wounded and disabled 
family members in the absence of health services. Thus, they not only 
face their own health needs, but also increased care work, which in 
turn restricts their livelihood and employment opportunities. Pro-
viding state-funded, easily accessible health care would thus improve 
the lives of caregivers, as well as the lives of those directly needing 
care, and of their families as well. 
Second, investing in health care in post-war contexts offers plen-
tiful rewarding job opportunities and, with explicit consideration 
to recruiting both men and women at all levels, an opportunity to 
break down the gendered inequalities and stereotypes, prevalent in 
all societies, which result in expectations that women will undertake 
the bulk of caring labour. Generating employment opportunities is a 
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crucial element of peace-building. It gives ex-combatants and civil-
ians alike a stake in the peace (see e.g. del Castillo 2016). As it is, 
employment post-war is often variously absent, degraded, depleted, 
unavailable, or precarious due to a range of factors: assets, resources 
and markets have been destroyed or stolen during fighting, labour 
has been displaced, disabled or is required for caring for the injured; 
there may be an influx of recently demobilised soldiers, internally 
displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees all looking for work. Lack 
of job opportunities for men can lead to psychological difficulties, 
higher levels of domestic violence, or (re)recruitment into armed 
groups or criminal gangs; and lack of job opportunities for women 
can reinforce pre-existing gendered inequalities and precariousness. 
Generating employment opportunities for both men and women 
is thus central to ensuring that peace is gender-equitable, just and 
sustainable. 
Third, building an economy around care can contribute to a new 
social contract, which can enhance the legitimacy of the post-war 
state, contributing to the sustainability of the peace. While there is not 
an automatic or linear relationship in this respect, improved health 
services can increase trust in government and thus modestly contrib-
ute to reinforcement of the authority and legitimacy of the post-war 
state. This is especially so when the health service also offers oppor-
tunities for employment and training, citizen oversight of health 
programmes, and participatory monitoring mechanisms (Haar and 
Rubenstein 2012).
The cruel irony we see when we look at health – that war prevents 
the meeting of human needs and produces horrific new problems, 
while it simultaneously destroys the means for responding to those 
needs – is repeated in similarly complex gendered ways vis-a-vis 
each of the other crucial services which make up the social infra-
structure of the state: education, childcare, social security, justice 
systems. So too for the physical infrastructure encompassing roads, 
water, energy, housing and so on. In all cases, war has destroyed the 
services on which people rely, at the same time people are in need of 
a particularly enhanced level of provision in gender-specific ways. 
Building an economy around care – in its broadest sense that is, not 
just physical and mental health care but social care, education, child-
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care – offers a route to transforming this situation, to ending wars 
and building equitable, just and sustainable peace. We will come on 
to the issue of how such a transition might be financed, but first, will 
introduce the second crucially important aspect of feminist thinking: 
the valuing of nature.
transforming economies by revaluing nature, 
and the implications for sustaining peace 
As well as recognising the importance of orienting economies to 
support care, broadly conceived, feminist economists, and particu-
larly feminist political ecologists, argue that sustainability and respect 
for the planet need to be put at the heart of our economic models 
(Leach 2015; Raworth 2017). A commitment to sustainability, they 
argue, requires recognising the connections between rising income 
inequality, conspicuous consumption, and the acceleration of fossil 
fuel and natural resource extraction (Benería et al. 2015), acknowl-
edging environmental limits to growth, and realising the need for a 
‘safe operating space for humanity’ (Rockström 2009). 
Feminist political ecologists’ and economists’ prescriptions for 
alternatives to capitalism share much with some of the Green New 
Deal thinking now evident in many political parties, think tanks 
and international organisations (Tienhaara 2019). But for feminists, 
green economies are not just about lowering carbon emissions; they 
must be inclusive, sustainable and restorative; they replace the logics 
of ‘extract and use-up’ with ideas of circularity and regeneration 
(Bauhardt 2014; Harcourt and Nelson 2015; Leach 2015). Feminist 
green economies have inherent in them a challenge to masculin-
ist values: growth, efficiency and extraction; dominion over nature 
and its unruliness; and costly, ambitious technical solutions to the 
problems we’ve created. They involve rethinking and understand-
ing humans’ relations to nature and ecosystems, and the purposes 
of life, noting that what constitutes a good life is not acquiring more 
things but the quality of your relationships and time in nature. A 




How might this second key insight of feminist ecologists – that 
nature, like unpaid labour, also needs to be revalued, to be recognised 
as both encompassing and sustaining all of life, including humanity – 
transform the priorities of post-war economic recovery policy? And 
how would this transformation help avoid a return to war, and lead 
to peace that is more sustainable?
Reframing our understandings of the goals of the economy – 
from growth of GDP and ‘efficient’ extraction of resources, to the 
goals of sustainability and sufficiency – would transform the prior-
ities of post-war economic recovery, enabling post-war countries to 
truly ‘build back better’. Indeed, as climate crisis and mass extinction 
become ever more acute and apparent, and as we increasingly rec-
ognise the ways in which climate change exacerbates violent conflict 
and undermines human security, the need to integrate policies and 
practices that address and arrest climate change and biodiversity-
collapse into peace-building has never been clearer (see Cohn and 
Duncanson forthcoming). 
These policies and practices will need to involve all spheres of 
the economy, including key sectors such as agriculture and land 
use, natural resources, energy, transport and urban planning. Tak-
ing inspiration from, learning from and giving more power and 
resources to Indigenous and other local communities, post-war 
countries could, for example, adopt a whole new approach to land. 
There is an opportunity for post-war countries to ban large-scale 
industrialised agriculture and develop instead regenerative agricul-
ture, massive reforestation, peatland and wetland restoration, and 
rewilding, all of which would contribute to climate and biodiversity 
restoration after war (see IPCC 2019). Large-scale industrialised fish-
ing could be replaced by more sustainable, locally owned fisheries. 
Renewable energy could replace fossil fuels, and ways to limit energy 
use, required to address climate change, could be devised in fair 
and equitable ways. Food production and distribution, urbanisation 
and transport systems could be designed to be as energy-efficient as 
possible. 
Policies regarding infrastructure, too, would require a significant 
rethink and transformation. Currently, post-war states are advised to 
prioritise massive physical infrastructure projects that can facilitate 
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the efficient export of extracted goods, even while they download the 
costs onto people and nature, and exacerbate inequalities. Instead, 
physical infrastructure could be designed to support a circular, 
restorative economy – a web of provisioning, rather than corridors 
of extraction. This, along with the substantial investment in social 
infrastructure designed to support care, wellbeing and harmony with 
nature, would go far to reduce the causes of structural violence and 
war itself.
Taken together, these feminist policies revaluing nature would 
have three clear benefits in terms of their contribution to sustaining 
peace and preventing relapse into war. First, the creation of circular, 
restorative economies involves a shift away from a reliance upon 
fossil fuels and other high-value mineral resources, resources which 
have infamously fuelled violence and corruption in many countries 
(see e.g. Lujala and Rustad 2012; UNEP 2009). The potential profit 
of extraction, under capitalism, makes the exploitation of natural 
resources worth displacing people off their land, looting and killing. 
From almost every corner of the globe, there are reports of people 
being uprooted for access to the land under which minerals, oil and 
gas can be found, and terrorised, tortured and killed (Global Witness 
2020). Women and other marginalised groups are targeted for rape 
and sexual violence by armed groups, including at times paramilitar-
ies acting at the behest of transnational corporations (see Cohn and 
Duncanson 2020; Méndez Gutiérrez and Carrera Guerra 2015). A 
move away from extractivism to feminist green economies has the 
potential to end this violence. 
Second, similar to investing in care, the creation of circular, 
restorative economies could contribute to addressing the inequali-
ties, injustices and alienation that have been so central to driving 
war through the provision of employment opportunities for diverse 
sectors of the population – for ex-combatants, as well as for those 
whose lives and means of livelihood were harmed by the war, and 
those who lacked decent livelihoods pre-war. Sustainable agriculture 
and land use, sustainable use of natural resources, renewable energy, 
sustainable transport systems, reforestation and peatland restora-
tion projects, rewilding and eco-tourism could provide plentiful 
rewarding employment and livelihood opportunities. Crucially, if 
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you de-carbonise farming, for example, or de-carbonise the heating 
and powering of homes and workplaces, and put specific policies 
in place to ensure that the new opportunities for employment are 
distributed fairly and that the work is decently rewarded (see Braun-
stein and Houston 2015), these climate and biodiversity-friendly 
policies can be a crucial element of building inclusive, gender-just 
peace after war. 
Third, circular, restorative economies must be understood as 
integral to peace. Such economies are fundamental to human well-
being: from maintaining the ecosystems in which humans farm and 
forage for their subsistence and livelihoods; to maintaining healthy 
habitats for the pollinators on whom our food security relies; to 
avoiding the eco-system destruction that leads to zoonotic epidem-
ics and pandemics; to maintaining healthy air and the water cycle; to 
providing sources for the development of new medications to allevi-
ate human suffering; to meeting human needs for recreation, pleasure 
and health. In this sense, there is no peace without functioning eco-
systems – only immiseration, starvation and conflict.
getting from here to there
Such a transition is not impossible. Many post-war countries in 
poorest regions of the world have comparative advantages in renew-
able energy, for example, and have the opportunity to leapfrog to 
climate-friendly transport and urbanisation strategies (Klasen 2013). 
Nonetheless, the financial and governmental challenges for post-war 
states can look overwhelming.
So how do we get from where we are now to where we want to be? 
How do we create just, inclusive, sustainable economies which prior-
itise infrastructures of care that sustain both people and our planet’s 
ecosystems? This feminist solution to ending war requires not only 
a transformation in our understanding of the purposes of economic 
activity; it also requires financial resources, and a strong, effective, 
accountable state which understands its primary function as ensuring 
social welfare, rather than ensuring conditions that enable the unfet-




The repair of war’s harms, and transition to an economy that trans-
forms the inequalities underlying armed conflicts, will require 
substantial financial resources. But given war’s destruction of the 
productive capacity of the economy, the entrenchment of war econ-
omies, and the distorting effects of an influx of internationals in the 
post-war period, any post-war state faces serious challenges in gen-
erating revenue. Prior to the war itself, it is likely that state revenue 
will already have been limited, as a legacy of colonialism and donor-
driven economic policies oriented to avoiding debt defaults. Then, 
war compounds the problem: resources will not just have been 
destroyed, they will have often been captured by military or criminal 
elites. 
The most commonly advocated options for generating revenue, 
such as attracting inward investment, privatisation of state-owned 
assets and exporting natural resources or goods, have the effect of 
exacerbating inequalities, including gendered inequalities. They 
also often fail to generate anticipated revenues, due to elite capture, 
whereby those who have amassed power and wealth during the war 
years are best able – through fair means and foul – to benefit from 
the deals and opportunities on offer. Aid, which can spike to 50 per 
cent of GDP in post-war periods (in countries receiving aid more 
generally, it is between 1 and 10 per cent) (del Castillo 2017), can be 
hard for any post-war government to manage, and is also subject to 
capture by criminal and political elites. Post-war states thus provide 
challenging contexts in which to embark on creating inclusive and 
sustainable green economies, with their ambitious plans for the pro-
vision of public goods and employment creation, outlined above.
And yet feminist economists and ecologists have solutions. They 
draw attention to a range of mechanisms through which the creation 
of just, inclusive and restorative economies could be financed. 
First, it would be possible for post-war governments to spend more 
on building an infrastructure of care if the way aid expenditure is 
classified were changed. Aid transfers to post-war countries are sig-
nificant but currently – due to International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
rules – restrictions apply which preclude post-war governments 
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from spending it to support a substantial infrastructure of care. But 
if a change were made to classify spending on social infrastructure 
was as ‘investment’ rather than ‘consumption’, so as to recognise 
its ‘public goods quality’, post-war states could invest more freely 
without infringing IMF limits on public debt (see Seguino 2016). 
Second, more resources for an infrastructure of care and for resto-
ration of nature would also be available if donors decided to forgive 
odious debts, an appropriate action especially because those debts 
were often racked up by the corrupt regime a war was fought to over-
throw (Ndikumana and Boyce 2011). Third, transforming taxation 
practices offers multiple opportunities: controls could be applied 
to cross-border short-term capital flows (e.g. Financial Transac-
tion Tax); tax loopholes could be closed and more progressive tax 
regimes enacted – corporate tax dodging costs poor countries at least 
$100 billion every year (see Oxfam 2019). Fourth, redirecting just a 
fraction of the resources spent worldwide on militaries and military 
equipment, some $1.7 trillion in 2018 (SIPRI 2018), to support the 
recovery of  post-war countries could enable significant investment 
in the transition from extractivism to an economy of restoration and 
care (WILPF 2018).
A strong (role for the) state
It will be clear from our account above that feminist just, inclu-
sive and restorative economies assume a strong role for the state. In 
post-war settings, however, as we note above, states are often weak, 
fragmented and beset by corruption. While IFIs have partly recog-
nised this with their push for good governance, they tend to mean 
little more than providing a stable environment for markets, whereas 
for us good governance should mean an active, interventionist state 
that puts care and the restoration of nature at its heart. 
Advocating for a strong state can be uncomfortable territory for 
many feminists. States, especially colonial settler states, have often 
been the source of gendered insecurities and oppressions. But when 
thinking about the needs of people in post-war contexts, the require-
ment for a well-resourced and well-managed social infrastructure to 
support care, and the need to find a new way to respect and live with 
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nature, it seems clear to us that the state has to be part of the solution. 
It is the state – if transparent, accountable and responsive – that has 
the legitimacy and scope to deliver the inclusive and sustainable 
economy we have argued for here (see Braunstein and Houston 2015; 
Tickner 2018).
How do you build strong states which prioritise social provisioning 
and environmentally sustainable forms of development? It is perhaps 
especially challenging in post-war countries where the state has 
been weakened by decades of structural adjustment policies, auster-
ity measures and warfare, and where patriarchal patronage relations 
have been privileged over public services – but most of those char-
acteristics are not limited to post-war states. So more generally, what 
elements could foster this transformation of the state? Civil society 
groups and social movements will need resources and support to 
hold the state accountable (Rai et al. 2019; UNDP 2008). Tools such 
as gender impact analyses, participatory budgeting and independ-
ent audits of government can all contribute. Civil society groups 
and international bodies can use the UN’s International Covenant of 
Economic and Social Rights to hold post-war governments and the 
donor community to account: economic recovery policies must con-
tribute to the progressive realisation of economic and social rights, 
and this legal provision can be used to push states and donors to fund 
the social infrastructure required for an economy organised around 
care, sufficiency and sustainability (Rees and Chinkin 2015). Mech-
anisms to ensure representation of women and other marginalised 
groups in all levels of government will also be central to countering 
vested interests and developing progressive policies for social provi-
sioning and environmental sustainability. 
 
conclusion
In this chapter, we have argued that building inclusive, just and sus-
tainable economies is an important feminist solution to ending war. 
Ending war cannot be achieved without addressing the root causes of 
wars, including – centrally – the currently dominant global capitalist 




We have focused specifically on post-war countries because they 
so often slip back into armed violence. Also, the aftermath of war 
presents especially daunting challenges, even while it also presents 
windows of opportunity. But we believe that the solution we have 
been outlining – a feminist approach to the building of inclusive, just 
and sustainable economies – is equally applicable to countries which 
do not have armed warfare in their recent past; that it is necessary 
if we are to end the many forms of physical and structural violence 
that characterise countries which are ‘at peace’, as well as to prevent 
future wars.
It strikes us that when international architects of post-war economic 
policy think about economic recovery policy, they start from above, 
with a model of the purpose of an economy, the meaning of a 
‘healthy’ economy, and steps that need to be taken to reach that goal 
(which typically include targeting inflation, export-oriented growth, 
tackling public deficits, and so on). In contrast, feminists start from 
the ground up. If we want economic recovery policy to contribute to 
ending war and building peace – to ameliorate the inequalities and 
exclusions that underlie armed conflict, and to make the lives of the 
country’s inhabitants more secure – we need to start by looking at the 
conditions in which people live their lives at the war’s end, for those 
are the conditions that will need to be transformed.
Starting, as feminist economist and ecologists do, with people’s 
lives, not abstract economic models, alerts us to the needs that people 
have for care – broadly defined – and for a healthy environment in 
which to recover and live. The feminist revaluing of care and nature 
can provide the basis of a radically different approach to post-war 
recovery, to ending war, and to building peace that is sustainable. 
This approach, through building just, inclusive and sustainable econ-
omies, would transform the conditions underpinning wars. Putting 
care at the heart of the economy would meet the needs of people after 
war, has the potential to provide employment in fair and inclusive 
ways, and can contribute to a new social contract. It would also rec-
ognise and prioritise the relationships which make our lives possible 
and give them depth and meaning. Shifting from an extractivist 
approach to valuing nature would bring an end to the violence fuelled 
by extractivism, could provide quality and inclusive employment 
Cohn and Duncanson
196
opportunities, and is imperative for ensuring the healthy function-
ing of ecosystems on which our lives and sustainable peace depend. 
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Change How Civilian Casualties  
are ‘Counted’ 
Thomas Gregory
This chapter suggests changing the way we count civilian casualties 
as a feminist solution to war. The chapter begins by acknowledging 
that body counts are an important tool in the fight against forgetting 
the costs of war as they provide some information about the number 
of people injured or killed as a consequence of this violence. Yet it 
also draws attention to the politics of counting – or not counting 
– civilian casualties. It will examine cases where the military has 
sought to downplay or deny the violence they cause by refusing to 
count civilian casualties or deliberately undercounting the number 
of civilians killed. Against those who suggest that the solution is to 
ensure that militaries count civilian casualties and that these counts 
are conducted correctly, this chapter argues that these numbers are 
insufficient when it comes to accounting for pain and suffering expe-
rienced by civilians and holding militaries accountable for the death 
and destruction they cause. 
Drawing on the work of feminist theorists, such as Sally Engle 
Merry and Adriana Cavarero, it argues that body counts fail to 
contest the dehumanising logic that reduce human beings to mere 
statistics. Moreover, these numerical indicators can reinforce a very 
clean and sterile image of war that is utterly devoid of the dead and 
injured bodies left strewn across the battlefield and the emotional 
experiences of those who have to live with its devastating effects. 
As a solution to this problem, this chapter proposes a more rela-
tional response to the suffering of civilians, which foregrounds the 
individual lives that are lost and the circumstances surrounding their 
deaths. Rather than simply counting civilian casualties, it argues that 
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we need to name those who are killed or injured, we need to find ways 
of telling their stories – not just stories about their grisly demise but 
also stories about who they were as individuals and the lives that they 
left behind. The solution, therefore, is not to devise more accurate or 
precise ways of counting civilian casualties but to look for alterna-
tive modes of accounting for the pain and suffering that is inflicted 
during these wars. As such, it takes seriously the feminist call to fore-
ground the everyday in global politics and to listen to those who are 
so often relegated to the margins. 
counting casualties
During Operation Desert Storm in Iraq, General Norman Schwar-
zkopf was asked to comment on the number of civilians killed by 
coalition troops, but claimed he had ‘absolutely no idea what the Iraqi 
casualties are’. He also seemed reluctant to correct this oversight, 
announcing that ‘if I have anything to say about it, we’re never going 
to get into a body-counting business’ (quoted in Cushman 1991). 
Describing this as a form of pre-censorship, Margot Norris (1991: 
225) argued that the military was actively trying to de-realise the dev-
astating effects of war by ensuring that the dead and injured bodies of 
Iraqi civilians remained completely invisible and totally unknowable. 
This refusal to count civilian casualties not only denies us a: 
numerical inventory of the enemy dead, but also the willingness to 
reckon with the meaning and significance of such vast numbers of 
the killed in an accounting of the purpose, necessity … and human 
cost of their violent destruction. (Norris 1991, 237–8) 
Without accurate information about the number of civilians who 
were killed as a consequence of these military operations, we have 
no way of knowing whether they were conducted in accordance with 
the dictates of international humanitarian law, which requires bel-
ligerents to discriminate between combatants and non-combatants, 
ensure any anticipated civilian harm is proportionate to the expected 
military gains, and that appropriate precautions are taken to reduce 
the likelihood of civilian deaths. (Norris 1991, 238) 
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Similar concerns were raised during the early stages of Opera-
tion Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan after General Tommy Franks 
announced to reporters that ‘we don’t do body counts’ (quoted in 
Broder 2003). Although coalition casualties were counted with metic-
ulous accuracy, Jessica Hyndman (2003, 8) argued that there was an 
‘audible silence’ about the civilians killed by coalition bombs. This 
enabled the military to portray the conflict as a surgical strike against 
the enemy – with minimal impact upon the civilian population – even 
though many of these bombs missed their targets and killed civilians 
in the process (Hyndman 2003, 9). Others also expressed concern 
about this refusal to count civilian casualties, with John Sloboda et al. 
(2013, 54) arguing that: ‘there can be no justification for insulating 
ourselves from knowledge of war’s effects’. At a minimum, they insist 
that militaries have an obligation to record – and release – basic facts 
about who was killed, where they were killed and when they were 
killed, insisting that there can be ‘no moral justification for refusing 
to record war deaths by every available means’ (Sloboda et al. 2013, 
54). This is echoed by Daniel Mahanty and Alex Moorehead (2019), 
who argue that people cannot participate in debates about the legit-
imacy of war if they are kept in the dark about the impact they are 
having on innocent civilians. 
This reluctance to count civilian casualties has prompted various 
non-profit organisations to keep a running tally of the civilians killed, 
drawing on a variety of sources – from international media reports 
through to local witness reports. Airwars (2019), for example, esti-
mates that between 8,148 and 13,097 civilians have been killed in 
coalition airstrikes in Iraq and Syria since August 2014, which is 
significantly more than the 1,321 deaths that coalition forces have 
admitted killing. Similarly, a joint investigation with Amnesty Inter-
national (Amnesty Internaitonal 2019) concluded that coalition 
forces had killed more than 1,600 civilians during a four-month 
campaign in the Syrian city of Raqqa, which reduced entire neigh-
bourhoods of the city to mounds of rubble. These body counts are 
obviously important when it comes to holding militaries accounta-
ble for the damage that they cause to both people and places, drawing 
attention to the disconnect between rhetoric and reality. 
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Even though coalition commanders challenged people to ‘find a 
more precise air campaign in the history of warfare’ – insisting that 
their goal is ‘always zero human casualties’ – these independent 
assessments revealed that civilian casualties were significantly higher 
than the official figures acknowledged, raising important questions 
about the heavy-handed tactics that were being used by coalition 
forces and the adequacy of their battlefield damage reports (Lieu-
tenant General Stephen Townsend, quoted in Amnesty International 
2019). 
Even when militaries do count civilian casualties, there is no guar-
antee that their data is accurate. Official figures released by the UK 
Ministry of Defence, for example, claimed that more than 4,000 
enemy combatants had been killed by the Royal Air Force (RAF) in 
approximately 1,700 bombing raids across Iraq and Syria and that 
only one civilian had been killed as a consequence of these operations. 
Data collected by various non-profit organisations suggested that 
these official figures were simply not credible, with Airwars noting 
that the RAF dropped over 4,000 munitions – mostly 500lb bombs 
– on densely populated residential areas. As the executive director of 
Action on Armed Violence Iain Overton put it, the suggestion that 
there was only ‘one civilian casualty against 4,315 enemies must be a 
world record in modern conflict’ (quoted in Barnes and Hall 2019). 
These discrepancies could be the product of deliberately undercoun-
ting the civilians killed but they might also arise as a consequence of 
methodological choices about how these counts are conducted and 
what is included in these counts (see Sebolt et al. 2013). 
When it comes to counting civilian casualties, it is important for us 
to consider whether these counts are being conducted and what is at 
stake when the military simply refuses to count those it kills. It is also 
important to pay attention to how these counts are conducted and 
what is included in these counts because these methodological deci-
sions will have a significant bearing on the accuracy of the figures 
eventually produced. However, we should also be cautious about 
how these numerical indicators shape our understanding about the 
violence inflicted on the battlefield. As we shall see in the follow-
ing section, feminists have warned that body counts create a very 
clean and sterile image of war, erasing the horrifying effects of this 
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violence while presenting its victims as mere objects – things that 
can be counted rather than human beings with specific stories to tell.
 
the limitations of counting civilian casualties
The previous section focused on concerns about the refusal to count 
civilian casualties and problems with how these counts are con-
ducted, which suggests that a potential solution would be to ensure 
that civilian casualties are counted and that these counts are con-
ducted properly. Feminists argued that militaries were actively trying 
to avoid counting civilians or downplay the number of civilians 
killed in order to present a simple and clean image of the battlefield 
– one that is completely devoid of the chaos and the carnage expe-
rienced by civilians on the ground. There are obvious parallels with 
the ‘techno strategic language’ used by nuclear strategists that actively 
seeks to evade the catastrophic consequences of a nuclear strike, as 
Ray Acheson demonstrates in her chapter. This section will argue 
that simply counting civilian casualties and ensuring these counts are 
accurate is not enough to disrupt the dehumanising logic that trans-
forms civilians into mere statistics – in some cases, counting civilian 
casualties might actually reinforce the problem.
The previous section focused on those occasions where militaries 
have refused to count civilian casualties or have deliberately under-
counted those they have killed, either by design or because of the 
methodological decisions taken before conducting their counts. One 
obvious solution to this problem would be to ensure that militaries 
not only count civilian casualties but that every civilian casualty is 
counted. Yet simply documenting these deaths fails to disrupt the 
dehumanising logic that renders the civilian population profoundly 
disposable because it reduces civilians to mere statistics while also 
erasing the devastating effects of the violence that is inflicted upon 
their bodies. Although she was critical of coalition attempts to conceal 
the death and destruction inflicted upon the Afghan people, Jessica 
Hyndman warned that simply counting these casualties cannot do 
justice to the individuals who lost their lives or capture the grief 
experienced by those left behind. She argues that while ‘counting is 
an important device for remembering, it is also flawed in the way it 
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transforms unnamed dead people into abstract figures’ (Hyndman 
2007, 38).
Feminists have also expressed broader concerns about the unin-
tended consequences of counting civilian casualties. Elsewhere, I 
have argued that body counts can disguise the full horrors of war by 
producing a strangely disembodied account of the violence inflicted 
in war, which tells us very little about what actually happens to the 
people when they are hit by falling bombs or struck by stray bullets 
(Gregory 2014). The process of counting these casualties cleanses 
them of any blood and gore, transforming them into numerical indi-
cators that can be tabulated into neat little rows or converted into 
pretty little graphs. As the horrifying effects of this violence – not 
to mention the emotional distress it causes to those left behind – 
is completely erased from view, there is no sense that the primary 
‘purpose of the event described is to alter (to burn, to blast, to shell, to 
cut) human tissue’ (Scarry 1985, 64). As such, these body counts can 
reproduce the ‘technostrategic language’ described by Ray Acheson 
in her chapter on nuclear weapons, as it enables us to talk about this 
violence without ever confronting the devastating effects of what 
happens to the people involved. 
Cristina Masters (2007, 44–5) is also ambivalent about the way in 
which body counts have been used by the military as a technology of 
war – a metric that can be used to measure progress in wars without a 
continuous front, or as a propaganda tool that can be used to remind 
people about the ‘necessity’ of a particular conflict. She argues that 
dead bodies cannot simply speak for themselves and there is always 
politics at play when it comes to representing the dead. The bodies 
that are counted by coalition forces – the bodies of soldiers who 
have been killed or injured in the line of duty – are not used to illus-
trate the awfulness of war, but deployed within a gendered narrative 
of sacrifice designed to reinforce masculinist notions of protection 
(Masters 2007, 48–9; see also Young 2003). When civilian casualties 
are counted, these figures are not necessarily used to highlight the 
horrors of war, but can also be used to demonstrate the ‘technolog-
ical prowess’ of the military or the surgical precision of its strikes, 
by emphasising how few civilians died in that particular operation 
(Masters 2007, 47). The dead bodies that do appear in these body 
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counts are not necessarily grieveable bodies, whose deaths can 
be publicly commemorated or mourned, but as bodies that have 
been thoroughly dehumanised, devalued and disqualified (Masters 
2007, 55).
Although she does not write about body counts per se, the work of 
Sally Engle Merry on what she terms the ‘seduction of quantification’ 
is particularly useful here as it provides a specific set of conceptual 
tools for thinking about how these numerical indicators work to 
make violence more or less visible. She argues that quantification is 
seductive because it appears to offer us concrete statistical informa-
tion about the world around us, creating simple metrics that can be 
used to measure, rank and compare different processes while helping 
people to make difficult decisions in the absence of more detailed 
contextual information. Yet she argues that:
the process of translating the buzzing confusion of social life into 
neat categories that can be tabulated risks distorting the complex-
ity of social phenomena [because …] counting things requires us 
to make them comparable, which means that they are inevitabil-
ity stripped of their context, history and meaning. (Merry 2016, 1)
Some of these concerns are technical, although she reminds us that 
the political often hides behind the technical. While numbers have 
an aura of objectivity, she argues that decisions will have been made 
about what is counted and what is not counted, who is authorised 
to conduct these counts and how these counts should be conducted 
– what methods will be used to accumulate this data and what meth-
odological assumptions have informed these decisions – and what 
categories need to be constructed in order to make sense of the social 
world (2016, 14).
There are some obvious lessons here for those of us interested 
in counting civilian casualties in terms of who is counting, what is 
counted and how these counts are conducted. While the catego-
ries of combatant and non-combatant may seem relatively stable 
and self-evident, Helen Kinsella (2011) argues that they are ines-
capably gendered, with women and children coming to be viewed 
as the quintessential innocent civilian while the status of combatant 
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is reserved almost exclusively for men. These gendered distinctions 
can be deadly for anyone that falls into the category of a ‘military age 
male’ in contemporary conflicts – irrespective of whether they are 
actually involved in the conflict – because fitting this description can 
be sufficient to transform someone into a legitimate target (Carpen-
ter 2013). At the same time, the distinctions can also be significant 
when it comes to counting and categorising the victims of a particu-
lar incident or operation, where gender might be one technique used 
to determine whether the victims were combatants or non-combat-
ants (Wilcox 2017). 
Counting casualties is an important weapon in the fight against 
forgetting. Feminists have resisted this forgetting and drawn atten-
tion to the problematic assumptions that shape how these counts are 
conducted. While body counts may appear to provide an objective 
and politically neutral measure of the death and injury inflicted in 
any given conflict, the figures that circulate within the public sphere 
quickly become detached from the specific methodological decisions 
that went into producing this data and the politics that informed 
these decisions. As Merry explains:
rather than objective representations of the world, such quanti-
fications are social constructs formed through protracted social 
processes [yet …] once established and recognized, they often cir-
culate beyond the sphere envisioned by their original creators and 
lose their moorings in specific methodological choices and com-
promises. (2016, 5) 
There are ‘technical’ dilemmas that raise important questions about 
who and what gets counted. Should investigators only focus on 
recorded deaths and risk underestimating the total number of casual-
ties or should they use sample techniques to estimate the total number 
of deaths and risk overstating the number of casualties? Should they 
focus only on the direct harm caused by conflicts or should they also 
consider indirect deaths caused by unexploded ordinance, unstable 
buildings and the toxic remnants of war, the health problems caused 
by disease, malnutrition and the difficulties accessing basic medical 
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care, and the harm that is caused by the disintegration of a commu-
nity’s infrastructure and the displacement of peoples? 
Feminist concerns about the quantification of social life is also 
evident in the work of Diane Nelson, who claims that counting is 
both ‘essential and insufficient, dehumanizing and reparative, nec-
essary and complicated’ (2015, 24). Conscious that numbers play 
an important role in highlighting the devastating effects of contem-
porary violence, drawing attention to the clandestine cemeteries 
overflowing with dead bodies and the hidden hospitals that are filled 
with the victims of war, she nevertheless argues that numbers can 
mask as much as they reveal, stripping away much of the horror and 
the heartache of these conflicts (Nelson 2015, 81). As Peter Greena-
way argues, ‘counting is like taking aspirin – it numbs the senses and 
protects the counter from reality [because it …] makes even hideous 
events bearable’ (quoted in Nelson 2015, 17). The process of counting 
bodies dissociates them from their context, transforming them into 
just another thing that needs to be quantified, enumerated, calcu-
lated. There is no guarantee that simply counting the casualties of 
war will do anything to disrupt the martial logic that renders this 
killing permissible in the first instance, no guarantee that keeping a 
running tally of casualties will make the horrors of war intelligible to 
those of us watching from afar, no guarantee that the publication of a 
daily body count will make the victims seem any more real, any more 
human. As Wilcox reminds us, ‘the enumeration of deaths does not 
necessarily constitute a politics of re-humanizing or “subjectivizing” 
those who have been made into “mere bodies”’ (2015, 163). 
from data to experience
Although it is fraught with various methodological conundrums 
– conundrums that are intensely political – most feminists would 
argue that accumulating data on civilian casualties is the absolute 
bare minimum that needs to be done, a small but essential step that 
can be taken to ensure that there is some level of accountability for 
the harm that is inflicted and that the victims receive some recogni-
tion for their suffering. Yet this demand that the victims are counted 
should always be accompanied by a reminder that numbers are insuf-
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ficient because so much is left on the cutting-room floor. A feminist 
solution to war would not dispense with these body counts, but it 
would also look for a more relational mode of address that does not 
erase the human lives that are lost. In short, feminist scholarship 
reminds us that body counts should be the beginning of the conver-
sation about the costs of war and not the goal. A feminist solution 
cannot treat people like ‘stick figures’ to be classified and counted but 
human beings with feelings, thoughts and emotions (Sylvester 2011). 
The insufficiency of numbers becomes clear when you consider the 
testimony of Zubair and Nabila ur Rehman – two Pakistani children 
who were injured in a drone strike that killed their 67-year-old grand-
mother Mamana Bibi and injured four of their cousins. The children 
had been invited to Washington DC to talk about the impact drones 
were having on their community, although only a small handful of 
lawmakers bothered to attend the session. Zubair, who was only 12 
at the time of the attack, describes how he was picking okra with 
his grandmother when he heard drones hovering overhead, telling 
members of Congress that neither of them felt afraid at first because 
neither of them were militants. When the first drone opened fire, 
he describes how ‘the whole ground shook and black smoke rose up 
[making …] the air smell poisonous’ (quoted in McVeigh 2013). His 
younger sister, who was only eight at the time of the attack, was also 
picking okra when she heard the ‘dum dum noise’ from the drones 
above. She describes the moment the first missile struck, telling law-
makers that ‘everything was dark and I couldn’t see anything. I heard 
a scream – I think it was my grandmother but I couldn’t see her’ 
(quoted in McVeigh 2013). Once the dust had settled, she describes 
how she ventured back out to search for her grandmother, eventu-
ally finding her shoes before discovering ‘her mutilated body a short 
time afterwards’. It had been ‘thrown quite a long distance away by 
the blast and it was in pieces [so…] we collected as many different 
parts from the field [as we could find] and wrapped them in a cloth’ 
(quoted in Amnesty International 2013, 19). 
Simply quantifying the harm inflicted on this fateful morning 
would inevitably mean that much of this context would be stripped 
away. The names of the victims would almost certainly be lost in the 
process, even if some of their demographic details might remain, and 
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the unimaginable terror experienced by the children as they fled the 
scene of the attack – not to mention the unthinkable horror of having 
to piece together the charred and dismembered remains of their dead 
grandmother – would be rendered invisible within the dataset. It 
is unlikely that the victims would register as human beings with a 
unique and rather shocking story to tell because they would simply 
be classified as one dead woman and six injured children when 
entered into the database. The process of quantification also means 
that these specific figures would quickly be subsumed into a much 
bigger dataset, which only adds to distance between the victims and 
those of us who rely on these body counts, further desensitising us 
to their pain. When looked at in isolation the number of civilians 
harmed in this single strike seems rather stark – one dead and at least 
six children injured – but it does not take long before these casualties 
are simply some of the 39 to 70 people who are thought to have been 
killed or injured by drones in Pakistan that month, or the 312 to 622 
people who are thought to have been killed or injured by drones in 
Pakistan that year, or the 3,677 to 5,775 people thought to have been 
killed or injured by drones in Pakistan since records began (Bureau 
of Investigative Journalism 2019).
Data on civilian casualties certainly help to reveal the scale of the 
violence and the sheer number of people affected, but they paint a 
very abstract and strangely disembodied view of war, and one that 
is remarkably devoid of human beings with feelings or thoughts. 
The testimony of Zubair and Nabila shows that a feminist solution 
to counting casualties would need to create space for the voices of 
ordinary civilians, so that they can explain how their lives have been 
affected by this conflict. On the one hand, this testimony works to 
remind us just how brutal war can be, particularly when it comes to 
the destruction or decimation of the human body. While body counts 
provide us with some sense of how many bodies have been killed or 
injured in war, they do not tell us what war actually does to these 
bodies, the fact that many – like the body of Mamana Bibi – are liter-
ally blown to smithereens. The work of the Italian feminist theorist 
Adriana Cavarero (2011, 2) is instructive here as it reminds us that: 
‘while violence against the helpless is becoming global in ever more 
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ferocious forms, language proves unable to renew itself to name it; 
indeed, it tends to mask it’. 
feminist solutions to the body count
The trouble with body counts is they do not create space for this 
horror to be seen – in fact they may inadvertently conceal it by trans-
forming these broken bodies into neat and tidy statistics that retain 
almost no trace of the human beings they are supposed to count. 
Cavarero argues that the language of horror can provide us with a 
conceptual framework that can make sense of this suffering, drawing 
attention to the dehumanising effects of this violence, the fact that 
this violence seems to overshoot the more ‘elementary goal of taking 
a life and dedicates itself to destroying the living being as a singular 
body’ (2011, 12). For Cavarero, contemporary practices of violence 
do not simply kill their victims, but leave them unrecognisable as 
human beings by reducing them to pieces of flesh and bone that first 
have to be collected, sorted and then reassembled before their rela-
tives can give them a proper funeral or burial (see also Gregory 2016). 
At the same time, the testimony of Nabila and Zubair reminds 
us that any feminist solution to war would need to make visible the 
heart-wrenching experiences of those touched by war, drawing atten-
tion to the ways in which this violence impinges upon their lives in 
ways that cannot be captured by numerical measurements alone. As 
well as drawing attention to the way in which these particular modes 
of thought work to obscure the horrors of war, Cavarero also points 
out that they work to objectify, devalue and ultimately dehumanise 
the victims by obscuring any sense of their status as singular beings. 
The reason this matters to feminists like Cavarero is that it high-
lights the violence that is inherent within traditional modes of 
thinking, which often focus on what someone is rather than who 
they are. When it comes to counting civilian casualties, it is clear that 
any attempt to quantify the deaths and injuries caused by war will 
end up erasing the stories of those who are killed or injured, along 
with the stories of those who have lost loved ones as a result of these 
actions. These statistical measures are not interested in the stories of 
those who have been harmed, but only in what they are – they rely 
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on categorising individuals based on whether they are combatants 
or non-combatants, and whether the victims were killed or merely 
injured. There is no space within these spreadsheets for any dis-
cussion about the people who are actually affected by this violence, 
which is why feminist attempts to make these stories visible is so 
important. Even though few people bothered to show up to hear 
Zubair and Nabila tell their story, their mere presence at the congres-
sional hearing can be seen as a kind of performative contradiction, 
a moment when attempts to reduce people to what they are come 
unstuck and we get a glimpse – albeit a very brief one – of who they 
are and how this violence affects their lives. 
Some non-profits have already started to supplement their statisti-
cal assessments with more detailed information about the individuals 
who were killed, including their name and profession, details of their 
deaths and photographs of the scene. When they are unable to find 
a name for those listed in their database, they include photographs 
of their personal effects – including bloodstained backpacks, dusty 
shoes and tattered identity cards – to help humanise the data, pro-
viding us with a brief glimpse of the individual lives lost as a result 
of these operations. Although the voices of those killed remain inau-
dible, these representations give us an opportunity to reflect on the 
violence that is inflicted during war. A feminist approach to counting 
casualties would enable us, therefore, to build a more complete 
picture of the pain and suffering experienced by civilians, enabling 
us to hold militaries more accountable for the death and destruction 
they cause. 
conclusion
Civilian casualty data presents feminists with a bit of a dilemma. 
On the one hand, there is no denying that this data is an important 
weapon in the fight against forgetting, as it provides us with basic 
information about the costs and consequences of war. At the same 
time, feminists are acutely aware that counting anything – including 
casualties – is an intensely political act. When attempting to count the 
costs of war, it is imperative that we pay attention to what is counted 
and what is not counted, because the refusal to count certain costs or 
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include certain costs in the count is one way that the pain and suf-
fering inflicted on civilians is camouflaged, erased or obscured. We 
must also pay close attention to who is conducting these counts and 
how these counts are conducted, examining how certain methodo-
logical choices can work to make this violence more or less visible. 
At the same time, this chapter has warned about how the quantifica-
tion of these costs can objectify, devalue and dehumanise the victims 
of war by transforming them into mere statistics. A feminist solution 
to war needs to move beyond this obsession with quantifying casual-
ties by finding novel and creative ways to acknowledge the individual 
lives lost and the horrifying circumstances surrounding these deaths. 
A feminist solution to war needs to find a way of re-humanising these 
debates by reminding people that every single statistic is an individual 
who has a unique and irreplaceable story to tell (Dauphinee 2007).
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Listen to Women When  
Creating Peace Initiatives 
Laura J. Shepherd
Women have always been centrally involved in peace and war work. 
Despite being systematically overlooked and erased through Western 
Anglophone accounts of peace and war, history includes multiple 
separate, interwoven narratives of women’s work in making, and 
ending, war. In the early 20th century, the efforts of a number of 
women to end war were crystallised in the formation of the Women’s 
International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF) at The Hague 
in 1915. Drawing on, and inspiring, many decades of related peace 
activism, WILPF’s work towards ending war is well documented 
(see, for example, Confortini 2012). In 2000, members of WILPF 
and others were instrumental in advocating the need for feminist 
perspective on conflict within the international body charged with 
the maintenance of peace and security: the United Nations Security 
Council. WILPF’s successful advocacy led to the adoption of a reso-
lution on gender and conflict, centring gender violence as a matter of 
concern to international security. This resolution became the corner-
stone of a thematic agenda on Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) at 
the UN Security Council. There are now ten related resolutions doc-
umenting the ways in which gender matters to peace and security. 
The originary impetus of the WPS agenda – to demilitarise the 
international system and end war – often seems to be forgotten 
(though this forgetting, in turn, can often be read as a wilful for-
getting, or act of deliberate erasure). In this chapter, I explore what 
we learn when we listen to women by providing a reading of the 
WPS agenda as an artefact of feminist knowledge. Focused on the 
WPS agenda, this chapter offers ‘listen to women,’ as a simple but 
Listen to Women
217
profound solution for ending war, one which recognises sustained 
feminist activism and theory as central to creating peace and reiter-
ates the importance of taking women’s perspectives on peace and war 
seriously. 
In this chapter, I begin by providing a brief outline of the WPS 
agenda. I then elaborate on three things we can usefully learn from 
listening to women, from attending closely to women’s activities and 
the knowledge claims that women make, drawn from the experience 
of working on and with the WPS agenda for two decades. The first of 
these three lessons coheres around feminist mobilisation and maxi-
misation of strategic opportunities for political change. The feminist 
peace activists who advocated for the WPS agenda operated from 
the principle that women know war in particular ways – ways that 
have historically been excluded from discussions about how to bring 
about war’s end – and that this knowledge should be taken seriously 
in order to end war. 
The second opportunity to learn relates to collaborative activism 
and the importance of coalition-building. If we listen to, and learn 
from, the way that women organise, we can filter this knowledge 
towards a solution for ending war. The third, and final, element 
resides in learning from the way feminists make connections, not only 
between people but also between different issue areas, and kinds of 
activity. The WPS agenda is sustained by a network of activists, advo-
cates and academics, policy-makers, politicians and practitioners; 
this network values different kinds of knowledge and facilitates con-
nections drawn across theory and practice as well as diverse fields of 
activity. War is complex and unbounded, extending across time and 
space, with plural effects that impact individuals and communities, 
as well as relations between states. Our ability to find ends to war will 
be enabled through our ability to grasp its complexity; ending war 
begins with recognising the intimate and intricate connections that 
together constitute the whole.
the women, peace and security agenda 
As mentioned above, the WPS agenda is formally articulated in 
a series of ten UN Security Council resolutions, a sequence that 
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began in 2000 with the adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 
(UNSCR) 1325. The organisation of the agenda is usually described 
in terms of three or four ‘pillars’: the participation of women in peace 
and security governance; the protection of women’s rights and their 
bodies; the prevention of violence; and a mandate for gender-respon-
sive relief and recovery programming. Beyond the formal architecture, 
however, there is a multitude of implementation, advocacy and 
policy practices that also constitute the agenda as a ‘known object’ in 
contemporary world politics: from NATO’s Bi-Strategic Command 
Directive 40-1, which explains how the WPS resolutions should be 
implemented across NATO activities; to the National Action Plans 
(NAPs) or NAP-like documents that articulate a commitment to 
implementation in 81 states; to the extensive civil society advocacy 
networks that nurture, support and challenge the development of the 
agenda across the world. Knowledge claims manifest not only in the 
stories that we tell about the WPS agenda but also in the provisions 
and principles of the agenda itself, and the practices that are its mode 
of reproduction. 
The WPS agenda is, in origin and practice, a product of feminist 
activism and feminist theory, and it is, in essence, concerned with the 
prevention of conflict – with ending war. I think we can read the WPS 
agenda, in its totality, as an embodiment of feminist activism and 
theory; the agenda would not have come into being without the dedi-
cated efforts of feminist peace activists, and it is an artefact of feminist 
theory because it is motivated by a set of feminist ideas about how 
the world works – how security can be achieved and how wars can 
end. If the WPS agenda, and its attendant provisions and principles, 
were resourced and supported, then the international system would 
be closer to effective conflict prevention. Within the WPS agenda are 
tools and resources to foster peace and security: the emphasis on par-
ticipation within the agenda, for example, is based on recognition of 
the simple fact that including women in peace negotiations produces 
material differences in the kinds of peace achieved. Women’s influ-
ence in negotiations may result in the elaboration and promotion of 
women’s rights in transitional justice processes, or increased support 
for women’s land ownership. Meanwhile, the emphasis on women’s 
engagement in conflict prevention values the peace-building and 
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violence prevention work that women do, often informally and at the 
community level, as part of the process of bringing about an end to 
war more globally. In order to develop feminist solutions for ending 
war, I thus propose that we listen to women. 
why listen to women?
There are many ways in which listening to women will move us closer 
to solutions for ending war. In this section, I propose that we should 
listen to women because women know (about peace, war, and eve-
rything in between and outside of these often arbitrary categories), 
women organise (formally and informally, in politics, peace-mak-
ing, and post-conflict reconstruction and beyond), and women make 
connections (across and between communities of all different kinds: 
intellectual, geographical, and those based on kinship). These ways of 
knowing and doing are integral to creating meaningful peace. 
Women know
Preceding the formalisation of the WPS agenda, women have devel-
oped and mobilised knowledges – often marginalised, feminist, 
Indigenous and subaltern knowledges – about peace and security. 
These knowledges have routinely and consistently been undervalued, 
systematically devalued, through and as a result of the imbrication of 
racialised and gendered power in the institutions that validate and 
sustain knowledge. As Chandra Talpade Mohanty explains, subal-
tern knowledge is positioned as Other, as lesser; the producers of 
such knowledge – ‘third-world women’ – are positioned as objects 
to be gazed upon by ‘Western eyes’, rather than agents of knowledge 
production: 
in the context of the hegemony of the western scholarly estab-
lishment in the production and dissemination of texts, and in 
the context of the legitimating imperative of humanistic and sci-
entific discourse, the definition of ‘the third-world woman’ as a 
monolith might well tie into the larger economic and ideological 
praxis of ‘disinterested’ scientific inquiry and pluralism which are 
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the surface manifestations of a latent economic and cultural colo-
nization of the ‘non-western’ world. (Mohanty 1988, 82) 
The subjugation of kinds of knowing cannot be separated from 
the use and application of ways of knowing to shore up systems of 
domination through time. ‘The ways in which scientific research is 
implicated in the worst excesses of colonialism remains a powerful 
remembered history for many of the world’s colonized peoples’ 
(Tuhiwai Smith 2012, 1). The reproduction of binary oppositions – 
researcher/researched, knower/known, subject/object – through the 
production of knowledge in service of ‘Western civilization’ (Tuhiwai 
Smith 2012, 62–7) creates subject positions in which coloniser and 
colonised are interpellated and from which it is, or is not, possible to 
speak with authority and have one’s story heard. It is to this reproduc-
tive knowledge economy that Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak gestures 
when she proposes that ‘the subtext of the palimpsestic narrative of 
imperialism be recognized as “subjugated knowledge”’ (1988, 25). 
We must quiet the will to dominate the conversation about peace 
and war, recognise different knowledges and ways of knowing, and 
listen attentively to those historically subjugated knowledges and 
subordinated subjects. In doing so, we will learn – not only about 
peace and war but about power, because ‘it takes resources and access 
to be “heard” when and where it matters’, and ‘the actual amount and 
amazing variety of powers that are required to keep the voices on the 
margins from having the right language and enough volume to be 
heard in the centre … are never fully tallied’ (Enloe 1996, 187–8). 
Without an understanding of power in knowledge production and 
the perpetuation of claims about the validity of certain kinds of 
knowledge over others, we cannot begin to identify the problems of 
war, let alone form its solution. And we can learn about power, and 
knowledge, from listening to women. 
From listening to women, we can learn about how to mobilise 
feminist knowledges and strategically mobilise to challenge ‘pale, 
male, and stale’, hierarchically organised, blinkered, and gender-
blind security organisations such as the UN Security Council. We 
can learn about how to value and amplify different forms of knowl-
edge, to think differently about expertise. One of the foundational 
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assumptions embedded in the WPS agenda is the fact that women – 
diverse women – know peace and security differently. Their expertise 
on peace and security cannot be ‘tacked on’ to existing, state-centric, 
narrow and militarised visions of what peace and security means, 
because to recognise the validity of their knowledge claims is to 
espouse a thoroughly transformed and transformative vision of peace 
and security. 
Up until the adoption of UNSCR 1325, the UN Security Council 
had not paid any attention at all to the fact that gender matters to 
peace and security concerns. Carol Cohn explains that ‘the SC is at 
the center of UN power. Not coincidentally, it is also an overwhelm-
ingly male and masculinist domain, devoted to the “hardcore” issue 
of military threats to international peace and security’ (2008, 186). 
The story of the WPS agenda, therefore, is a gendered story of women 
pushing at the door of ‘the master’s house’ (Lorde 1984, 110). Cohn 
and others elaborate persuasively on what a significant achieve-
ment it was for advocates to get the issue of ‘women and peace and 
security’ on to the agenda of the UN Security Council at the turn of 
the 21st century. Those involved have written about how the women 
– as individuals and as representatives of civil society organisations 
from across the world – mobilised feminist knowledges to disrupt the 
conservative space of the Security Council. Sanam Naraghi Ander-
lini, for example, recalls: ‘We were offering an alternative, or a new 
opening as a pathway to adapt the institutions better to the changing 
nature of warfare: Women in civil society build peace. They can make 
a difference. Work with them’ (Naraghi Anderlini 2019, 43, emphasis 
in original). 
Relatedly, from women’s activism around the WPS agenda, we 
can learn about how to strategically seize political opportunities, to 
identify and work with allies, and to lobby, canvas and advocate not 
only for the big things – like the new mechanisms of international 
governance, or new forms of national policy – but also for the little 
things, like making sure that gender isn’t used as a synonym for 
women in those policy documents. Feminists historically have been 
admirably strategic in their forms of political engagement, taking 
advantage of moments of possibility and using those moments to 
leverage lasting change. Scholars of political change refer to ‘political 
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opportunity structures’ to describe those windows of opportunity 
that open, politically, to enable new perspectives to inform existing 
debates or areas of political practice. The efforts of allies demanding 
the Security Council take seriously the WPS agenda took place in the 
broader context of shifting ideas about security at the UN and beyond. 
At the end of the 20th century, critical interventions by the above-
mentioned bearers of marginalised knowledges challenged the 
international community’s focus on traditional notions of state-cen-
tred security (where the state is also seen in conventional terms as 
a territory with defined borders and a population to be governed). 
This ‘state-centric’ view shifted towards the idea of ‘human security’, 
which focused on the different forms of insecurity that exist in the 
world. Human security sees the referent object of security – the thing 
that needs to be made secure – as the human individual rather than 
the state. Human security discourse and practice was the result of the 
international community taking seriously women’s knowledge about 
(in)security. Those feminist activists working on the nascent WPS 
agenda recognised the political significance of this shift in security 
thinking. They identified this moment as an opportunity to inte-
grate long-held concerns for women’s human rights in conflict and 
conflict-affected settings with ideas about how to prevent further 
violence and insecurity in those contexts. Recognising that the UN 
Security Council – and the UN more broadly – was ‘primed’ to listen 
to ideas about women’s rights in relation to discussions about peace 
and security was an integral part of successful advocacy for what 
became the WPS agenda. 
Women organise
One of the key things that we are learning from listening to women, and 
carefully observing their political activism, is that they have sophis-
ticated and powerful modes of organising for peace. The adoption 
of UNSCR 1325, and the subsequent development of the thematic 
agenda item on ‘women and peace and security’ into a complex gov-
ernance system that we have come to know as the WPS agenda, relied 
on mobilisation and maximising political opportunities. There is no 
doubt that this represented significant, and concerted, collective 
Listen to Women
223
effort. Even if we limit the window of historical enquiry to just the 
few weeks prior to the adoption of UNSCR 1325, we can identify 
multiple forms and vectors of collaboration: between female civil 
society representatives and their constituencies within their coun-
tries of origin; between those representatives and staff at UN Women; 
between all of those people and the staff at various country missions 
(notably the missions of Jamaica, Namibia and Bangladesh) at the 
UN in New York. These people – all involved in ways large and small 
with the drafting and eventual adoption of UNSCR 1325, all of whom 
had identified that this was the right time to be pushing this agenda 
forward and to be seeking to effect real political change in the field 
of peace and security – organised around this issue because they felt 
a sense of real investment, of ownership. One such activist explains: 
‘SCR 1325 is our tool, the tool of women’s peace activists and human 
rights non-governmental organisations (NGOs). It was our idea, not 
the Security Council’s, and it is our efforts that have given it life since 
its adoption’ (Ruby 2014, 181).
We can learn from women’s organisations, from their political 
movements. We can learn about how to work collaboratively and 
effectively even where there are profound differences of perspective 
and priorities, and we can learn how to respect and harness those dif-
ferences to create better policy and advocacy platforms. The working 
group of NGOs that cohered around the WPS issues that they wanted 
to see embedded in a Security Council resolution were by no means 
united on all of those issues, nor were the demands of the commu-
nities they represented necessarily aligned, but they found a way to 
work together to achieve something that they could all believe in. 
In surfacing the possibility of learning from women’s organising, I 
do not mean to erase the many tensions and vectors of exclusion 
that inform and shape women’s movements globally and historically. 
Much disservice is done to the struggles for voice and representation 
within cis-heteronormative and racist institutions if idealised myths 
about harmony within feminist peace activism are perpetuated. For 
example, the ‘origin stories’ of the adoption of UNSCR 1325 fre-
quently exclude the formative and profound influence that African 
women and women’s organisations had on the emergent agenda. 
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The agenda is frequently traced back to the Fourth World Con-
ference on Women in Beijing in 1995 and the outcome document, 
the Beijing Platform for Action; the Platform for Action included a 
chapter on gender and armed conflict, which is often sighted and 
cited as the foundation of UNSCR 1325. What is frequently missing 
from the citation and recitation of the Beijing Platform for Action as a 
linchpin of the WPS agenda, however, is any acknowledgement that 
‘Africa was the source and venue for the establishment of the type of 
principles and policies articulated in UNSCR 1325 even before the 
emergence of this UN resolution on women’ (Diop 2011, 173). While 
mention is made in the origin story of the WPS agenda of the influ-
ence of the Windhoek Conference, held in Namibia in May 2000, the 
subsequent Declaration, and the Namibia Plan of Action on Main-
streaming a Gender Perspective in Multidimensional Peace Support 
Operations, it does not enjoy nearly as central a role in the narrative 
as the Beijing Platform for Action. Moreover, the Windhoek Decla-
ration is articulated as part of the documentary heritage of UNSCR 
1325 in the Preamble of the resolution itself but, unlike the Beijing 
Platform for Action, is never mentioned again in the policy architec-
ture of the agenda. 
In combination with the elision of time between March and October 
in many narratives of UNSCR 1325, the writing-out of Windhoek 
and the failure to cite the African Platform for Action (adopted in 
1994) as the primary inspiration for the Beijing Platform for Action 
represents place and race in the WPS story in not altogether unprob-
lematic ways; although Beijing was a ‘world conference’, it took place 
at a time at which some feminist collectives and organisations in the 
global South were expressing concern ‘about the imposition of what is 
perceived as an external agenda, and about whose interests are served 
by the [gender] mainstreaming project’ (Baden and Goetz 1997, 10). 
Further, differences in political preparedness and positional author-
ity meant that women of colour in Beijing were not necessarily able 
to contribute to the deliberations and the outcome document as fully 
as other groups of women (Dutt 1996, 527). Thus, the incantation 
of Beijing invokes not only a particular policy platform – and it is 
important to remember that the Platform for Action was ultimately 
negotiated by government representatives – but a temporal linkage 
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to the other UN conferences in the series, a spatial linkage through 
attachment to the UN, and a racialisation of the agenda that positions 
African feminists as supplicants to the UN Security Council rather 
than drivers of this agenda. 
But we can learn from this whitewashing of the WPS agenda’s 
history. We can recognise the need to organise differently, and more 
inclusively, in order to make space for different perspectives and to 
make visible different knowledges. It is essential that the ‘we’ here is 
an inclusive collective, mindful of differences between women and 
their experiences – differences that do not, importantly, preclude 
collective political action, as I elaborate below. This is not a new 
challenge for feminist knowledge and praxis. Feminist philosophers 
have often questioned the integrity and coherence of the subject of 
‘woman’. Contestation over who counts as a woman, and on whose 
behalf rights as a woman can therefore be claimed, has been a feature 
of the landscape in feminist theory for over two centuries; as Lisa 
Tilley reminds us, ‘within white feminism the category of “woman” 
has always been a tightly bordered one’ (2018, n.p.). Transgressing 
those borders and thinking about women in an inclusive, intersec-
tional way that is respectful of all modes of self-identification can 
form the basis of a feminist politics. Until we recognise the instabil-
ity and mutability of the subject of ‘woman’, however, we risk carrying 
with us in our peace work a residual essentialism that reproduces 
particular configurations of overlapping and interconnected white, 
cis, hetero and male privilege. The demand for a coherent subject on 
whose behalf rights are claimed can be a way of undermining feminist 
political movements. Celebrating diversity and, at times, incoherence 
can be a way of finding unity in difference. 
Diverse need not mean divided, and the acknowledgement of 
women’s differences is a necessary precondition for the meaningful 
participation of women in politics. Mobilising this knowledge can 
create new collectives, new forms of organisation, and new political 
possibilities, including the possibility of finding solutions to end war. 
Activists and WPS advocates are vigorously organising to challenge 
the idea that descriptive representation is enough in peace-making, 
peace-building, and post-conflict reconstruction. The questions of 
which women are present, and how they substantively represent the 
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interests and priorities of their communities, are of primary signifi-
cance. We are learning how to avoid the assumption that just because 
a woman is female-identified by medical discourse, she herself 
identifies as a woman, and, further, can speak for all women. Coa-
lition-building, and collective action involving the collaboration of 
diverse women in respectful and inclusive ways is a challenging way 
of doing political work, but it is essential to learn how to know and 
organise differently if we are going to achieve different outcomes 
than have been achieved throughout history. Thinking about the 
subject of ‘woman’ in an inclusive, intersectional way that is respect-
ful of all modes of self-identification can draw from feminist theory 
and practice. 
Women make connections
Thinking carefully, and empathetically, about difference, involves 
– perhaps seemingly paradoxically – making connections across 
communities, across borders both physical and intellectual. While 
‘organising’ is action-focused, making connections is about the 
process of ‘joining the dots’, a process for which feminists – being so 
attuned to the workings of multiple forms of power – have a particu-
lar talent. Feminist peace research has, for many decades, charted the 
establishment and consolidation of connections across intellectual, 
ethnic, community and national boundaries by women working for 
peace and resolution to conflict. 
The challenge is to see how differences allow us to explain the 
connections and border crossings better and more accurately, how 
specifying difference allows us to theorise universal concerns more 
fully. It is this intellectual move that allows for my concern for women 
of different communities and identities to build coalitions and soli-
darities across borders (Mohanty 2003, 505). 
Thus, third and finally, from women’s advocacy for the WPS agenda 
(which again I am reading here as an artefact of feminist activism and 
theory), I think we can learn how to make the connections between 
different forms of inequality, different forms of injustice, and differ-
ent forms of violence. 
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Activists and researchers working on WPS issues are, for example, 
making the connections between domestic violence policy-setting 
agendas within the state – the reduced funding available for effec-
tive programme development and delivery, and the deprioritisation 
of domestic violence as a political issue during the average election 
campaign cycle – and that same state’s commitments to, and lavish 
funding of, violence prevention in conflict-affected settings overseas. 
This example is specifically grounded in critique of the UK govern-
ment’s reduction in funding allocated to domestic violence crisis 
centres across the UK, which happened in tandem with the much-
publicised (and expensive) Global Summit to End Sexual Violence in 
Conflict held in London in June 2014, part of the Preventing Sexual 
Violence Initiative championed by former Foreign Secretary Lord 
William Hague and UN Special Envoy Angelina Jolie. British feminists 
and others are mobilising and organising, drawing these connections 
and holding those in power accountable for the outcomes that flow 
from these policy decisions.
Women doing peace work also build coalitions and draw connec-
tions across issue areas. Ending war means ending war economies, 
and so peace work has to take into consideration not just the recon-
figuration of formal and informal political institutions but also 
the redistribution of resources, including rights to land and water, 
support to engage in small- and large-scale economic activity, and 
education. At the transnational level, WPS advocates are connecting 
the WPS agenda to other important platforms: first, the Convention 
on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination against Women 
(CEDAW) – General Recommendation 30 of which now requires 
states to report to the CEDAW Committee on the work they are doing 
to support women’s rights in conflict and conflict-affected areas – 
and secondly, the Sustainable Development Goals (particularly Goal 
5 on gender equality and Goal 16 on peace, justice, and strong insti-
tutions). Nationally, regionally and internationally, women working 
for peace are using social media and digital technologies to foster and 
strengthen connections. 
Activists and researchers working on WPS issues are beginning to 
understand, and work to mitigate, the gendered, racialised and sexu-
alised exercise of power that perpetuates hierarchies of authority in 
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peace and security governance. They are drawing attention to exclu-
sions of people and their lived experiences – for example, the lack 
of consideration given to lesbian, gay, bisexual, and trans people in 
the majority of WPS policy actions. Activists also flag exclusion-
ary themes and issues – for example, the omission of reproductive 
rights from the core of the WPS agenda, even though the protection 
of these rights is essential for bodily autonomy and integrity. There 
are numerous examples of WPS activists, advocates and researchers 
making those connections, across national boundaries, across issue 
areas, and across institutions, in pursuit of ending war and prevent-
ing violence of all kinds, to all kinds: human and non-human alike. 
Learning from women making connections broadens our perspec-
tive on peace work and enables holistic and relational perspectives 
on ending war.
ending war
Preventing violence is complex, ending war much more so. A lot of 
violence prevention work outside of feminist spaces looks solely at 
disarmament, or solely at organisational power, or solely at deter-
rence. The feminist activism and theory that is embedded in the WPS 
agenda, in all its glorious diversity, is complex and clever, and draws 
together connections between disparate forms of violence to explore 
how such violence can be prevented. The meaningful and consistent 
participation of diverse groups of women, and the protection of the 
rights of all women in all circumstances, are inextricably linked to the 
prevention of violence. The WPS agenda renders visible those con-
nections, across a multitude of contexts and in an endless variety of 
ways. These different knowledges are of critical significance. Under-
standing the racialised and gendered hierarchies of knowledge that 
have precluded the recognition of these knowledges as knowledge 
will help us further our engagement with the racialised and gendered 
discourses that perpetuate peacelessness. I would even argue that 
now it is difficult to think through violence prevention, to venture 
solutions to war ideologies and war fighting, without taking seriously 
the issues around which the WPS agenda coheres: without listening 
to women. Listening to women – paying close attention to women’s 
Listen to Women
229
knowledge claims, of all kinds – is essential to efforts at ending war. 
Listening to women ensures a peace that is inclusive and expansive, 
a peace that is attuned to the operation of power. A gender-blind, 
exclusionary, narrow vision of peace and security is a thin and meagre 
vision indeed.
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